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Abstract 
 
Although there has been a wealth of academic literature which has examined 
counter-terrorism, both in the general sense and in case study focused 
approaches, there has seldom been an engagement in terrorism studies 
literature on the nature of the state itself and how this impacts upon the 
particular response to terrorism.  Existing literature has a tendency to either 
examine one branch of the state or to treat (explicitly or implicitly) the state as 
a unitary actor.   
This thesis challenges the view of the state as a unitary actor, looking beneath 
the surface of the state, investigating intra-state dynamics and the 
consequences for counter-terrorism.  I highlight that the state by its nature is 
‘peopled’, demonstrating through comparative analysis of case studies from 
Spain, France, and the United Kingdom, how the individual identities and 
dispositions of state personnel at all levels from elites to entry level positions 
determine the nature and characteristics of particular states.   
I show that if we accept that the state is peopled, we must pay attention to a 
series of traits that I argue all states exhibit to understand why campaigns of 
counter-terrorism take the shape and form that they do.  I posit that we must 
understand the role that emotional and visceral action by state personnel in 
response to terrorism plays, how the character of particular state 
organisations can impact upon the trajectory of conflicts, and how issues of 
intra-state competition and coordination can frustrate even the best laid 
counter-terrorism strategies.  Furthermore, I show how the propensity for sub-
state political violence to ‘terrorise’ populations makes the response to 
terrorism a powerful political tool, and how it has been deployed in the past for 
political gain rather than purely as an instrument to improve security.   
I conclude that future academic analyses of counter-terrorism must take this 
into consideration, and likewise, state personnel must be mindful of the nature 
and character of their state should they wish to effectively prevent terrorism 
and protect human rights and the rule of law.!
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Introduction 
 
Since at least the French Revolution, the concepts of terrorism and the modern state 
have been intimately linked.1  Indeed, more often than not, terrorism has been a tool 
of states, attempting in desperation to control their populations and maintain their 
control.  At other times, the state has been both the direct target of terrorism, with 
terrorist attacks perpetrated against state personnel and state institutions, and an 
indirect target, as sub-state actors sought to coerce the actions of the state through 
violence carried out against non-state targets.  And yet, even in cases where the 
state is a target rather than the perpetrator of terrorism, the actions of the state in 
response have the propensity to create much more dramatic and long-standing 
effects, for better or for worse, than the actions of non-state terrorist actors. Paul 
Wilkinson acknowledged that terrorism perpetrated by the state is ‘far more lethal and 
large-scale than that of sub-state actors, and it is notoriously difficult for international 
opinion to alleviate or prevent large-scale violation of human rights by states.’2  
Despite this acknowledgement of the centrality of the state to terrorism, both as 
perpetrators and (direct and indirect) targets, there has been a widespread failure on 
the part of academics to integrate understandings of the state itself into explanations 
of terrorism.  Academic research on terrorism has overwhelmingly been focused in 
one direction: upon sub-state perpetrators of terrorism, and on taking an instrumental 
concern with the measures that governments should adopt to deal with it.3   
 
                                                 
1 See T. Wilson, ‘State Terrorism: An Historical Overview’ in G. Duncan, O. Lynch, G. Ramsay, and 
A.M.S Watson, (eds.) State Terrorism and Human Rights: International Responses Since the End of 
the Cold War (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), pp. 14-28, B. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (revised edn.), (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2006), p. 4, and M. Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes 
Processes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 21.  
2 P. Wilkinson, ‘Ethical Defences of Terrorism - Defending the Indefensible’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 1/1, (1989), p.10. 
3 It should be noted however that while state terrorism and state-sponsorship of terrorism are under 
represented, there is a body of work which seeks to address such issues.  See for example, G. 
Duncan, O. Lynch, G. Ramsay, and A.M.S Watson, State Terrorism and Human Rights: International 
Responses Since the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Routledge, 2013), D. Byman, Deadly Connections: 
States That Sponsor Terrorism (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), R. Jackson, E. 
Murphy, and S. Poynting, (eds.), Contemporary State Terrorism: Theory and Practice (London: 
Routledge, 2010), R. Blakeley, State Terrorism and Neoliberalism: The North in the South, (Oxford: 
Routledge, 2009), M, Stohl, and G.A. Lopez, (eds.), The State as Terrorist: The Dynamics of 
Governmental Repression and Violence (London: Aldwych, 1984), J.A Sluka, (ed.) Death Squad: The 
Anthropology of State Terrorism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000). 
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The trend of neglecting the state in discussing terrorism has persisted despite (and 
perhaps has even been exacerbated by), the surge in interest in terrorism that has 
occurred since the attacks of 11 September 2001.  In the clamour to explain and 
understand the motivations and ideologies of terrorists and how they can be 
defeated, most academics have eschewed rigorous examination of the nature and 
character of the state.  This omission becomes all the more pronounced when we 
consider that, despite the emergence of transatlantic and international cooperation 
with regards to defending against terrorism, it is still the state which is the primary 
actor when it comes to countering terrorism from sub-state groups.  This thesis will 
complement the existing literature on terrorism by putting the state under the 
microscope as our principal focus. It will show how thinking not just about the 
terrorists themselves, but the states which they seek to coerce or destroy is essential 
for balanced, reasoned and holistic understandings of terrorism and political violence.  
I will highlight how understanding the nature of the modern state and the character of 
particular states faced with challenges from the threat or actuality of terrorist violence, 
can illuminate and explain more fully the trajectories of conflicts and the effectiveness 
of responses to terrorism.  I will do so through the systematic and rigorous analyses 
of case studies, and by focusing more than is customary in the terrorism studies 
literature on the concept of the state.  Through this, it will pinpoint factors determining 
the shape, outcome and effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts historically, 
presently, and in the future.  
 
The particular case studies I will address will be, the conflict between the Spanish 
state and the Basque separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), the French 
state’s struggle to subdue the activities of Organisation l’Armee Secrete (OAS) in 
French Algeria and France, and the engagement of the United Kingdom state in the 
Northern Ireland conflict, primarily against the Irish Republican Army (IRA).    It is not 
my contention that the terrorist organisations in question, the states that are 
attempting to defeat them, or the wider historical context into which these conflicts 
emerge are carbon copies of each other.  Rather, these case studies at times share 
what we might call ‘family resemblances’.  The ways in which these case studies 
differ from each other is in many instances just as illuminating as where they are 
similar. The case studies I will examine have been carefully selected based on 
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recognition of deficiencies in the literature. It is my hope that in using these cases, my 
thesis will go some way to addressing other substantial problems in the literature. At 
first glance, two of these cases, the Northern Ireland and Basque case studies, 
appear more alike than the case of the French response to the OAS in Algeria.  It has 
however been noted in the past that there are often overlooked differences between 
the Northern Ireland and Basque conflicts.4 Complexities of the cases are frequently 
ignored for the sake of comparative work, but the histories of state development and 
the political atmosphere in which these two campaigns of political violence were 
fought mean that they are quite far from being the same conflict transposed into two 
different settings.  While the French state response to the OAS has features that set 
it apart from the Basque and Northern Ireland cases in terms of the raison d’etre of 
the principal protagonist under examination, all three share similar features.  In some 
respects, we might say that each of these cases represent attempts by violent 
organisations to undermine the legitimacy of the state and to force their own political 
agenda in a situation where there has been a partial failure of state building.  
Whatever the differences between ETA, IRA and OAS, the focus in this instance is 
the state, and the goal is to examine what we can usefully say about how state’s 
respond to terrorism in instances such as these. 
 
The importance of a renewed focus on the state 
 
Discussions of terrorism in the terrorism studies literature, as well as in the wider 
political science and international relations literature often neglect to comment on the 
state.    As stated, this might in part be a symptom of the ‘state centric priorities’5 
recognised by Jackson, and in the literature post-9/11 it may stem from the 
eagerness to explain and understand the threat from Islamic fundamentalism and 
address a threat perceived to be imminent, that the need for analysis and 
consideration of the state and its impact on terrorism campaigns was spoken about 
only in an instrumental sense.  Furthermore, where counter-terrorism is discussed, 
scholars appear to fall into the trap of discussing ‘government’ and ‘government 
policy’ in a way which reveals some assumptions which shape the nature of the 
                                                 
4 J. Argomaniz and A. Vidal-Diez, ‘Examining Deterrence and Backlash Effects in Counter-Terrorism: 
The Case of ETA’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 27/1 (2015), p. 162. 
5 R. Jackson, ‘The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies’, European Political Science, 6/3, 
(2007), p.245. 
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debate.  To talk about counter-terrorism in terms of government alone, reveals the 
assumption that it is policy as set by those at the upper echelons of the state that is 
the key to ensuring the success of counter-terrorism efforts.  In other cases, studies 
have investigated the role of other branches of the state, usually the coercive arms of 
the state in the form of the police and military, but amongst these works, seldom is 
there a consideration of how these state organisations sit within the wider state.  
Furthermore, the focus is still overwhelmingly on the policies and protocols that these 
organisations work with, rather than any meaningful investigation of the character of 
these organisations and how this might affect the outcome of counter-terrorism 
efforts. Without a consideration of the entire state apparatus with responsibility for 
combating terrorism, and an awareness of the roles played by state organisations, 
how they interact with each other, and an understanding of the overall nature of 
states, we miss opportunities to gain a more meaningful insight into what drives and 
shapes counter-terrorism, and crucially, how this impacts upon its effectiveness. As 
Martin Miller points out, the prevalence of non-state terrorism is predicated upon the 
presence of both state and terrorists, and to focus solely on one and not the other 
‘obscures the fact that both are, however incommensurately, in some way 
responsible’.6   
 
The State is notoriously difficult to define, and indeed, we may wonder as Andreas 
Anter asks whether such a constantly changing, abstract and complex structure can 
be reduced to one clear concept. 7  The emergence of the modern state through time 
was a project of centralisation; an attempt to relocate political and social power from 
the multiple sites and varied relationships that were characteristic of feudal society, to 
a single site.  The impetus for this development was the perceived need to control 
capital and the activity of populations which would enable states to more effectively 
wage war against their enemies in the shape of neighbouring and competing states.8   
 
However, the need for a more productive population to increase the material wealth 
of the state required the state to develop agencies to monitor its citizens, with a view 
                                                 
6 M. A. Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism: State, Society and the Dynamics of Political 
Violence, (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 3. 
7 A. Anter, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State: Origins, Structure and Significance 
(Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan: 2014), p. 9. 
8 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1990, (Oxford; Blackwell, 1990), p. 25. 
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to promoting and improving their health and education and to regulate their economic 
activities.  As Poggi put it, ‘a bigger, busier, more productive, better educated, 
happier population would yield greater revenues, and thus indirectly increase the 
state’s military might’.9  The expansion of the state in this way in modernity to 
controlling vast territories, huge populations and executing a wide array of duties 
required a much deeper penetration by the state into society.10  Furthermore, the 
state apparatus that was developed was specialised, with division of labour between 
the institutions, with each one taking on a particular set of competences concerned 
with the ‘distributive, regulatory, compensatory, and adjudicative activities’. 11 
 
The widening remit of state responsibility and the deeper penetration required for 
effective state control of capital and ensuring the happiness, healthiness and thus 
productivity of the population meant that the exercise of power had to be delegated to 
subsidiary state organisations, with diverse competences as a result of the division of 
labour.12  Paradoxically, in the pursuit of greater centralisation of power, the state 
elites found they had to delegate power to subsidiary state organisations.  Overall, 
state leaders may have nominal control over the direction that the state takes, but 
state power is administered on a daily basis through the range of organisations which 
constitute the full breadth of the state.  Today, each state owes its character and 
idiosyncrasies to this history of development and emergence.  The facets of 
individual states can be seen as the product of the state’s experience of struggle and 
bargaining with the range of classes and interests that occurred during the 
accumulation and concentration of capital, and the power of coercion, 13 and indeed, 
continues to be shaped by this process. The modern state has not reached some 
pre-determined end point, but rather is in a continual state of flux, and emergence.14  
The changing nature of the state over time means that more attention needs to be 
paid to the historical development of the state as a whole and to each of the state 
                                                 
9 G. Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects, (Stanford, CA; Stanford University 
Press, 1990), p. 66. 
10 C. Pierson, The Modern State, (3rd edn), (London; Routledge, 2011), p. 46  
11 C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, p.29. 
12 G. Poggi, The State: Its Nature, Development and Prospects, p. 66. 
13 Ibid, p.26. 
14 R. Jones, People/States/Territories: The Political Geographies of British State Transformation 
(Oxford; Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p.45. 
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organisations, if we are to understand the dynamics of how the contemporary state 
approaches counter-terrorism.  
 
It might seem an obvious point to say that all states are ‘human communities’.  The 
state is incomprehensible apart from through the people who fill its offices and carry 
out state action.  It is through state personnel that the citizens of any state will 
experience it and the associated power on a daily basis.15  However, rather than 
simply a base recognition that the state relies on human endeavour to make it 
function, interrogating what this means for state action is crucially important.  In our 
context, the focus will be on how this has an impact on and shapes counter-terrorism 
efforts, but these issues are as cogent for all forms of foreign and domestic activities 
of the state.  That the state is fundamentally an organisation of people, has been 
called by Rhys Jones, the ‘peopled’ nature of the state.16  Jones offers a critique of 
the traditional Weberian understanding of the state.  Max Weber recognised the state 
as a ‘human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use 
of physical force within a given territory’.17  Furthermore, Weber recognised the 
importance in some instances of the personal attributes and charisma of the state 
leader in shaping the state and ensuring its survival and success, through securing 
the legitimation of the state.18  While Weber implicitly acknowledges the plurality of 
the state, speaking about ‘orders’ rather than ‘order’, which are multiple, 
‘heterogeneous, competing orders’,19 he pays little attention to the importance of 
understanding the effect that personal attributes and identities have in shaping the 
state in its entirety, instead choosing to focus solely on the elite level of the state 
leader.  Weber’s assertion that state personnel are well trained and conditioned to be 
obedient and carry out their duties, with incentives to ensure their compliance meant 
that for him any sense of the individual was ‘subsumed within the professional and 
technical state bureaucracy.’20  As such, while Weber recognises the state as a 
human community, he does so only in a narrow sense.  The functionaries of the 
modern state in Weber’s understanding of the state only demonstrate qualities and 
                                                 
15 C. Pierson, The Modern State, p.4 
16 R. Jones, People/States/Territories, p.44. 
17 M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, (trans.), H.H. Gerth, and C.W. Mills, (London: 
Routledge, 1991), p. 78. 
18 Ibid, pp. 79- 80. 
19 A. Anter, Max Weber’s Theory of the Modern State, p. 17. 
20 R. Jones, People/States/Territories, pp. 23-4. 
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identities as a group.21  While the power holder relies on state apparatus (state 
organisations or ‘estates’), which are wholly or partly’ autonomously controlled by the 
administrative staff within them, they are ‘bound by obedience to the power-holder’.22  
In contrast, Jones’ interpretation of the ‘peopled’ state is much broader.  He argues 
that state personnel ‘possess a variety of different identities, subjectivities and 
prejudices’ and that ‘state personnel have always played an active role on the 
continual emergence of the state’.23   
 
The issue is a complex one, which Jones recognises, highlighting how depending on 
the position within the state, the individual will have a varying capacity to shape the 
state itself, and reciprocally, the state can shape the identities of state personnel, 
with some individuals being more inclined than others to become part of the ‘habitus 
of state bureaucracies’.24  Jones recognises the importance of state apparatus as the 
institutionalisation of state power, but highlights that these state organisations are in 
themselves, ‘the product of decisions and priorities of state personnel’.25  Indeed, the 
use of the term habitus, by Jones raises an important point.  Pierre Bourdieu has 
described habitus as:   
 
structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that 
is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and 
representations which can be objectively "regulated' and "regular" without 
in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to 
their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends of an express 
mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this. 
collectively orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating 
action of a conductor.26 
 
Bourdieu goes on to highlight that habitus means that practice or action lies 
somewhere between ‘mechanical reaction, directly determined by the antecedent 
                                                 
21 Ibid, p.22. 
22 M. Weber, From Max Weber, pp. 80-1. 
23 R. Jones, People/States/Territories, p. 45. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid. 
26 P. Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, (trans. R. Nice), (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1977), p. 72. 
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conditions’ and ‘creative free will’.27  He highlights that of course habitus might be 
accompanied by a ‘strategic calculation’ but that ‘these responses are defined first in 
relation to a system of objective potentialities, immediately inscribed in the present’ 
and falls short of deliberation with regards to the future.28  Thus for Jones, state 
personnel may be more or less likely, depending on the individual and the 
circumstances to become enveloped in the state habitus, with action representing the 
product of something less than creative free will and yet more than simply the 
automatic action proscribed by antecedent conditions. 
 
This understanding of the modern state, which takes account of the agency, identity, 
prejudices, and subjectivities of state personnel in an individual and collective sense, 
is useful for illuminating and explaining state action.  If the state as an institution is 
not immune to being shaped by those who compose it, then it does not logically 
follow that the state can be a rational actor.  It also makes little sense to talk about 
the state as if it were a unitary actor.  Instead, in attempting to understand state 
action, it is critically important that we recognise the states as an amalgam, or loose 
coalition of organisations.  Furthermore, each state organisation, being composed of 
people, is both shaped by the individual identities and actions of those personnel, 
and in turn, shapes the identity and actions of these personnel.  If we accept this 
explanation of the development of the modern state, along with the importance of its 
peopled nature, then it stands to sense that to view the state as a unitary and rational 
actor, making only purposive acts is a naive view which obscures potentially more 
accurate, and at any rate, more fruitful understandings of state action.  Relating to 
sub-state political violence then, the idea that what is required by states is simply to 
find the right combination of counter-terrorism policies, to increase security 
measures, and to harden infrastructure and places that might represent attractive 
targets is misguided.  State elites must engage in introspection, examining the state 
apparatus, and recognise the contingency of terrorism and the potential for state 
actions to exacerbate rather than quell political violence. The task of putting the entire 
state’s approach to terrorism is an unwieldy one, perhaps explaining why so few 
scholars have attempted to put the whole state under the microscope, chosing 
instead to focus on one particular branch or another.  As already noted, the state is 
                                                 
27 Ibid, p. 73. 
28 Ibid, p. 76. 
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composed of a multitude of organisations, and depending on their function, they will 
have more or less involvement with the practicalities of responding to and dealing 
with terrorism and political violence.  It is my aim in this thesis, to study the state in 
terms of the organisations that have foremost responsibility for dealing with political 
violence, (the executive branch of government, the security forces, intelligence 
community, and prison services, for the most part), the people who comprise these 
organisations, and the relationships and dynamics between these people and their 
organisations. 
 
The over focus on Islamic fundamentalism 
 
Given the shock and horror caused in first decade of the 21st century by Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorism, firstly in the form of the Al Qaeda attacks in September 
2001 on targets in the USA, but followed by a raft of attacks in the aftermath of the 
US led invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq, including the Bali bombings in 2002 and 
2005, The Madrid train bomb in 2004 and the London rail and bus bombings in July 
2005, the attention of media and academics alike turned towards Islamic inspired 
terrorism.29  Doubtless, these attacks and their perpetrators need to be understood 
and explained if we strive for intellectual rigour or indeed the ability to prevent such 
attacks in the future.  However, since 9/11 there has been a disproportionate amount 
of attention given to Islamic terrorism, perhaps based on the understanding of some 
that terrorism arrives in ‘waves’ 30, and thus terrorism motivated by ethno-nationalist, 
ideological or other concerns will eventually become a thing of the past. It is true to 
say that the last decade has witnessed the end of many terrorist organisations’ 
campaigns. 17 November Movement, LTTE, ETA and the PIRA amongst others have 
ceased their hostilities. However, it would be naive to assume that we have 
                                                 
29 Andrew Silke highlights the extent of this surge in interest in Al Qaeda in the academic literature 
post-9/11.  Despite their existence since 1988 and significant attacks carried out in Aden in 1992, at 
the World Trade Centre in 1993, US Embassy bombings in 1998 in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, and 
the USS Cole attack in 2000, articles focusing on Al Qaeda in the two central Terrorism Studies 
journals (Terrorism and Political Violence, and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism) accounted for only 
0.5 per cent of publications for the twelve years before 9/11, compared to 13.2 per cent in the five 
years immediately after 9/11.  See, A. Silke ‘Research on Terrorism: A Review of the Impact of 9/11 
and the Global War on Terror’ in H.Chen, E. Reid, J. Sinai, A. Silke, and B. Ganor, Terrorism 
Informatics: Knowledge Management and Data Mining for Homeland Security (New York; London: 
Springer, 2008), pp. 27-50. 
30 see for example, D.C. Rapoport, ‘The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism’, in A.K. Cronin and J.M. 
Ludes, (eds.) Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy (Washington, D.C: Georgetown 
University Press, 2004). 
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witnessed some new dawn, and that in future, terrorists will not be motivated by the 
range of grievances that have driven them to violence in the past. 
 
George Kassimeris, highlighting the emergence and continuation of a number of 
radical left wing terrorist groups in Greece in the last decade noted that, ‘the Greek 
terrorist landscape, in spite of 17N’s spectacular demise, remains as enduring, 
complex and unpredictable as ever’.31  Peter Lehr points to the decade long 
campaign of NSU (Nationalist Socialist Underground), in Germany which went 
undetected until 2011 despite the murder of ten people.32  Terrorism stemming from 
the conflict over the constitutional position of Northern Ireland has not disappeared 
altogether either, with gun and bomb attacks carried out by dissident Republican 
groups splintered from and inspired by the PIRA continuing to this day.33  Thus, it 
must not be assumed that the future of terrorism will solely be the violent outgrowths 
of Islamic fundamentalism.  Rather, long standing historical grievances and an ever 
shifting political and social climate will continue to provide the impetus for normal 
men and women to use politically violent means in search of recourse. 
 
Indeed, the taxonomic designation of terrorist organisations as religious, ideological, 
ethno-nationalist, millenarian, and so on is a confusing and unclear business.  Often, 
despite the official rhetoric of a terrorist organisation, they may have implicit aims in 
addition to their clearly stated objectives.  Furthermore, terrorist organisations are 
collections of people who may have a range of aims and objectives of their own that 
may diverge from the stated aims of the group they participate in, but still view the 
group as an effective way to address their concerns.  When looking at terrorist 
                                                 
31 G. Kassimeris, Inside Greek Terrorism (London, Hurst and Co, 2013), p. 115. 
32 P. Lehr, “Still Blind in the Right Eye?: A Comparison of German Responses to Political Violence 
from the Extreme Left and the Extreme Right”, in M. Taylor, P.M. Currie, and D. Holbrook, (eds), 
Extreme Right-Wing Political Violence and Terrorism, (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), p.187. Indeed, 
Lehr makes a compelling point in this piece, suggesting that governments are inclined to take 
terrorism substantially less seriously when it does not represent a direct and existential threat to the 
state. 
33 Contemporary terrorism emanating from the Northern Ireland conflict continues to generate 
substantial academic interest.  See for example, M. Frampton, Legion of the Rearguard: Dissident 
Irish Republicanism (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2011), A. Sanders, Inside the IRA: Dissident 
Republicans and the War for Legitimacy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2011), P.M. Currie 
and M. Taylor, (eds.) Dissident Irish Republicanism (New York: Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2011), J. Horgan, Divided We Stand: The Strategy and Psychology of Ireland’s Dissident 
Terrorists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) and, J.F. Morrison, The Origins and Rise of 
Dissident Irish Republicanism: The Role and Impact of Organizational Splits (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013).   
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organisations which claim to be affiliates or allies of Al Qaeda for example, we would 
do well to investigate their actions and operations.  Such close attention often 
highlights that in parallel with their religious motivation, these organisations have 
ethno-nationalist agendas, or may utilise rhetoric more often used by left wing 
radicals than by devout Muslims.  This analysis is accentuated when we take into 
consideration the UK state’s own perception of terrorist threat.  A glance at the MI5 
website for example shows that the threat of terrorism in Northern Ireland is usually 
said to be ‘severe’, meaning a terrorist attack is highly likely, whereas the threat level 
in Great Britain is usually estimated as ‘moderate’, indicating that a terrorist attack is 
possible but not likely.34 Even if we were to accept the claims by some about the 
increased lethality of Islamic fundamentalist terrorism as compared to ethno-
nationalist or ideological terrorism, that the threat from terrorism is still consistently 
higher in Northern Ireland than in Britain tells us something about how terrorist 
threats are portrayed in the media and perceived by the public at large versus the 
actual threat as calculated by the UK’s intelligence services. 
 
The lack of historically grounded research 
 
Some scholars of terrorism studies have claimed that there exists a difference 
between more traditional forms of political violence which constitute ‘old terrorism’ 
and a vastly different trend today which constitutes ‘new terrorism’.35  This analysis is 
misguided, oversimplifies complex trends, and has some dangerous implications for 
both the academy and for policy makers. New terrorism has no conceptual 
coherence.  Even among the scholars who declare its existence, there is a failure to 
draw the demarcation lines between what kind of actors, tactics or weaponry are the 
hallmarks of new terrorism, vis a vis old terrorism, and no consensus regarding when 
‘new’ terrorism emerged.  Orla Lynch and Christopher Ryder have highlighted in a 
systematic study of articles in a leading journal, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 
how ‘new terrorism’ lacks conceptual coherence, with there being little agreement on 
                                                 
34 https://www.mi5.gov.uk/home/about-us/faqs-about-mi5/what-is-the-current-national-threat-level.html  
(accessed 22/05/2014). 
35 See for example W. Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction 
(London: Phoenix Press, 2001), P.R. Neumann, Old & New Terrorism (London: Polity Press, 2009). 
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what demarcates it from the supposed ‘old terrorism’.36  Furthermore, they examine 
rigorously the factors which some authors highlight as representing something ‘new’ 
in terrorism, and highlight how in many instances, the distinctions are not as 
concrete, nor as new as they have often been presented.37 As Thomas Mockaitis 
points out: 
 
...contemporary terrorist organizations developed from past ones, copying 
their successes, learning from their mistakes, and adapting their methods 
and approaches to changing circumstances. These groups also make use 
of resources unavailable to their predecessors.  Despite these continuities, 
however, contemporary terrorism does have features not present in 
previous movements, but even this “new” dimension has historical roots.38   
 
The implications of the misidentification of contemporary terrorist threats as 
representing some sort of starkly new terrorism are far more serious than simply a 
mislabelling of terrorist movements.  That the present field of terrorism studies works 
for ‘state centric priorities’ is something contended by those on the more critical wing 
of terrorism studies.39 Richard Jackson for example contends that overwhelmingly, 
terrorism studies research is conducted with a view to informing policy and providing 
legitimation for the actions of western liberal democratic states in dealing with 
terrorism.40  One does not have to accept his view, that academic research centres 
dedicated to the study of terrorism uncritically endorse government programs and 
support the status quo in return for research grants.41 Indeed, even a cursory glance 
at the range of research being conducted at one such institution, the Centre for the 
Study of Terrorism and Political Violence (CSTPV) at the University of St Andrews, 
demonstrates that academics at such institutions can and do conduct research which 
                                                 
36 See for example O. Lynch and C. Ryder, ‘Deadliness, Organisational Change and Suicide Attacks: 
Understanding the Assumptions Inherent in the Use of the Term ‘New Terrorism’, Critical Studies on 
Terrorism, 5/2, (2012), pp. 257-75. 
37 Ibid. 
38 T.R. Mockaitis, The ‘New’ Terrorism (Westport, CT; London: Praeger, 2007), p.19. 
39 R. Jackson, “The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies”, European Political Science, 6/2, 
(2007), p. 245. 
40 Ibid 
41 see for example, J. Horgan, and M. J. Boyle, ‘A Case Against “Critical Terrorism Studies”, Critical 
Studies on Terrorism, 1/1,  (2008), pp. 51-64. 
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is often critical of states, and which need not feed directly into policy.42 But we should 
recognise that academic discourses on terrorism can have a profound effect on our 
understanding of political violence and can inform and shape policy debates.  As 
such, declaring some aspect of terrorism faced by states today to be somehow ‘new’ 
from terrorism past (for whatever reason), runs the risk of negating the importance of 
the academic research and historical lessons learned from previous analyses and 
engagements with terrorism.  As Martha Crenshaw so eloquently states of some 
approaches in the post-9/11 world: the accumulated knowledge on terrorism to some 
adherents of the new terrorism thesis is ‘irrelevant at best, and obsolete and 
anachronistic, even harmful at worst’.43 The danger here is that academics and policy 
makers will neglect to learn from the mistakes made with regards to earlier 
manifestations of terrorism, condoning illiberal and repressive action or indeed 
exacerbating the effect of terrorism. 
 
In order to demonstrate the importance of understanding earlier terrorist movements, 
the case studies examined here are largely historical ones.  The way in which they 
are presented highlights the importance of understanding the histories of both the 
state and the milieu from which the terrorist organisation emerges.  Within the cases 
themselves, there is clear identification of the importance of understanding the 
historical development of the terrorist movements themselves and the states which 
seek to counter them. It is my hope that this work be seen to join the body of 
academic studies conducted on terrorism by those who acknowledge the importance 
of historical long view.  
 
                                                 
42 A glance at the recent publication profile of CSTPV scholars shows the weakness of some Critical 
Terrorism Studies scholars arguments regarding work at terrorism studies centres with links to the 
state being partial and focused on state centric priorities. For example, see S.V. Marsden, ‘Media 
Metrics: How Arab and Western Media Construct Success and Failure in the ‘Global War on Terror”’, 
Perspectives on Terrorism, 7/6, (2013), pp. 10-26,  G. Ramsay, Jihadi Culture on the World Wide Web 
(New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), R. Singh, ‘The Discourse and Practice of “Heroic Resistance” in the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict - The Case of Hamas, Politics, Religion and Ideology, 14/4 (2012), R. 
Singh, ‘Thinking About the “Law of Unintended Consequences”’, Journal of Terrorism Research, 1/1, 
(2011), O. Lynch, ‘British Muslim Youth: Radicalisation, Terrorism and the Construction of the “Other”’, 
Critical Studies on Terrorism, 6/2, (2013), M. Taylor and D. Holbrook, (eds.) Extreme Right Wing 
Political VIolence and Terrorism (London: Continuum Press, 2013), and G. Duncan, O. Lynch, G. 
Ramsay, and A.M.S Watson, (eds.) State Terrorism and Human Rights: International Responses 
Since the End of the Cold War (Oxford: Routledge, 2013). 
43 M. Crenshaw, Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences (London: Routledge, 
2011), p. 51. 
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Compartmentalisation of the literature 
 
In the wider literature on conflict and political violence, there have been some 
impressive comparative works.  Jeremy Weinstein’s Inside Rebellion is a particularly 
authoritative and useful example of how comparative work can enrich the study of 
conflict.  As a work of serious academic rigour, it is interesting firstly as a paragon of 
the kind of impact that comparative work can have.  Weinstein’s book compares the 
activities of three unrelated and rarely compared rebel groups from conflicts in 
Uganda, Mozambique and Peru.  The insight Weinstein gives into why rebel groups 
in the way that they do, speaks in some ways to the arguments that I will develop 
here, in attempting to understand why state response takes particular shapes.44 
Chenoweth and Stephan have used comparative approaches to support their claim 
and non-violent resistance has been more successful in securing regime change and 
the shift to democracy than campaigns of political violence.45 Comparative literature 
on the particular conflicts I will look at here, has been illuminating, though the focus 
has been somewhat different to mine.  Bew, Frampton and Gurruchaga have used a 
comparative study of the Basque and Northern Ireland conflicts to examine the 
approaches to political violence which have helped secure settlement to the conflicts 
in each case.46 Ian Lustick has examined the Algerian and Irish cases comparatively, 
viewing the conflicts there as the product of the failure of effective state building, 
which he highlights in detail.47  While Lustick’s treatment of the conflicts is interesting 
and the case he builds is compelling, his focus is on the root causes of the conflict in 
itself rather than on the actions of the state during the conflict.  Furthermore, his 
focus in the Algerian case is primarily on the Algerian nationalists and their conflict 
with the state, rather than on the OAS.  However, generally there is a dearth of 
comparative studies in the terrorism studies literature.  While the use of the empirical 
works to explain general trends or facets of terrorism and counter-terrorism can be 
                                                 
44 see for example J.M. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
45 E. Chenoweth and M.J. Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent 
Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). 
46 J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga, Talking to Terrorists: Making Peace in Northern Ireland 
and the Basque Country (London: Hurst and Company, 2009). 
47 I. Lustick, State Building Failure in British Ireland and French Algeria (Berkeley: Institute of 
International Studies, University of California, 1985), and also I. Lustick, Unsettled States, Disrupted 
Lands: Britain and Ireland, France and Algeria, Israel and the West Bank-Gaza (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1993). 
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useful, again we run the risk of missing the complexities that can be uncovered 
through an attention to historical and comparative accounts, which can uncover detail 
and explain facets of terrorism that the wider surveys in the discipline might miss.  As 
such, rather than surveying the breadth of historical cases of terrorism and counter-
terrorism, this thesis seeks to engage meaningfully in close analysis of the 
campaigns of terrorism in question, analysing how their similarities but also the 
differences, make important and seldom commented upon points about the nature 
and character of the state and its impact on the response to terrorism and the 
trajectory of terrorist campaigns.  
 
The question of a definition 
 
Terrorism may be added to the long list of terms in the social sciences and 
humanities about whose definition there remains no consensus.  Arriving at an 
agreed definition of terrorism has proved elusive thus far and given the vehemence 
with which scholars in the field defend their own approaches, it is extremely unlikely 
in the future.  Attempts in the past to survey the definitions in use and highlight a 
workable single definition have been carried out.48 Despite these efforts, there is still 
substantial disagreement over definitions, which is unlikely to subside.  Indeed, it is 
ironic that those who have conducted broad surveys of the literature in search of a 
unifying definition, have instead had the effect of adding yet another definition to the 
list.  Nevertheless, debate and disagreement in this area has ensured that academics 
have been forced to think critically about when they deploy particular terminology, 
and to defend their position. 
 
Disagreement over the definition of terrorism does not preclude fruitful discussion 
and analysis of terrorism and its associated phenomena.  Those studying terrorism 
are not the first, nor are they likely to be the last group of scholars to be frustrated in 
their search for a definitional consensus.  There are serious works of great value 
which cover topics such as civil war, insurgency, violence, non-violence, democracy 
and the state, despite debate being sustained over where the demarcation lines lie 
                                                 
48 Most notably by Alex Schmid, who compiled and analysed 109 individual definitions from the 
literature before compiling his own.  See A.P. Schmid and A.J. Jongman, Political Terrorism, (New 
Brunswick, N.J; Transaction Publishers, 2005).  
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with reference to these topics.  While the definition and conceptual clarity of terrorism 
is important, it should not become the central focus of the discipline and thus prevent 
scholars from engaging with other substantive issues.  However, while there may be 
little in the way of consistency between scholars, it is of the utmost importance when 
conducting research on terrorism to make clear one’s own parameters and to be 
consistent.  Failure to make clear what constitutes terrorism and what does not in the 
eyes of the researcher, makes it extremely difficult for the audience to interpret the 
work and difficult for other academics to engage with it.    
 
In this piece, I will adopt the definition given by Richard English in Terrorism: How to 
Respond:  
 
Terrorism involves heterogeneous violence used or threatened with a 
political aim; it can involve a variety of acts, of targets, and of actors; it 
possesses an important psychological dimension, producing terror or fear 
among a directly threatened group and also a wider implied audience in 
the hope of maximizing political communication and achievement; it 
embodies the exerting and implementing of power, and the attempted 
redressing of power relations; it represents a subspecies of warfare, and 
as such it can form part of a wider campaign of violent and non-violent 
attempts at political leverage.49 
 
Aim of this thesis 
 
This thesis aims to highlight the ways in which the nature and character of the state 
shapes counter-terrorism policy and drives political conflicts in particular directions in 
ways that are seldom analysed in the wider literature on terrorism.  I argue that these 
factors can be separated into four strands.  Firstly, what I refer to as ‘emotional 
responses’; how the identities and outlook of individual state personnel at each level 
from the entry level to state elite both shapes and is shaped by the state, and thus 
how state action towards terrorism is commonly driven (at least in part) by visceral 
and emotive response as much as it is by well reasoned policy towards an 
                                                 
49 R. English, Terrorism: How to Respond (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 24. 
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overarching goal.  Secondly, the effect that the particular character of state 
organisations tasked with counter-terrorism responsibility can have on the course of 
the conflict.  Thirdly, I argue that issues of coordination and competition between 
state organisations whose competences sometimes overlap and whose aims and 
objectives are often mutually clashing can result in unintended consequences in the 
course of counter-terrorism efforts.  Fourthly, I highlight how counter-terrorism itself is 
frequently used as ‘propaganda of the deed’ in itself, in attempts to send 
unambiguous messages to those using or considering political violence, to silence 
political opponents within and out-with the state apparatus, and for partisan 
electioneering purposes.  Furthermore, I contend that going forward, academics and 
policy makers alike must take these factors into consideration if they hope to 
understand state action and to find ways to combat particular campaigns of terrorism 
without encroaching on the civil liberties and human rights of populations, and without 
exacerbating the level and threat from political violence.50 
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Chapter One 
The Spanish State and the Basque Problem: 
Countering ETA Terrorism 
 
 
The sacred mission of the armies of a nation is that of maintaining 
order, and that is what we do. 
    Francisco Franco.1 
 
  It is not ETA that had bred violence.  It is violence that has bred ETA. 
    Telesforzo Monzón 1997 (Herri Batasuna member)2 
 
In order to understand comprehensively the counter-terrorism efforts of the state in 
tackling the violent campaign by ETA from their emergence to the present day, it is 
necessary to discuss the historical emergence of the contemporary Spanish state, 
and the parallel and interlinked development of Basque nationalism on the whole and 
its more virulent and radical strains. 
 
The historical development of the Spanish state 
 
The nation-state of Spain was born out of the unification of the crowns of Aragon and 
Castile in the 15th century. As an amalgam of a number of forerunner entities, Spain 
has thus from its inception been somewhat defined by its fractious nature and the 
contrast and tension between the multiplicity of identities existing within the Spanish 
borders. The regions of Spain, because of their separate histories and their 
geographical and cultural differences maintained separate identities despite their 
incorporation into the state of Spain. Spain was no different in this respect to many 
                                                 
1  Francisco Franco, quoted in N. Serra, The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed 
Forces, (trans.) P. Bush, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 97. 
2 Telesforzo Monzón, quoted in D. Muro, The Case of Radical Basque Nationalism (London: 
Routledge, 2007) p. 133. 
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other continental countries.  It was however the inability of the Spanish state to 
‘generate and diffuse to the masses a coherent national project’ and the 
‘confrontation between different visions of Spain that impeded Spanish nation 
building’ and allowed Basque national sentiment to solidify.3 The tension between 
those in favour of a centralisation of Spain and a greater degree of autonomy for the 
constituent regions has been a principal concern of the Spanish state since at least 
the 19th century, and continues to influence politics and society in Spain today, 
manifested in the nationalist independence movements in the Basque Country and 
Catalonia, and to a lesser degree in Galicia.   
 
Though the Carlist Wars of the 19th century were primarily wars fought concerning 
the succession to the Spanish throne, and the associated political approaches of 
liberalism and traditionalism, the issue of regional identity and autonomy played out 
as something as a subtext in these bloody conflicts.4 The issue of regional identity 
and control was taken seriously across Spain, and was seen as an instrumental 
factor in the collapse of the Federal Republic of 1873-4.5  The regions of Spain had 
operated a fueros or foral system of local statutes and charters, under which each 
province exercised a separate administration.6  With the integration of these entities 
into the Spanish state, the Spanish crown had codified these rights, allowing for a 
highegree of autonomy with formal control by the Spanish state itself limited to 
taxation, and being represented in each region by a viceroy.7 As André Lecours 
notes, so long as the foral system remained in place, its division of the Basque 
country into smaller administrative provinces made mobilisation beyond these 
borders on the idea of Basque identity difficult in practical terms, and also prevented 
Basque and Spanish identities from being directly oppositional.8 The Third Carlist 
War eventually saw the abolition of these rights in 1876.  The fight to retain the foral 
system by the Carlists had won them a great deal of support in the Basque Country, 
                                                 
3 A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2007), p. 
60. 
4 R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents: ETA 1952-1980 (Madison: Wisconsin University Press, 1984), p. 
14. 
5 S.G. Payne, Spain’s First Democracy: The Second Republic 1931-1936 (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1993), p. 6. 
6 D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation 
(Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1993) p. 45. 
7 G. Darby, Spain in the Seventeenth Century (London: Longman, 1994), p. 10. 
8 A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, p. 40. 
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and the removal of this system represented a ‘watershed in relations between the 
Basques and Madrid’.9  In addition to the importance of the foral system, there was 
little to create a sense of allegiance to Madrid.  In the pre-Civil War days of the early 
20th century, there were no ‘integrative mechanisms that fostered a sense of national 
belonging’10, something which was lamented by Spanish nationalists who were 
critical of the lack of nation-building which might have allowed a strong Spanish 
identity to flourish.11   
 
The frequent bloody outbursts in the 19th and 20th century were to be important 
formative events for both the remarkably resilient characteristics of the Spanish state 
and for its relationship with the general population. In many ways, the political 
upheaval within the state and within wider Spanish society was to impact decisively 
on how the Spanish state viewed and responded to the political violence of Basque 
nationalists. The Carlist Wars could perhaps be seen as a foreshadowing of the 
cleavages in Spanish society, between traditional, religious factions and liberal 
tendencies which would play out throughout the 19th and 20th century.12   
 
The political instability of the 18th and 19th centuries led to a situation where the 
army were inherently distrustful of politicians.  With the officer class swollen to 
between 11,000 and 12,000 by 1814, the military began to represent a significant 
threat to political stability in itself.13  In reaction to attempts by King Ferdinand VII in 
1814 to introduce military reforms, elements within the army rebelled, beginning a 
long tradition of pronunciamento, whereby the rebellious army factions would register 
their disapproval of particular measures, essentially presenting the government with a 
situation which required a compromise or risk open coup.  That the crude tool of 
pronunciamento was relied upon so frequently by the military in the 19th century, is 
testament not only to the political activism of the army, but of the lack of consensus 
within the state and wider Spanish society, cleavages which would continue to shape 
                                                 
9 D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p. 47. 
10 H. Graham, The Spanish Republic at War 1936-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002),p. 4. 
11 A. Lecours, Basque Nationalism and the Spanish State, p. 41. 
12 R. Carr, Modern Spain: 1875-1980 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 1-2. 
13 C.P. Boyd, cited in J.A. Junco and A. Shubert, (eds.) Spanish History Since 1808, (London:  Arnold, 
2000), p. 67. 
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the politics and society of Spain well into the 20th century.14  The pronunciamento by 
progressive forces to their allies in the military that commenced the ‘Glorious 
Revolution’ of September 1868 would set the precedent for how serious political 
change would be effected in Spain over the next century.15  Indeed the military were 
to establish themselves as a dominant force within the apparatus of the State early in 
the twentieth century. Frequently in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
there was friction between the military and successive governmental regimes.16  No 
event worked to widen this developing chasm between military and political branches 
of the state more than the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War, resulting in 
the final loss of empire in 1898.17  The government of the day blamed the military, 
feeling it had not fought hard enough to defend the empire, whilst the military blamed 
the government, feeling that they had had their hands tied by ‘political corruption and 
incapacity’.18  Preston notes that in the aftermath, the army came to believe that they 
‘held the monopoly on patriotism and were the executors of “national truth” which 
they could impose on the nation whenever the need arose’.19 Indeed, the army had 
seen itself as the only strand of Spanish society which had protected Spain from the 
Carlist and cantonist revolts of the 19th century.20  But with the loss of Cuba in the 
Spanish American War, the Spanish Empire had been reduced to some small tracts 
in North Africa.  The campaign in north Africa opened cleavages in the military 
however, between those units mostly based in the Iberian peninsula, known as the 
Juntas de Defensa, and those mostly based in Morocco, known as the Africanistas. 
For the Africanistas, who in the main were more politically motivated and ideological 
than the Junteros, the task of pacifying parts of Morocco represented as a chance to 
restore the prestige of the military and of Spain.21  The perceived gravity of their task 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p. 68. 
15 R. Carr, Modern Spain, p. 3. 
16 S.G. Payne, cited in, R. Carr (ed.), The Republic and the Civil War in Spain (London, Macmillan; 
1971), p.79. 
17 G. Jackson, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 1974) p. 
12. 
18 P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge: Fascism and the Military in Twentieth Century Spain (London: 
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and the camaraderie galvanised by engagement in conflict in north Africa led the 
Africanistas to develop a strong espirit de corps.22 
 
In July 1909, popular protests against military conscription culminated in the Semana 
Trágica (Tragic Week), a week of civil unrest inspired by radical Republicanism.23  
This saw the death of 120 people in Barcelona as anarchists movements and the 
working class clashed with Guardia Civil.24  Again in 1917, political violence broke out 
in Barcelona from the anarcho-syndacalist CNT.  Their actions were to be sharply 
countered first by private vigilantes at the behest of employers, and later by state 
repression under martial law.25 In these early days of the twentieth century it was 
becoming apparent that political violence was the weapon of choice for both radical 
movements hoping to effect change.  The state itself responded customarily with 
violent repression and declarations of martial law.  Dangerous precedents were being 
set.  Indeed the state was overthrown several times in the early twentieth century, 
first by military coup, backed by King Alfonso XIII which installed the dictatorship of 
General Miguel Primo de Rivera in 1923.26  Primo de Rivera had not intended to be a 
long-term dictator, instead hoping to rid the Spanish political system of its flaws 
before stepping down when he had solved the problems. He stated: 
 
Our aim... is to open a brief parenthesis in the constitutional life of Spain 
and to re-establish it as soon as the country offers us men 
uncontaminated with the vices of political organization. We will then hasten 
to present these men to Your Majesty so that normality can be established 
as soon as possible.27 
 
Predictably, the amateur politician was unable to achieve what his professional 
predecessors had not managed.  De Rivera’s regime faced opposition from former 
politicians, intellectuals and students, and when he alienated the military and the 
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King, it sealed his fate.28  De Rivera stepped down in January 1929, having failed to 
carry out his intended clean up of Spanish politics.  His caretaker successor, General 
Berenguer was also unable to prevent the rising tide of Republicanism.  King Alfonso 
XIII fled for exile in 1931 and Spain became a Republic in April of that year. 
 
It soon became apparent however that the Spanish Second Republic was not to be 
the utopia that many of its advocates had hoped.  Despite the heralding of a new 
dawn, beneath the rhetoric of Republicanism and the veneer of radical change, the 
Spanish Second Republic proved to be no less bloody or repressive a regime than its 
predecessors.  Miguel Maura, the new Minister of Interior had pointed out that the 
use of the army and Guardia Civil for keeping the peace was counter-productive, with 
neither force being particularly well equipped for the job.29 Indeed, Payne points to 
the Guardia Civil as instrumental for alienating the civilian population from the state.  
He described them as ‘a paramilitary force whose brutal tactics had earned them the 
hatred of the leftist groups. Untrained in effective methods of crowd dispersal, the 
Guards often resorted to bloodshed, thus exciting more violence and resentment’.30 
Despite the organisation of a new Republican police force, armed only with pistols 
and clubs,31 the upsurge in violence in the succeeding years showed that heavy 
handed and violent action by the Guardia Civil and army was still a feature of the 
Spanish state, even under the Republic.32  Attempts to reform the Guardia Civil and 
army proved to be problematic.  The Guardia Civil had been established in 1844 as a 
means of strengthening the authority of the civil administration and to encourage 
centralisation, and had been shaped into a militarised organisation early in its life, 
with its quasi-military status being formalised in 1878.33 At first, Prime Minister 
Azaña’s military reforms, intended to streamline the army through offering officers 
incentives to retire appeared to be working, but the military became suspicious of 
Azaña and his advisors’ motives, particularly when he closed the Academia General 
Militar, (a military institution closely associated with the Africanistas and directed by 
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Francisco Franco34) and were accused of disrupting ‘the harmony of the military 
family’. 35  
 
The Second Republic from the outset declared itself a régimen de plenos poderes, 
suspending legal rights and allowing censorship, the breaking up of public meetings 
and taking whatever steps it felt necessary to ensure order.36 Indeed the first 
legislative action of the new Republic was to pass the Law for the Defence of the 
Republic.37  In addition to the existence of the old grievances and political adversities 
that existed in the towns and cities, Carr points to the Second Republic as 
instrumental in a ‘process of mass politicization’.38  The hopes of the underprivileged 
which had been raised with the advent of the Second Republic however went 
unfulfilled.  The ambitious aspirations of the governments of the Second Republic 
never came close to being fulfilled.39 There was more continuity and replication of the 
old habits of political patronage, albeit with a new twist.  The radical aims of the 
Second Republic were to be implemented by the institutions of the state that had 
been inherited from previous monarchist regimes, and crucially, with the vast majority 
of the same personnel occupying the key positions.40  Corruption and heavy 
handedness from the state security forces soon dashed any hopes that the Second 
Republic would achieve a more equitable, liberal or truly democratic Spain. Graham 
notes that whilst the Republican victory had brought an end to the old cacique system 
whereby local politics was dominated by political ‘bosses’ or ‘fixers’, highly dependent 
on electoral fraud with the idea that traditional political elites would always be 
maintained in their strong positions, the networks of power and influence that had 
underpinned the system had not been killed.41  
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When the Spanish Civil War came in 1936, it began in the familiar way of a military 
coup; ‘an old instrument being used to a new end’.42  The military rebellion, this time, 
as with the coup that brought Primo de Rivera to power announced not a contrary 
ideological position to the government of the day but rather stated its intentions of 
‘saving Spain from anarchy’.43  Society became polarised, with loose coalitions of 
disparate factions joining the Republican side, with anarchists, and socialists joining 
republicans in a Popular Front, and Nationalists, with most Carlists and the 
Falangists supporting the right wing military coup.  Carlists in the Basque country 
however bucked the general trend, joining the Republican side on account of the 
higher degree of autonomy that the Second Republic had afforded the Basque 
country, which had culminated in a Statute of Autonomy in 1935.44  Carlists however 
were still the subject of much suspicion in the Basque country amongst the 
Republican forces, with actions being carried out against prominent Carlists in San 
Sebastian during the Civil War as symptomatic of the suspicion reserved for these 
traditionalists.45  General Francisco Franco rose to become Head of State in October 
1936, a position he would hold until his death in 1975. 
 
After the Civil War, the authoritarian regime was shaped greatly by the personal 
leadership of General Franco. While he delegated power to his ministers, allowing 
them a free reign to create and implement policy, he retained direct control over what 
he deemed to be the most important policy areas, and played the role of final arbiter 
between the factions that constituted his government and the wider authoritarian 
regime.46 Under the Franco dictatorship, the Basque population were to suffer state 
terror of unparalleled levels.  All symbols of Basque identity and culture were 
subjected to ‘suspicion, inquiry, and proscription’. 47 The Basque language Euskera, 
was targeted specifically, and the use of the language in public, in schools and in 
publication were outlawed. Decrees were passed ordering the translation into 
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Spanish of all Basque names in civil registries and official documentation.48  
Politically motivated imprisonments and executions took place of those the Franco 
regime deemed to have promoted ‘separatism’49.  As Cameron Watson notes, 
Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa were officially named as traitorous provinces in 1937 as 
punishment for their open opposition to Franco during the Civil War, and for the 
attempt to ‘deny their Spanish national identity’.50 Preston recounts that the Spanish 
military under Franco, from the early days of the regime until the death of Franco 
himself were trained, prepared and organised as if Spain was a country under 
occupation.  He states that these measures were to prepare the army to conduct 
action, not against occupation or invading army, but towards the native population 
instead.51 Indeed it was not only the Basque population that were to suffer, though 
they undoubtedly were reviled more than other perceived enemies by the Franco 
regime.  Acts of revenge in the form of executions, often by garrotte, sometimes with 
press coverage, were officially conducted from 1937 until 1963, although politically 
motivated attacks against Republicans and perceived enemies of the regime 
remained a feature of Spanish life until the death of Franco in 1975.52 The 
exceptional treatment of the Basque provinces and the clear message from the 
Franco regime regarding the expression of Basque identity fomented the sense of 
alienation amongst Basques towards both the Spanish state and Spanish identity 
which was to be key in the emergence and sustained support for ETA under the 
Franco regime.   
 
Whilst officially neutral during World War II, Spain was viewed with suspicion by the 
Allies throughout the war period for the fascist overtones of the Franco regime and 
their close relationship with Nazi Germany in the years before the onset of the war.  
However, the cloak of neutrality worked in Franco’s favour and the international 
community now faced with the emerging Cold War, normalised relationships with 
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Franco’s Spain and the junta was afforded legitimacy by the United Nations and the 
World Health Organisation in the early part of the 1950s.  Conversi and Clark remark: 
  
the failure of Western democracies, especially Britain and the United 
States, to isolate and exert pressures on the regime “led the Basques to 
conclude that they could not depend on outside assistance”... This is one 
of the crucial features which helps to explain the birth of ETA less than ten 
years later.53  
 
Basque nationalism had taken its modern form from the political thought and writing 
of Sabino de Arana y Goiri in the latter half of the 19th century.  Arana awakened a 
generation of Basques to the ideas of nationalism, manifesting itself in the formation 
of a new party, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV) founded by Arana in 1895 As ‘the 
political vehicle by which Basque autonomy was to be achieved’54. As stated 
previously, Basque nationalists had thrown their weight behind the Republican cause 
in the Civil War because of the regional autonomy it had afforded the Basque 
Country.  In the early 1950‘s, some students from the university of Bilbao, disaffected 
with the PNV and the lack of any meaningful nationalist action or representation 
formed the organisation Ekin (meaning ‘to begin’ in Euskera).  Around the same time, 
the youth wing of the PNV, known as Eukzo Gastedi (EG, later EGI) began to 
become more active.  Ekin was eventually drawn towards the PNV as their positions 
differed little, rather they were born out of frustration about the latter’s lack of 
activism. Eventually Ekin and EG merged, with the resulting group breaking from the 
PNV over ideas about the direction the Basque nationalist movement needed to take.  
As Sullivan notes, the former Ekin members within the EGI felt that violent methods 
against the Franco regime must be employed, whilst the PNV leadership felt the 
Basque festivals and cultural events were political enough activities.55  The resulting 
group, born on 31 July 1959 called themselves Euskadi ta Askatasuna, (Basque 
Homeland and Freedom), ETA for short.   A statement by one founding member of 
ETA in the early days of the organisation stated: 
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We, Basque nationalists of this generation, have only known the farcical 
‘vertical trade union’ of Franco, his northern policy, his ‘organic 
democracy’, the claws of Eymar [a much hated military prosecutor] and his 
henchmen, the monstrous confabulation of the bishops with the most 
abject and reactionary regime on earth and the quiet wait for the Yankees 
to impose free elections in the Spanish state... We now think that we have 
understood. And, contrary to what our elders do, we have decided to 
change course.56 
 
From the Emergence of ETA Violence to the Death of Franco 
 
From the moment of the first claimed ETA attack in 1961 to the death of Franco in 
1975, the Spanish state response to terrorism took a predictable form for the violent, 
muscular and repressive regime. 57   The attempts by the Spanish state under Franco 
to counter terrorism from ETA was largely uncoordinated with no overarching plan.  
The state reacted to each terrorist attack on an ad-hoc basis.   
 
The first claimed ETA attack came somewhat out of the blue for the Franco regime. 
The attempt on July 18, 1961 to derail trainloads of Falangist Civil War veterans on 
their way to services commemorating the 25th anniversary of the military coup that 
spawned the Civil War in the Basque city of Donostia-San Sebastián was 
unsuccessful.  Nevertheless, the state response was harsh and unequivocal and 
appeared to be designed to punish not just those suspected of the attack but Basque 
nationalists and sympathisers of ETA more generally. The security forces arrested 
and tortured 100 Basques with 30 of these being sent to the infamous Carabanchel 
prison in Madrid for further interrogation and torture.  Stiff penalties were handed out 
with most of those arrested being sent into exile or given prison sentences of 15 to 20 
years.58  Confrontations between ETA and the security forces in the mid 1960s were 
scarce, with the internally split ETA focusing on fund raising robberies rather than 
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overt violent action for most of the period59.  The terrorist group seemed to be aware 
that they were not yet ready and thus sought not to provoke ‘excessive and 
disastrous countermeasures by the Spanish government’.60 
 
When confrontation between the state and ETA did occur, the state seemed keen to 
send a clear message to the militants that terrorist actions were not to be tolerated. 
The result was that the repressive and over-zealous response often had the effect of 
producing more harm than good, ultimately being counter-productive to the 
countenance of terrorism.  For example, the shooting in cold blood of ETA member 
Txabi Etxebarrieta at a roadblock by the Guardia Civil as Etxebarrieta attempted to 
flee from a bank robbery. The attack caused widespread unrest in the Basque 
country and drove many Basques into the ranks of ETA.61  This action started a spiral 
of violence that fitted with the ETA strategy of ‘action-repression-action’; a strategy 
inspired by Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth,62 whose writings on the 
Algerian struggle for independence had become a ‘textbook’ for radical Basques in 
the 1960s.63  This particular spiral of violence culminated in the Burgos trial, which 
proved to be an unmitigated disaster for the Spanish state, embarrassing them 
internationally, leading to a loss of face domestically and helping cement the idea that 
ETA were bastions of opposition to the oppressive Franco regime, not just for 
Basque nationalists, but indeed for left leaning organisations and individuals across 
Spain.64  
 
Similarly, the regime implemented ‘state of exception’ decrees on a number of 
occasions from 1961 to 1975.  These decrees, which were sometimes limited to 
Basque provinces and other times extended across the whole of Spain, depending 
on the particular crisis and levels of unrest, meant that certain guarantees of rights 
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under the Francoist Fuero de los Españoles (Charter of the Spanish People) which 
had been produced in 1945 and only allowed for rather flimsy and superficial 
freedoms in the first place, were suspended. 65  Most frequently suspended were 
Articles 18, ensuring the right to habeas corpus and those guaranteeing inviolability 
of the home, Articles 14 and 15.66  Whilst the imposition of States of Exception 
allowed the regime to quell protests and civil disobedience, round up ETA suspects 
and indeed on a number of occasions damaged the structure of the group, the violent 
manner in which searches were conducted and ordinary Basque nationalists were 
mistreated during these spells meant that support for ETA often rose in the aftermath 
and the credibility of the Franco regime was further damaged as result.   
 
The manner in which the regime dealt with ETA members who were apprehended 
and arrested also saw them come under fire from human rights groups globally as 
well as Basques and the wider Spanish population. Carrero Blanco who had been 
promoted to the position of Prime Minister the year before was keen to make his 
presence felt and in the first nine months of 1970, to September, the regime tried 
1101 people for political offences, with a disproportionate number of these being 
Basques.67  More crucially in 1970, the Burgos trial, the arrest and trial of 16 ETA 
suspects for a range of crimes, the most serious of which being murder of security 
force personnel, caused widespread protest of unprecedented levels.   The Burgos 
trial was perhaps the most important moment for ETA in helping them cement their 
legitimacy as armed opponents to the brutal Franco regime.68  The death penalties 
passed by the military court at the Burgos trial and the harsh sentences meted out to 
the other suspects received global media coverage, caused protests and violence 
across Spain and beyond, and opened up foreign media channels for ETA to 
publicise their plight.  ETA kidnapped the West German consul in San Sebastián, 
threatening to kill him if the sentences were not reduced.  As a result of this threat, 
the international pressure, and a call from the Vatican for clemency for those 
sentenced to death, Franco eventually commuted the death penalties, but not before 
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the regime lost a considerable amount of face and the relationship between the 
regime and the church, which had been crucial during the Civil War and the 
solidification of Franco’s rule had been irreparably damaged.69 
 
The worsening health of Franco throughout the late 1960s and 1970s caused 
problems for the regime as it attempted to face down attacks from ETA.  The 
movimiento which constituted Franco’s support base and was built of a coalition of 
various right wing movements began to fragment.  In 1969, Don Juan Carlos, who 
would become King Juan Carlos was named as the successor to Franco.  Luis 
Carrero Blanco was promoted to Prime Minister in 1969 and was keen to show that 
the aperturismo (‘openness’) faction within the movimiento (The National Movement 
which controlled all aspects of public life in Spain during the Franco regime) had 
been silenced and a continued hard line on dissent would be taken.  As a result, 
repressive actions by the state rose in response to ETA attacks and wide scale 
protests in the aftermath of repressive state actions and the killing of ETA etarres  
worsened.  The regime was struggling to maintain legitimacy.  ETA assassinated 
Carrero Blanco in a breathtaking attack in 1973 as he left morning Mass in Madrid.  
The attack was an attempt to destabilise the regime and throw the continuation of 
Francoism beyond Franco’s death into doubt and as a reprisal for the assassination 
of one of their leaders, Txikia.  The assassination of such a high profile person, a 
man who was close to Franco personally, and who represented the future of his 
ideology beyond the General’s death was a massive coup for ETA, and indeed for 
opponents of the regime across Spain.  As Paul Preston notes ‘the death of Carrero 
Blanco smashed the myth of Francoist invulnerability, ignited the squabbles within 
the walls and roused the opposition to seek the unity that had always eluded it.70  
Franco himself was deeply disturbed by the attack, commenting during the memorial 
service: ‘They have cut my last link with the world’.71  Furthermore, it demonstrated 
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ETA’s ability to bring the fight for Basque independence to the heart of the Spanish 
regime. 72 
 
The announcement by Carrero Blanco’s successor, Arias Navarro, that he planned to 
make some reforms and move towards greater levels of democracy was viewed with 
both hope and suspicion by Basque nationalists.  The side effect of the official line 
taken by Arias Navarro and the regime however was to upset the ultra-right faction in 
the movimiento.73  The result of this was the creation of ultra gangs, comprised 
mostly of off-duty security force personnel who conducted gun and bomb attacks on 
prominent nationalist bars, businesses and homes in the Basque country.  Officially 
these ultra gangs were illegal and their effect was certainly counter-productive, 
undermining for certain any sense of hope that the regime might be liberalising and 
changing.  There were never any convictions or arrests for the actions carried out by 
these organisations, who masqueraded behind names such as Batallon Vasco 
Español (BVE).  In response to heightened levels of ETA violence in 1974 and 1975, 
the regime under Arias Navarro seemed to revert back to the robust and brutal 
counter terrorism approach it had been known for throughout the Carrero Blanco 
premiership, with security forces mistreating ETA suspects in detention and 
intimidating their families during raids under one State of Exception in 1975.   
 
Later that year the death penalty was passed on two ETA members, including senior 
ETA(p-m) militant Juan Paredes Manot (Txiki), who was convicted of the murder of 
two state officials.  Sentenced to death under the retroactive Decreto Ley 10/1975, 
the decision was deeply unpopular across the Basque country yet despite the penalty 
being carried out and a massive push by ETA(p-m) to have their member saved, the 
press coverage nor the protests were as pronounced for Juan Paredes Manot (Txiki) 
as they had been for those convicted in the Burgos trial five years earlier.74  The lack 
of justice and due process in the trial was commented upon by media outside of 
Spain.  The Times seemed to recognise the counter-productivity of the trial and the 
effect that it would have on sentiment in the Basque country and across Spain, 
declaring in an article headline on the case that ‘Franco must take the blame for 
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Spain’s growing violence’.75 Franco died in November 1975 marking an end to this 
repressive era, yet it would be a further three years before the transition to 
democracy was complete.  Nevertheless, the counter-terrorism approach of the state 
changed immeasurably in the aftermath of Franco’s death.   
 
Democratic State Responses to ETA 
 
Juan Carlos, who had been named as the successor to Franco was crowned on 22 
November 1975.  Almost immediately, the king initiated a series of reforms designed 
to placate Basque nationalists and soften Basque opposition to the Spanish 
government.76  The most substantial measures were three general amnesties which 
covered nearly all of Spain’s political prisoners. Those who remained in prison 
benefitted from reductions to their sentences.  In addition, the conciliatory moves 
included the legalisation of flying the Basque flags, relaxation of censorship laws, and 
senior personnel changes in the Guardia Civil and the armed forces, designed to give 
the security forces a less Francoist image.77 Crucially too, in 1976, the Cortes 
approved new labour legislation that allowed for the forming of trade unions, strike 
activity and legalised political parties, including the PNV.  These steps were 
extremely important as the Spanish state now permitted organisations which allowed 
open and active protest and opposition to the Spanish government and its policies.  
Despite these moves, and the elections in June 1977 which created the first 
democratically elected Spanish Cortes since 1936 and the promulgation of the new 
constitution in mid 1978 by Juan Carlos, there was still widespread opposition to the 
government in the Basque country.  Clark notes that despite the widespread reforms, 
many Basques felt that King Juan Carlos had not gone far enough.  No longer faced 
with the Franco regime and the possibility of its characteristically brutal response, 
Basques seemed less afraid to protest, demonstrate and call strikes.78 
 
Juan Carlos occupied a precarious position.  The military was divided along several 
axes, between ‘recalcitrant Francoists’, ‘those in favour of limited reforms’ and a more 
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‘progressive minded’ faction who favoured an evolution to a European-style 
democracy.79   Thus, to push through rapid and radical reforms would provoke the ire 
of hard-liners in the military, endangering the democratic experiment before it had a 
chance to solidify.80  The paranoia of the ultras in the military leadership was also 
becoming apparent as they suppressed the green shoots of liberalism in the form of 
the Union Militar Democratica (UMD), a secret association of the officer classes who 
sought to work to keep the military apolitical in the post Franco era.  Sentences of up 
to eight years were given to nine officers who were subject to a military trial, and 
denied access to civilian lawyers for the UMD involvement.  The trial was seen as a 
‘symptom of the continuing strength of right wing feeling within the armed forces’.81 It 
is hardly surprising that Juan Carlos and latterly the democratic Prime Ministers were 
unable to completely overhaul the outlook and character of the Spanish state.  The 
way in which Franco strove to change the character of the Spanish state to ensure 
the loyalty of state operatives meant that the task of de-Francoising the state was a 
massive undertaking.82  Franco’s consolidation of power owed much to the 
repressive measures he meted out in the 1930s and 1940s, post-Civil War, which 
Julius Ruiz explains comprehensively. 83  As such, Franco’s consolidation of power 
and the cementing of the position of the movimento was only possible because it 
came in the wake of the civil war, and because it was enforced using the 
characteristically repressive measures employed by authoritarian regimes.84  For the 
newly emergent democratic regime, such reform would be unthinkable as well as 
technically impossible.  Even without the problems posed by internal cleavages in the 
state and the resistance of many elements of the state apparatus to the democratic 
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reform, changing the outward appearance of the Spanish state to make it more 
acceptable to those within Spain who expressed other identities, and to the 
international system was a massive undertaking.  As Lecours notes, the Spanish 
national identity was one heavily associated (for obvious reasons) with 
authoritarianism, Catholic traditionalism, militarism and hyper-centralism.85  Even if 
rapid reform of the state apparatus had been possible, changing the accepted image 
of the Spanish nation in the eyes of Basques and in the eyes of the international 
community would be a slow process, and one that would only occur through the 
‘normalisation’ of Spain to fit the Western liberal democratic model.  This was 
something that Spain eventually achieved, but which took decades.86 It should be 
noted however, that the transition to democracy was a swifter and smoother process 
than many might have expected given the fractures in the state apparatus and the 
absence of Franco’s centripetal influence which had ensured at least the illusion of 
unity in the past.  
 
One effect of the moves towards liberalisation was that it caused the fomentation of 
disputes between and within rival factions of ETA, ETA(m), ETA(p-m) which had split 
apart in 1974.  The late 1970s for ETA was to bring much turmoil as the unfamiliar 
political climate left the groups struggling to decide on the best approach.  The 
byproduct of this strife was that ETA became much more violent in the post-Franco 
era than they had been previously.  ETA(p-m)’s leader Eduardo Moreno Bergareche, 
‘Pertur’ was assassinated in mysterious circumstances in January 1982 with both 
internal ETA(p-m) rivals and the Alianza Apostólica Anticommunista (AAA) suspected 
of the murder.  ETA(p-m) suffered a split with its military unit, the Berezi commando 
under Miguel Angel Apalategui Ayerbe “Apala” splintering from the group over 
ETA(p-m)’s desire to form a new political party from mid 197687.  In the aftermath of 
this split, Apala’s group and ETA(m) under José Miguel Beñarán Ordeñana ‘Argala’ 
attempted to impress rank and file members of ETA with daring attacks hoping to win 
them over to their faction,88 contributing to the spike in fatalities from ETA attacks in 
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the latter half of the 1970s.89 For the politico-militar faction of ETA, the utility of 
political violence had waned with the death of Franco and the shift from the 
authoritarian regime to the beginnings of the democratic system.  The instrumentality 
of the action-repression-action strategy perhaps no longer made as much sense as 
participation in the post-Franco democratic process,90 but for the militarists of 
ETA(m), they recognised that the volatility of the political atmosphere during the 
transition to democracy meant that perhaps with increased pressure on the state that 
Basque independence could be achieved.91  Additionally, there was the sense that 
with restrictions on political organisations and demonstrations being lifted, 
empowering leftist organisations across Spain, that ETA would have to fight to 
maintain relevance, ‘ETA was no longer the reference point and a plethora of political 
groups and social movements were able to represent the plurality of political views.  
By waging a war of attrition, ETA made its presence visible and forced all political 
parties to take a stand with regard to nationalist violence.92  As such, those factions 
of ETA still committed to armed struggle opportunistically ratcheted up the level of 
violence, killing 240 people between 1977 and 1980, where previously there had 
been around only 20 deaths a year.93 
 
In June 1977, Adolfo Suarez, who had been appointed as Prime Minister by King 
Juan Carlos the previous year, became the first democratically elected Prime Minister 
of post Franco-Spain and formed the government with his party the UCD. The newly 
elected Cortes set to work formulating the new constitution, which was promulgated 
in mid 1978.  The constitution’s final text, after much wrangling and debate between 
the more conservative and Franquista politicians on one hand and the socialists and 
nationalists on the other included in Article 2 stated: 
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the Constitution is based on the indissoluble unity of the Spanish Nation, 
the common and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards, and recognizes 
and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions 
which compose it.94 
 
Article 3 recognised Castilian as the official language of Spain but held that in the 
autonomous regions, the local language would also be official, while Article 4 called 
for the flying of both local and national flags on public buildings and at official 
occasions.95 While in general, when the Constitution was put to the people in a 
referendum, it received overwhelming support at around 87.9 percent of the vote, the 
Basque country was a notable exception for such support.  In the Basque country, 
less than half of the eligible electorate turned out and almost one-fifth of those who 
did voted against the Constitution96, with abstention rates reaching 56 percent in 
Gipuzkoa and Bizkaia97. 
 
However, despite the conciliatory gestures from the democratic government in the 
form of the recognition of regional language and identity in the constitution, and the 
Basque Autonomy Statute which was ratified in 1979, there was obvious 
disenchantment amongst Basque nationalists.  ETA had scaled up their campaign of 
violence in 1978, claiming the lives of 68 people.98  The following year, a political 
party with heavy links to ETA(m), Herri Batasuna (Popular Unity) made their first 
foray into democratic politics in the Cortes elections, collecting 15 per cent of the 
Basque poll.  The nature of the party as a vehicle for Basque discontent with the 
political reforms was clear.  Gilmour states that ‘apart from its demand for 
independence, Herri Batasuna did not have a political programme.  It was simply 
opposed to every measure which the government had taken: anti the constitution, 
anti the statute, anti the Basque government’.99  This is a sentiment echoed by others 
too, who highlight that Herri Batasuna existed primarily to mobilize popular support 
for ETA and its objectives, contrasted perhaps with Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), the 
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party which had grown out of ETA(p-m) whose commitment to parliamentary politics 
and engagement in the democratic process was more expansive and sincere.100  
However, while Batasuna was very much a product of the conflict between ETA and 
the Spanish state, with the abertzale (Basque nationalist, literally meaning ‘patriot’) 
agenda of independence for the Basque country as its central aim, it was more than 
just a mouthpiece for ETA.  Herri Batasuna played a key role in mobilising broad 
support behind the broad front of Basque nationalist organisations that ETA had 
created in 1975, the Movimento de Liberacion Nacional Vasco (MLNV) of which it 
became an integral part.101 While the party may have been close to being a single 
issue party at the time of its foundation in 1978, by the mid 1980s, it had become the 
main political player in the izquerda abertzale (patriotic left), forging links with working 
class organisations, and changing its symbols to represent its commitment to 
workers, women, antimilitarists, and environmentalists.102 As a result, the party’s 
support was drawn predominantly from the young, the working class, and the 
unemployed, contrasting with the older, more middle class electoral base of the PNV. 
103 
  
Parallel to the new conciliatory tone of the new constitutional arrangements, the 
Spanish government introduced a raft of robust counter-terrorism legislation. The 
legislation shared many of the same characteristics of the Francoist measures. The 
special 1978 Decree-Law on Antiterrorism existed for around two and a half years in 
various forms and was replaced eventually in mid-October 1980 by legislation which 
was democratically passed in the Spanish Cortes.  It allowed for the suspension of 
important constitutional guarantees against preventive detention, search without 
warrant, protection of privacy of mail and telecoms and allowed for 10 day 
incommunicado detention without charge104. 
 
In 1980, perhaps born out of the frustration that the constitutional arrangements did 
not go far enough, ETA claimed their most bloody year.  The PNV began to take a 
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more unequivocal stance towards ETA violence, condemning their attacks and 
joining anti-ETA demonstrations after the assassination of two local UCD leaders in 
San Sebastian.    In the aftermath of the attacks, the leader of the PNV at the time, 
Jesuit priest Xabier Arzallus commented ‘We want no tyrants, not even Basque 
ones’.105 However the unreformed nature of the Guardia Civil, and their abuse of 
Basques sometimes entirely unconnected to ETA whilst in detention made total 
condemnation of ETA a difficult sentiment to articulate106.  However as ETA 
scrambled to retain some of the sense of legitimacy they had had during the Franco 
regime, they attacked a wider range of targets and alienated former allies and 
sympathisers in the process.   Under this set of measures, the number of ETA 
members in detention began to rise from 1978 and by 1981, there were 265 etarras 
(ETA members) in prison. 
 
The UCD government had inherited the problem of knee-jerk reaction too. Following 
the assassination by ETA of José María Portell, a Spanish journalist, the Spanish 
Minister of the Interior made the decision to move ETA prisoners from their current 
prisons to other parts of Spain, away from the Basque Country where security 
provisions were better.  Most of the ETA prisoners were moved to a maximum 
security prison in Soria where they were controlled by special antiterrorist army 
troops instead of regular prison officers.107 The move prompted widespread protests 
around the Basque country. Whilst Franco was gone and the government was now 
democratic, the state had not lost its muscular edge in the early days after the 
transition. Amnesty International found in 1979 that ‘maltreatment amounting to 
torture has occurred in police stations in Madrid, Barcelona and Bilbao between 
September 1978 and June 1979’.108  In addition to this embarrassment, a body 
created by the Cortes to investigate allegations of mistreatment in police and Guardia 
Civil custody was refused entrance to a number of sites in July 1980109.   
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There were other clear signs that the state was in disarray during the transition to 
democracy.  The largely unreformed military had been suspicious of the democratic 
project from the outset.  The clear cleavages between the new democratically elected 
government and the military manifested themselves twice under the initial period of 
UCD rule in the form of attempted coups in 1978 and 1981.  While the spike in ETA 
violence during the transition period enraged military hardliners, ‘sharpening hostility 
towards the process of democratization’110, it was the recognition of the autonomies 
and of the regional systems of government in the Constitution of 1978 that caused 
the military hardliners the most dismay.111  The sense of discontent in the military 
was palpable, as ‘attitudes of indiscipline and even of rebellion from the extreme right 
were treated lightly and covered up’, while military courts and disciplinary procedures 
were enforced to punish those who supported democracy.112 After the initial coup 
attempt which was short lived and abortive, the government failed to take the 
opportunity to punish severely those who had been involved, handing out lenient 
punishments for misconduct.  Similarly, the October 1981 coup attempt led by 
Guardia Civil Lieutenant-Colonel Tejero which was much more threatening, but was 
still quickly controlled by units of the military which had remained loyal to the king.  
Whilst the new UCD Prime Minister, Calvo Sotelo ensured that the Tejero coup 
conspirators received heavy prison sentences, the government did not seize on the 
opportunity to redress the amount of independence and power held by the military at 
this point.113  In the aftermath, the government felt the need to negotiate changes of 
personnel or shifts in policy with senior military commanders.114  Calvo Sotelo’s 
Defence Minister commented told El País, ‘I remember Raymond Carr, the historian, 
asking me a stupid question: “Why didn’t you clean up the army?” “Because if I clean 
up the army on the basis of people’s ideas, I’ll be left with twenty soldiers”’.115  
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Spain under the PSOE 
 
The PSOE came to power at the October 1982 Spanish general election.  Right wing 
opponents criticisms during the election campaign and in the early days of the 
administration under Felipe Gonzáles centred around the idea that the Socialists 
would be soft on terrorism.116 This was despite the fact that the UCD had themselves 
been orchestrating negotiations with ETA(p-m) whereby etarras abandoning the 
armed struggle would be ‘socially reinserted’ into normal Spanish society, and 
integrated into normal democratic politics through the ETA(p-m) linked party 
Euskadiko Ezkerra.117  It was primarily this policy which led ETA(p-m) to abandon 
armed struggle altogether in 1982, with a rump of their members disaffected with the 
process continuing to conduct attacks for a further year before defecting to ETA(m).   
To answer the critics, the Socialist government steadily toughened their policy, 
making it more coercive throughout their tenure.  Legislation was passed in 1983 and 
early 1984 which regulated the right of accused persons to legal assistance and the 
use of habeas corpus in legal proceedings.118  In reaction to a spate of ETA murders, 
including the assassination of an army captain in 1983, more legislation was quickly 
introduced by the government, becoming law in December 1984, creating what one 
Basque politician called a ‘semipermanent state of exception in the Basque 
country’.119 Clark notes that the immediate consequences of these policies were felt 
by the media, as the state arrested prominent journalists and editors of Basque 
nationalist leaning newspapers for a variety of offences under the new legislation 
such as ‘publishing articles that insulted the Spanish government and the king’.120   
 
Arrest rates rose in this period from under 100 to over 150 per month, and the 
number of Basque political prisoners held in Spanish prisons jumped from 300 to 400 
in 1984.  Allegations and evidence of torture of Basques in Spanish prisons began to 
emerge in 1983 and 1984 which were strenuously denied by the government despite 
the frequency of the complains and several reports by Amnesty International 
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throughout the period that asserted the claims of torture and mistreatment of ETA 
prisoners.121  This hard line approach, born out of the perceived need to be seen to 
be tough on terror to quiet right wing critics and the anger created by ETA 
assassinations of military personnel and the very human sense that they must do 
something, ‘produced widespread anger and resentment among large affected 
sectors of the Basque population, facilitating the reproduction of effective adhesion 
and even a significant amount of popular support of ETA’.122  
 
The failure to constrain the power and independence of the military had other deadly 
consequences in the 1980s.  From 1975 until around 1981, there had been a number 
of attacks carried out against ETA personnel and the wider Basque population on 
both sides of the Spanish French border by groups opposed to ETA violence.  These 
organisations used a variety of names, including Alianza Apolóstica Anticomunista 
(AAA), Ante-Terrorismo ETA (ATE), and Comandos Anti-Marxistas but most attacks 
were carried out under the name of Batallón Vasco Español (BVE) or the Basque 
Spanish Battalion.123  It appeared that these organisations were illegal offshoots of 
the state, having been formed by SECED, Carrero Blanco’s newly established 
intelligence agency, and being composed mostly of Spanish military officers and 
mercenaries.124  Over the period of 1975 to 1981, these groups claimed the lives of 
five ETA members and injured over two dozen civilians with no links to terrorism.125  
The continuation of such repressive measures under the elected government of the 
UCD can be seen as emblematic of the discontent of some elements of the state with 
the democratic project, who perhaps feared the direction that the fight against ETA 
would take under democracy,126 and the failure or unwillingness of the state to root 
out the elements of the security services and military who continued to take the law 
into their own hands.  Decisions on how to respond to ETA during this crucial period 
thus had a difficult balance to strike: too lenient and the state risked provoking more  
state operatives to go rogue and take illegal action themselves in the aforementioned 
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shadowy organisations, or perhaps even putting the entire democratic project at risk,  
whereas too harsh a response risked consolidating Basques behind ETA and giving 
the impression that the Spanish state, with or without democracy would continue to 
violently repress the Basques. 
 
By 1983, the PSOE were in power and were failing to make inroads in their efforts to 
quell terrorist violence from ETA, only serving to ratchet up the cycle of ‘action-
repression-action’ which suited the continuation of ETA’s campaign. Furthermore, the 
Spanish government had made attempts to secure cooperation on cross-border 
security issues from France, but to no avail, despite the continued operation of ETA 
from their ‘French sanctuary’, with numerous attacks being launched from the French 
Basque country, with cell members often escaping back across the border to safety 
afterwards. The French government appeared to be unconvinced of Spain’s 
democratic credentials. 127  Spurred on by the frustration of continued ETA attacks, 
and the obduracy of France on security cooperation, the Spanish state embarked on 
a ‘dirty war’ against ETA.  The question of at what level there was knowledge and 
approval of the previous dirty war against ETA waged by the BVE and other remains 
unanswered. However, the emergence of Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL) 
in 1983 can be traced directly to the highest levels of the PSOE government.128  The 
GAL were financed through the use of secret funds by the Interior Ministry, who 
protected the organisation.  Its personnel were recruited by the Spanish police, and it 
is thought that some of those active in the BVE and previous ‘contra’ terrorist groups 
were also members.129 
 
The decision to revert to illegal death squads in an attempt to counter ETA appears 
to have been spurred on in part by the kidnap and eventual execution in October 
1983 of an army medical officer, Captain Alberto Martín Barrios by the remnant of 
ETA(p-m) that would later dissolve into ETA(m) or the social reinsertion 
programme.130  When the GAL did strike first on 16 October 1983, abducting low 
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level ETA operatives Joxean Lasa and Joxi Zalaba in Bayonne, France with their 
bodies being found two years later in Alicante in a quicklime grave, it caused a wave 
of panic amongst Basque refugees living in the French Basque Country.  Two days 
later, Segundo Marey was kidnapped in Hendaye, released on the 14 December 
1983.  Marey’s abduction was a case of mistaken identity but the GAL mercenaries 
nevertheless exploited the situation, issuing their first public statement.  The 
statement explained that the GAL had been established to counter ETA attacks 
launched from French territory.  It stated that each murder by ETA would have a 
‘necessary reply’ and that French interests in Europe would be attacked as the 
French government was responsible for permitting ETA terrorists to act with impunity 
in their territory.131 
 
The link to the upper echelons of the Spanish state might have been presumed by 
those critical and suspicious of the Spanish state, and its failure to overhaul the state 
apparatus after the transition to democracy, but it was officially proven in the 1990s.  
In July 1998, Jose Barrionuevo, former secretary of state for security, Rafael Vera, 
former Minister of the Interior, and Julian Sancristóbal, former Governor of Viscaya 
region were found guilty of kidnapping Segundo Marey and of embezzlement; an 
indication of just how high in the PSOE administration complicity with GAL operations 
went.132  In total, the GAL were responsible for around 40 attacks between 1983 and 
1987.  A spate of attacks against high ranking ETA members living in the French 
Basque country might have been effective in rattling ETA’s cage and disrupting its 
organisational structure.  However, whilst the GAL were for a time at least militarily 
effective, the political fall out of their actions was clear to be seen.  Despite going 
some way to securing cooperation with the French government, who in 1984 began 
to take a more proactive approach towards ETA, with French police conducting raids 
and arrests, deporting several arrestees to Guadeloupe and then Panama, and 
eventually beginning to extradite suspects to Spain, support for ETA was galvanised 
due to GAL attacks.  Woodworth notes that GAL activities added ‘fuel to ETA’s 
cooling fires’ 133, pointing to the increased vote for Herri Batasuna at the February 
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1984 Basque Parliament elections to 14.5 percent, reversing their decline at the 
municipal elections the year before.134  Indeed there was the feeling that with the 
assassination of Santiago Brouard on November 20 1984, known as Tío Santi, and a 
public representative for Herri Batasuna, that even moderate Basques would no 
longer condemn the actions of ETA.  Woodworth again comments that the actions of 
the GAL had perhaps killed off a representative who might have been able to bring 
about a peaceful conclusion to ETA’s armed campaign at that stage in the mid-
1980s.135  He states also that, ‘In killing Brouard, the GAL did not bring ETA to its 
knees; on the contrary, the shooting had brought ETA supporters, in their hundreds 
of thousands, to their feet’.136 
 
Attacks by the GAL appeared to end by 1987, perhaps because of the greater levels 
of cooperation from the newly elected French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and his 
centre right government, or perhaps because of the ever increasing speculation that 
the GAL was a government-led and funded organisation or some combination of the 
two.  Nevertheless, the public trials and attempts by sympathetic judges to protect 
state personnel and state secrets throughout the 1990s were a clear indication, at 
least for many Basques, that the state was heavily involved, whatever the actual 
organisational structure.137 
 
Negotiating with ETA 
 
Running parallel at various stages to the secret ‘dirty war’ being waged by the 
Socialist government, were attempts at negotiating with ETA.  There had been some 
abortive attempts made under the UCD government previously to engage with 
ETA(m) which had largely fallen at the first hurdle when ETA(m) demanded that the 
talks be held in the open and that the KAS Alternative, a set of basic points which 
ETA(m) had published in February 1978, offering a ceasefire in return for the granting 
of these five demands.  They were as follows: 
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1. Total amnesty. 
2. Legalization of all political parties, including those whose program 
includes the creation of an independent Basque state without having to 
reduce their statutes. 
3. Expulsion from Euskadi of the Guardia Civil, the Policía Armada and the 
General Police Corps. 
4. Improvement of the living and working conditions for the popular classes 
and especially for the working class, satisfaction of their immediate 
social and economic aspirations as expressed by their representative 
associations. 
5. An autonomy statute that, as a minimum, recognizes the national 
sovereignty of Euskadi, authorizes Euskera as the principal official 
language of the country, provides for Basque government control over all 
law enforcement authorities and all military units garrisoned in the 
Basque country, and endows the Basque people with adequate power to 
adopt whatever political, economic or social structures they deem 
appropriate for their own progress and welfare.138 
 
Whilst the initial efforts to negotiate with ETA (m) failed at this point, the UCD 
government had some success in establishing the ‘social reinsertion’ system, which 
was the product of tentative talks with ETA(p-m) at this point.139  Clark notes too that 
despite public statements from the government to the contrary, channels for dialogue 
with ETA(m) remained open.  Detail however about the nature of these channels is 
hard to come by, both because they are officially denied by the State, and those 
involved on the ETA side have either died or become unwilling to provide information 
on the matter.140  Initial attempts by the PSOE government to negotiate with ETA(m) 
were no more successful.   
 
                                                 
138  R.P. Clark, Negotiating with ETA, p. 82. 
139 However, some elements of ETA(m) were clearly unhappy with the weakening of their organisation 
that the social reinsertion measures were causing.  In September 1986, a former ETA(m) etarra, 
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However as the 1980s continued ETA were becoming more desperate.  ETA units 
had been dismantled in Madrid and Barcelona, and the head of ETA’s military office 
was arrested in the town of Angelet in France, with the security forces there 
uncovering a cache of documents, leading to the handing over of 58 people to the 
Spanish authorities.  The desperation that ETA were feeling was borne out in a 
change in attack style.  The shift was tangible as they moved from highly discriminate 
assassinations to indiscriminate car bombs claiming the lives of many civilians, such 
as the supermarket bomb in Barcelona in June 1987, and an attack on a Guardia 
Civil barracks in December of that year that killed family members and children of 
security forces as well as the intended targets.141 In this atmosphere, the PSOE 
government felt compelled to reopen negotiations via a previously set up channel to 
ETA leadership living in exile in Algeria. The culmination of several months of efforts 
was a two week ceasefire announced in January 1989 by ETA which was eventually 
extended until 26 March.  In a series of talks which strayed far past the Spanish 
government’s stated position of discussing only technical issues, it became apparent 
that no arrangement could be met, owing to ETA leader Eugenio Etxebeste 
Arizkuren’s demand that the Spanish constitution would have to be amended, 
something the Spanish negotiators were unwilling to agree to142.  ETA renewed their 
violent campaign at this point and sought particularly to cause havoc in 1992, seen 
as a crucially important year for Spain, who were hosting the Summer Olympic 
Games in Barcelona and the International Expo in Seville.  However, Spanish and 
French police conducted arrests in May 1992, two months before the Olympic Games 
were due to start and arrested the three man Supreme Council of ETA, decapitating 
the organisation. 143 For several years after, ETA violence would shrink to new lows. 
 
ETA’s waning fortunes 
 
The new approach appeared to reap rewards for the Spanish state.  Despite the 
decline in the number of arrests, 60 per cent of those arrested were formally 
prosecuted by the judiciary between 1988 and 1997, up from around 33 per cent 
                                                 
141 J. Bew, M. Frampton, and I. Gurruchaga,Talking to Terrorists, pp. 209-10. 
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between 1977 and 1987.144  For Alonso and Reinares, this change in policing style 
was of paramount importance for splitting ETA from their support base.145 Indeed, 
without brutal repression from Guardia Civil officers, stories of torture and 
mistreatment in detention and the dark spectre of the GAL and the ‘dirty war’, it 
became clear that the violence now found most objectionable to the ordinary Basque 
population was that of ETA itself.   
 
This became most apparent when in July 1997, under the new Partidad Popular 
government, which depended on support from the PNV and other marginal parties, 
ETA kidnapped a PP councillor in the Basque country, demanding the return of all its 
prisoners to prisons in the Basque country.  Estimates say that 100,000 people 
marched in demonstrations in Bilbao alone against ETA’s kidnapping, which 
eventually ended in the death of the young PP activist.  The following year, ETA 
assassinated five PP members across Spain.146 
 
There were signs too that the Basques were looking towards Northern Ireland for 
ideas as to how to bring the conflict to a peaceful conclusion.  Talks between the 
radical nationalist and leftist groups produced the Lizarra Declaration, sometimes 
known as the ‘Estella Agreement’ in 1998.  The document, apparently heavily 
modelled on the Northern Ireland peace process, asked for a negotiated settlement 
to the Basque conflict that was to involve representatives of the Basque people as 
well as the French and Spanish governments. It incorporated language similar to that 
of the Belfast Agreement, asking for multilateral dialogue ‘without exclusion of those 
involved’. 147  The idea was that once full negotiations were realised, that violent 
action would be a thing of the past.  However, as Rogelio Alonso has pointed out, the 
Lizarra Declaration whilst outlining what those attending the talks felt ‘propitiated the 
Peace Agreement in the north of Ireland’, also conveniently ignored the realities that 
Sinn Féin and the IRA had to make massive concessions, and accept that their 
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political aspirations were not guaranteed for the peace process to become 
workable.148  
 
Shortly after the announcement of the Lizarra Declaration, ETA called a ‘general and 
indefinite’ ceasefire.149 Meetings were eventually held in June 1999 between 
representatives of Prime Minister Aznar’s PP government and representatives of 
Herri Batasuna which were this time announced openly, a landmark occasion 
marking the U-turn on the government’s policy of not engaging openly with ETA.150  
However, the peace process broke down among controversy between ETA and the 
PNV.  The PNV who had agreed to negotiations under the Lizarra Declaration had 
become unhappy with their waning electoral success and also later refused to 
withdraw from the Spanish general elections in favour of establishing an illegal pan-
Basque assembly, as ETA suggested in the Declaration, a move that would have 
constituted ‘political suicide’. 151 There was also controversy about perceived 
breaches of the ceasefire. The Spanish government claimed that the kale borroka, or 
‘street violence’, that continued to be perpetrated by Basque nationalist youths during 
the ETA ceasefire represented a violation of the ceasefire.152 Feeling the pressure 
from a number of fronts and frustrated at the lack of progress, ETA announced the 
end to their cessation on 28 November 1999. 
 
Aznar’s government countered the Estella Agreement in December 2000 with the 
‘Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism’ (Pacto por las Libertades y contra el 
Terrorismo), which called for Basque nationalist parties to abandon the Estella 
Agreement and its institutions prior to any agreement on the Basque countries. The 
pact was designed to foster a consensus amongst the PSOE and the PP on 
countering ETA violence and move towards bipartisanship on the issue.  The sense 
of bipartisanship was eventually to be shattered by in 2004 with the 
acknowledgement by the PSOE government that negotiations with ETA might be 
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necessary.153  Again in June 2002, Aznar’s government passed the Ley Orgánica de 
Partidos Políticos (Political Parties Act, from here on referred to as LOPP). 154  The 
law was conceived to make illegal the political wing of ETA; Batasuna.  The law also 
made provisions to prohibit any party which might reconstitute itself with a similar 
name or with personnel who had been convicted of terrorist offences. 155  The effect 
was felt in March 2003 when the Supreme Court banned Batasuna.  In addition, the 
PP government introduced measures to extend the maximum period of custody for 
terrorist offences from 20 to 40 years, and tightened rights of remission and parole.  
The return to power of the PSOE after the 2004 elections, under the new Prime 
Minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero had to face difficulty from Basque nationalists 
from the outset, countering the plans by nationalists in the Basque parliament to hold 
a referendum on a new Autonomy Statute which would declare that the Basque 
Autonomous Community existed in ‘free association’ within Spain.156  However, the 
capacity of ETA seemed to have been reduced.  The early 2000s, especially in the 
aftermath of the Madrid train bombing, carried out by an Al Qaeda inspired group had 
been a quiet spell for ETA. Media pundits claimed that the international revulsion in 
the aftermath of the indiscriminate attack by Islamic fundamentalist terrorists meant 
that ETA felt they were unable to carry out large scale attacks.  The leader of the 
Basque police trade union Erne, Roberto Seijo is quoted by London’s Financial 
Times, as stating in October 2005 that, ‘the massacre provoked such revulsion that 
ETA has not dared stage a big attack since then’.157 There is little doubt that the 
Basque and Spanish sympathisers’ tolerance for attacks in the aftermath of such an 
atrocity would have been considerably weaker.  However, ETA at this point were 
already struggling with high numbers of their members imprisoned and their political 
mouthpiece Batasuna unable to operate openly since its proscription.  The revulsion 
and public backlash that ETA faced, and their reduced capacity to operate was of 
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fundamental importance to the trajectory that the conflict was to take over the next 
few years.  
 
A rally held at the Anoeta Velodrome by the now banned party Batasuna called for 
peace as a priority and offered a new option, a two track approach in which political 
parties and trade unions would focus on political negotiations, whilst ETA talks with 
both the French and Spanish states would centre on what were to be called ‘technical 
issues’ dealing with matters such as demilitarisation, prisoners and victims.  The 
move was a significant departure for ETA, who confirmed the substance of the 
speech given by Batasuna leader Otegi in a letter in January 2005. 
 
In reaction, the PSOE government under Zapatero passed a motion in the Cortes to 
begin peace talks on the basis that, ‘political questions should be solved only be 
legitimate representatives of the popular will’ and the acknowledgement that ‘violence 
can have no political price’.158  The move angered the PP who voted against it but it 
passed nevertheless.  As a result of the motion, meetings between ETA 
representatives and a representative of the Basque branch of the PSOE secured a 
‘permanent’ ETA ceasefire in March 2006.  However, in December 2006, frustrated at 
the lack of talks between political parties, ETA broke their ceasefire with a bomb at 
Madrid Airport which killed two civilians. Renewed talks, observed by representatives 
of Sinn Féin as well as Tony Blair in 2007 also faltered as the PSOE supported the 
minority government in the Navarre parliament of the PP linked Union of the 
Navarran People (UPN).  When the ceasefire was eventually called off in June 2007, 
the Spanish State resumed their robust actions against ETA operatives in the courts, 
arresting the leadership of Batasuna, including Otegi and the entire party executive.  
Whilst ETA attacks still occurred infrequently, the security forces carried out 
successful operations in the aftermath of prominent attacks in 2008, arresting key 
Batasuna and ETA personnel.159 By late 2008, the future looked bleak for ETA.   
 
In September 2010, a conference between the radical leftwing party EA (Eusko 
Alkartasuna) and a grouping of ex-ETA personnel known simply as the ‘nationalist 
left’ led to the signing of an agreement in which they declared their intent to protect 
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the sovereignty of the Basque country against the Spanish and French governments.  
More important in this agreement however was the calling for an end to Basque 
nationalist violence, without explicit reference to ETA.  The agreement was followed 
shortly by an explicit call by EA on ETA to renounce violent means.  Just two days 
later, on September 5 2010, ETA held a press conference with the British 
Broadcasting Corporation and announced a ceasefire, stating that it was prepared to 
engage in a democratic process if the will existed from the Spanish state.160  Just 
over a year later, the peace process was internationalised with the meeting of what 
was to be known as the ‘Donostia-San Sebastián International Peace Conference’ in 
mid October 2011.  Delegates included former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, 
former Prime Minister of Norway and Gro Harlem Brundtland, former Interior Minister 
of France, Pierre Joxe.  Importantly, representatives who had played significant roles 
in the Northern Ireland peace process were also present, including former Taoiseach 
of Ireland, Bertie Ahern, President of Sinn Féin, Gerry Adams, and former Downing 
Street Chief of Staff and British Diplomat, Jonathan Powell.  The symbolic importance 
of the somewhat successful peace process in Northern Ireland was clear to be seen, 
with Ahern stating ‘We believe it is possible today to end more than 50 years of 
violence and reach a fair and lasting peace...we know from our own experience that 
when there is a real opportunity to reach peace, it must be used’.161  The final 
declaration of the conference amongst other subsidiary points, called for an 
announcement by ETA of a permanent cessation of armed violence in Spain and 
France and a process of dialogue to be established by political representatives and 
nonviolent actors in consultation with the general population. This message was 
echoed by former ETA leader Rufion Etxeberria Arbelaitz, who by this stage was a 
prominent member of the Basque nationalist left and a signatory to the agreement 
signed in September 2010.162 In response, ETA announced their permanent 
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cessation just two days later, appearing to conclude an armed campaign that had 
lasted for 50 years.163  The ETA statement announced:  
 
Eta calls upon the Spanish and French governments to open a process of 
direct dialogue with the aim of addressing the resolution of the 
consequences of the conflict and, thus, to overcome the armed 
confrontation. Thorough this historical  declaration, Eta shows its clear, 
solid and definitive commitment.  Lastly, Eta calls upon the Basque society 
to commit to this process until freedom and peace are achieved.164 
 
Since then, the announcement of the permanent cessation by one of the most 
durable and resilient terrorist organisations in European history and the peace 
appears to have held.  In January 2013, Batasuna announced their dissolution and 
support for the Basque separatist coalition, Euskal Herria Bildu. Whilst the process is 
tentative and it would be foolish to say that ETA terrorism has disappeared forever, 
precluding the emergence of ‘dissident’ reincarnations of the former organisation, 
such an event looks unlikely.  With the dissolution of Batasuna and with the peaceful 
and democratic Catalonian nationalist movement making steps towards holding a 
controversial independence poll, Basque separatist violence makes less sense today 
than it ever did in the past. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Having examined the trajectory of the conflict between the Spanish state and radical 
Basque nationalists, it seems apt that some final points might be elucidated by way 
of conclusion. 
 
Barbara Walter highlights in her book Reputation and Civil War, the importance of 
reputation in responding to separatist challenges to the state, particularly where a 
number of ethnic minority groups concentrated in geographical regions may attempt 
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to secede in the future.  She posits that it is rational for states faced with numerous 
potential challenges to build a reputation of not conceding to such challenges so as 
to avoid future challenges.165  It is possible to view the robust action taken in 
response to the violent challenge to the Spanish state from ETA in the Franco years 
as an indicative of Spain’s attempt to make an example of the Basques in an attempt 
to prevent Catalonian and Galician nationalists from resorting to similar tactics, and 
perhaps even violence from radical leftist organisations that opposed the 
authoritarian regime. Thus, in some respects, the extremely forthright and 
uncompromising measures taken by the Franco regime in response to ETA violence, 
particularly in the early years of their violence, could be seen to represent 
‘propaganda of the deed’ by the state, making an example of Basques, and sending 
a clear and unequivocal message to potential challengers in other regions of Spain 
that any attempts to mobilise nationalist sentiment in a similar manner would be met 
with harsh and brutal repression. 
 
The Spanish state under Franco lacked ideological coherence of the sort often seen 
in other European authoritarian regimes.  Instead, the movimento that underpinned 
the Franco regime, acted as his support base, and from which the state elites were 
drawn was a broad church of socially conservative factions which had banded 
together at the time of the civil war.  A central theme of the image of Spain under 
Franco was the indivisibility of the Spanish nation, and the importance of centralism.  
The branding of the Basque provinces as ‘enemy’ provinces provided an adversary 
which was internal to Spain, but external to the factions which composed the 
movimento.  Thus, opposition to radical Basque nationalism was something that the 
factions could coalesce behind, and the strident rhetoric and action taken helped 
Franco to remain in power.  Counter-terrorism was used to set the tone by Spanish 
state elites on a number of other occasions.  Notably, Carrero Blanco upon becoming 
Premier, took a particularly harsh approach to dealing with ETA, attempting to show 
that he would steer the regime on a steady course, and that there was little chance of 
a softening of the state post-Franco.   As reviled as he already was by the radical 
Basque milieu, there is little doubt that his rise to become Prime Minister and his 
posturing on ETA at that time were instrumental in the decision taken by ETA to 
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assassinate him.  Later, after Spain had transitioned to democracy, the PSOE took a 
hard line on terrorism too, in their attempt to allay the fears of the electorate, and to 
silence their critics who presumed they would be weak and noncommittal.    
 
Although Franco worked hard to consolidate his power and shape Spain in his image, 
the character of the state apparatus was not entirely all his own making.  He had 
inherited a Guardia Civil which had been routinely used for the quelling of civil 
disobedience and for dealing harshly with subversives and undesirables.  So too, the 
character of the military, seeing itself as the embodiment of the Spanish nation, was 
a trait which preceded the Franco era, but one which the General used well to 
maintain his hold on political power. 
 
The military was fragmented and fractured, however, and when softer approaches to 
countering ETA violence were taken, the result was illegal and secretive death 
squads in the shape of the BVE and AAA, as frustrated soldiers and civil guards 
made retributive attacks as members of these organisations, perhaps even with the 
acquiescence or tacit approval of state elites.  The power held by the military and the 
danger that they might launch a coup d’etat, as had been seen so many times in the 
past in Spain, meant that when democratic transition came, Juan Carlos and Alfonso 
Suarez had to tread carefully in their reforms.  A fine balance had to be struck 
between granting concessions to Basques which might drive a wedge between the 
Basque nationalist population and ETA, and ensuring that these measures and the 
attempts at military reform did not provoke a pronunciamento or outright putsch which 
would have destroyed the democratic experiment in its infancy.  The task was 
complicated further by ETA(m)’s ratcheting up of violence during the transition to 
democracy as it attempted to destabilise the Spanish state at its most vulnerable, and 
demonstrate that it would continue to be relevant in a Spain without Franco. 
 
Frustration and anger played a role in determining how the state responded to ETA 
violence too.  The emergence of the GAL under the PSOE government can partly be 
explained by the failure of the PSOE to secure cooperation from France on counter-
terrorism issues.  France remained unconvinced by the democratic credentials of 
Spain post-Franco and ETA’s continued use of French Basque safe havens became 
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a thorn in the side of the Spanish state, which hampered their ability to root out ETA 
operatives and the support network they relied on.  The GAL, established and paid 
for by the Ministry of the Interior through secret funds attacked ETA across the border 
in France, as well as attacking the wider Basque population.  While these attacks 
were tactically successful in disrupting the ETA hierarchy, the backlash in the 
aftermath destroyed trust in the Spanish state which had begun to emerge in some 
quarters with the reforms introduced during transition, and made it difficult for more 
moderate voices within the Basque nationalist movement to criticise ETA openly. 
 
While the response of the state in later years was not perfect by any means, often 
stirring up unrest in the wake of controversial measures such as the proscription of 
Batasuna and the fall out in the 1990s over the financing by the state of the GAL.  
However, it was the reduction of aggressive and muscular state action, both overt 
and covert, as well as the cooperation with France that allowed Spain to chip away 
effectively at ETA’s capacity to continue their operations.  In the absence of the 
robust and repressive measures adopted by the state during the Franco regime and 
in the early days of the new democracy, ETA struggled to retain relevance.  
Hampered by negative public reaction to some of their attacks, and deprived of 
effective political representation after the banning of Batasuna, the Basque nationalist 
population drifted away from ETA as they struggled in the propaganda war, and it 
became clear that their continued war on the Spanish state was abortive.  
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Chapter Two 
The French State, French Algeria, and the Response 
to the OAS 
 
In the theatre of peacetime, it is the statesman who plays the chief rôle.  
Whether the masses greet him with applause or boos, it is for him first of 
all that they have eyes and ears.  Then suddenly war calls another actor 
from the wings, pushes him to the middle of the stage, and trains the 
limelight on him: the military chief appears. A drama is about to begin 
which will be played by statesman and soldier in concert.  No matter how 
great the crowd of extras, how noisy the audience, it is on these two 
performers that attention will be centred.  So closely interwoven is their 
dialogue that nothing said by either has any relevance, point or effect 
except with reference to the other.  If one of them misses his cue, then 
disaster overwhelms them both. 
       Charles de Gaulle, 19321 
 
The French – when they deign to deal with politics – never stop turning 
these questions over in their heads without ever – and for good reason – 
finding an answer to them. Nothing demonstrates better the depth of their 
abdication. They wonder about the possible attitude of the active officers, 
their loyalty and the links that unite them with fascism, pieds-noirs, and the 
former putschists as if the Army alone, independent and sovereign, 
decided our destiny. It is wrong: the Army must obey the people. When it 
does not obey, it is the fault of the nation itself. And when all is said and 
done, one always has the army one deserves. 
 
        Jean Paul Sartre, 19622 
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This chapter will focus on the nature, development, and character of the French 
state, and its responses to the terrorist efforts of the group known as ‘Organisation de 
l'armée secrète’, the Secret Army Organisation, or OAS from 1961 to 1962. The OAS 
were an organisation born largely out of the French military and headed by former 
senior officers of the French Army.  The OAS emerged at the height of the Algerian 
War, as the Algerian Front de Libération Nationale, or FLN struggled against the 
French state for Algerian independence.  The OAS sought to prevent at all costs the 
disengagement of France from Algeria, preventing independence and ensuring the 
maintenance of French Algeria.  Supporting the senior former military officers in the 
OAS were a ragged band of ‘ultras’ from the political right of the pieds noirs, the 
European community in Algeria.  They were joined by disenfranchised former 
legionnaires unwilling to accept the defeat of their Algerian campaign and orders to 
stand down, and Jews and Muslims fearful of a future independent Algeria under 
what they feared would be the rigidly Islamic regime of the FLN. 
 
Juxtaposing state responses to the OAS with responses to violence from ETA and 
the IRA might seem like a strange comparison to make, given the vast differences 
between the OAS and the other two organisations in question.  In addition, the 
geographical position of Algeria, unquestionably outside Europe might make it a 
curious case study in what is essentially a study of European approaches to terrorism 
and political violence.   However, whilst the differences are, undeniably pronounced, 
there is merit in the comparison. France’s dealing with the Algerian crisis is an 
example of the state struggling with the effects of partial failure of state building, 
caused, as Ian Lustick highlights, by the failure of state elites to establish a 
hegemonic ideology of the nation beyond the metropole.3  In many ways, the conflicts 
in the Basque country and in Northern Ireland take place against a similar backdrop, 
though it is perhaps uncommon to describe them in such a manner. 
 
 
Though the OAS were indeed primarily active in Algeria, and thus outside Europe, 
they also carried out attacks in metropolitan France. Indeed, the OAS was largely 
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composed of Europeans who either hailed directly from the European continent or 
were pied noirs settlers in North Africa, of clear European origin, and the struggle of 
the OAS and the target of their terrorism, was French.  They sought to affect French 
policy on Algeria, and at times even to overthrow the government.  They also sought 
to appeal to elements of the French military and win their support.  Crucially, they 
attempted to sway public opinion among European settlers in Algeria and in 
metropolitan France. While Algeria is geographically situated outside Europe, 
politically it had been viewed as an integral part of France, sending representatives to 
the National Assembly in a way which other French colonies did not; giving rise to the 
old phrase of ‘France from Dunkirk to Tamanrasset’.4 Also, the responses to 
terrorism emanating from the OAS in Algeria shortly before and after Algerian 
independence came from the French state and as we will see, was tempered by the 
history of the French state and its involvement in Algeria.  
 
Given that the OAS was the brainchild of former and serving state personnel, it is a 
particularly interesting case for examination.  In the previous chapter, the disunity of 
the state has been examined and its effects on terrorism and counter-terrorist 
campaigns has been elucidated.  In Spain, we saw how the disunity of the state gave 
rise to the Franco regime with its particularly staunch opposition to independence, 
owing to the predominance of the Africanista element in the regime.  We also saw 
how this resolute refusal to part with part of the ‘national territory’ was in some ways 
responsible for the blunt nature of counter terrorism techniques adopted by the state 
security forces.  As has been discussed previously, the attitude of the Franco regime 
towards regional identity was in part responsible for the flourishing of Basque 
nationalist sentiment and the levels of support for ETA violence throughout Spain 
until the dismantlement of the dictatorship and the move towards democracy.  With 
the OAS we have an example of how the disunity of the state not only tempered the 
response to an existing terrorist campaign, but in this case, also gave rise to it. Given 
the substantial involvement of former state personnel in the OAS, and the sympathy 
for their cause amongst some still firmly embedded in the state apparatus, the 
response to the OAS had to be substantially different. 
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In addition, the French state found itself battling against the OAS, an organisation 
which represented a rigid adherence to the idea of maintaining Algérie française 
which state elites had once considered inalienable.  This situation sets the OAS apart 
from revolutionary separatist organisations such as ETA and the IRA.  Similarly, the 
OAS differs from so called ‘pro-state’ terrorist groups like the UVF and UDA in 
Northern Ireland.  Steve Bruce, says of ‘pro-state’ terrorist organisations that they 
‘may use force to stiffen the resolve of the legitimate defenders of the state and they 
may try to do the state’s job for it by challenging its monopoly of the legitimate use of 
force’.5  At the outset, the OAS may have shared with the state the goal of 
maintaining the political status quo insofar as French Algeria was concerned, that 
their violence was so often an attempt to coerce the state itself, and even included 
efforts to stir up a military coup against the government, sets it apart from the more 
traditional ‘pro-state’ terrorism that Bruce discusses.  A further important 
consideration is that many of the senior members of the OAS were not from some 
extrinsic region or province of their nation like loyalist leaders were in Northern 
Ireland, but rather they were largely of metropolitan France.  Where they perhaps do 
bear similarities to Northern Ireland’s loyalists is in the general aims and outlook of 
their membership, though the demographic makeup is quite different. Drake, in his 
1996 article in Terrorism and Political Violence places the OAS in the bracket of 
‘Conservative Terrorism’ alongside Northern Ireland’s Ulster Defence Association 
(UDA), the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), and 19th century political vigilantes in the 
USA.6 Drake summarises ‘conservative terrorists’ as   
 
...see[ing] their aim as the preservation of the existing political and social 
order or, if necessary, the restoration of an order which has gone, and they 
facilitate this by the elimination of those people or institutions which they 
believe constitute a threat.7   
 
In order to fully understand the rationale and position of the OAS and the response of 
the French state to their violent campaign, it is essential that we first look at the 
                                                 
5 S. Bruce, ‘The State and Pro-State Terrorism in Ireland’, in, R. English and C. Townshend, (eds.)The 
State: Historical and Political Dimensions (London; New York: Routledge, 1999), p.185. 
6 C.J.M Drake, ‘The Phenomenon of Conservative Terrorism’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 8/3, 
(1996),  pp. 29-46. See particularly pp. 30-1. 
7 Ibid, p. 30. 
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background to the Algerian war and the immediate history of the French state and its 
state apparatus.  
 
History of French Algeria 
 
The Algerian War has been well studied elsewhere, thus it is not my intention to 
expend time and resources on recovering old ground.8  However, for the purposes of 
clarity and to provide context for the lesser known struggle, that of OAS, it is 
necessary to give a brief précis of the events leading up to the Algerian War. 
 
The French colonial presence in Algeria began with the invasion of June 1830. A 
brief series of battles ensued against the occupying Ottoman Empire and by the end 
of that month, the Ottoman Sultan had declared that they would no longer defend 
Algeria, and French forces had established a base in Algiers.9  On 26 August 1881, 
the French government announced that Algeria was to be governed as if it was an 
integral part of France.10  Algeria was to be viewed as if it was French ‘in the same 
way as Normandy, Brittany or the Savoy. To leave would be to dismember the 
essence of the nation state, an unthinkable scenario for any future government’ - an 
arrangement which was to haunt the Fourth and Fifth Republics,11 and one which 
Alistair Horne described evocatively as successive governments being ‘lumbered 
with the albatross round its neck of Algeria being, not a colony, but an inseparable 
part of France herself’.12 French citizenship was extended to the European settlers of 
Algeria in 1865 but notably not to the native Arab and Berber populations which they 
had colonised.13  It became clear that the extension of such citizenship rights to the 
masses was incompatible with the establishment of a sort of Home Rule for Algeria in 
                                                 
8 See for example, M. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (London: Macmillan London, 1977), T. 
Shepard, The Invention of Decolonization: The Algerian War of the Remaking of France (Ithica, NY.; 
London: Cornell University Press, 2006), M.S. Alexander, M. Evans, and J.F.V. Keiger, (eds.)The 
Algerian War and the French Army, 1954-62: Experiences, Images, Testimonies (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), and M. Kettle, De Gaulle and Algeria 1940-1960: From Mers El-Kébir to 
the Algiers Barricades (London: Quartet Books Ltd, 1993). 
9 M. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, p. 7. 
10 Ibid, p.19.  
11 Ibid. 
12 A. Horne, The French Army and Politics 1870-1970 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1984), p. 78.  
13 A. Harrison, Challenging De Gaulle (St.Petersburg, FL: Hailer Publishing, 1989), p. 23. 
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1898.14 The clear divide in Algerian society was along ethnic lines.  Alexander 
Harrison comments on how despite class differences and a class system being 
apparent from the dawning of French Algeria: 
  
Ethnic links produced a solidarity that overrode social barriers.  All 
Europeans, from the dirt-poor gitan to the wealthy landowner, were agreed 
on the bottom line of Algerian politics - survival.15 
 
Thus despite the differences in their countries of origin, with many hailing from other 
southern Mediterranean states, and the social class divides, the pied noirs separated 
themselves from the Muslims on an ethnic basis. 
 
Anti-French and anti-colonial sentiment had boiled over in Algeria from the Arab and 
Berber population at various intervals since the French invasion.  This was somewhat 
catalysed by World War II and the hardship they had faced during it, as well as the 
spurned attempts to create some moderate reform granting piecemeal rights to 
Muslims. Algerian nationalists were growing discontented.  It culminated in 1945, 
when Muslims clashed with French forces in Sétif during a parade on V.E Day in 
which the nationalists chanted ‘For the Liberation of the People, Long Live Free and 
Independent Algeria!’16  Shots were exchanged between some within the 
demonstration and the gendarmes.  By the time the revolt had been crushed, the 
death toll amongst the Algerians numbered somewhere between 5,000 and 45,000.17  
This incident in Sétif and a similar incident on 23 May in the town of Guelma near the 
Tunisian border which saw the death of 1,500 Algerian Muslims, this time at the 
hands not of the French forces but of a pied noir militia, caused strained relations 
between the European and Algerian Muslim communities.18  Following these 
incidents, many Algerian nationalist leaders were arrested and imprisoned and the 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid, p. 24.  
16 A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, p. 25. 
17 Matthew Connolly suggests that the burial of slain Algerians in mass graves and a cover up by 
French officials makes an accurate casualty count impossible for this incident. See M. Connolly, 
‘Rethinking the Cold War and Decolonization: The Grand Strategy of The Algerian War for 
Independence’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 33/2, (2001) pp. 221-45, particularly 
p. 240 n. 7.  
18 M. Evans, Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, pp. 88-9. 
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memory of these crises remained in the collective memory of both communities for 
years to come.19 
 
Relations between pieds noirs and Algerian Muslims continued to be strained 
throughout the late 1940s and early 1950s, with electoral rigging to ensure the strong 
position held by pieds noirs would be maintained.20  Simultaneously, Algerian 
nationalism was growing and once more came to a head on 1 November 1954.  All 
Saint’s Day had been chosen as the day for the debut attacks of the newly formed 
FLN.  A series of attacks were carried out across Algeria, first upon French Army 
outposts in the Aurès mountains, then in the Department of Constantine, into Kabylia, 
and across Algeria.21  Political pamphlets left in their wake announced the arrival and 
aims of the hitherto unheard of organisation.  Their major aims were declared to be 
the independence of Algeria and internationalisation of the Algerian problem by every 
means until their goals were realised.22  The attacks of 1 November 1954 by the FLN 
marked the first strike in what was to become known as the Algerian War, which 
lasted until Algeria was granted independence in March 1962. That it was a war at all 
that the French state had been engaged in, was something that went unrecognised 
by French authorities until 1999.  
 
Historical Development of the French State 
 
To understand the position of the French state and the responses taken towards to 
the OAS and its violence, it is important to look at the features of the state’s history 
which might have influenced the decisions taken in countering the terrorist violence 
from the OAS.  France has a troubled history socially and economically but 
particularly politically.  The state has seen in no more than 250 years; constitutional 
monarchy, revolution, five republics, more than seventeen constitutions, two world 
wars and the loss of an empire.  As Philip M. Williams pointed out, ‘Frenchmen are 
used to changes not merely of government but of the whole political regime’.23  Thus 
                                                 
19 M. Kettle, De Gaulle and Algeria 1940-1960, p. 31. 
20 A. Horne, A Savage War of Peace, pp. 70-1. 
21 G. Bocca, The Secret Army (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall Inc, 1968), p. xiii. 
22 See, M.  Kettle, De Gaulle and Algeria 1940-1960, p.116, for further details of the minutiae of the 
FLN’s stated aims at the outset of their struggle.  
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the experience of the turbulent political history is something which is shared by the 
Spanish and French states. By 1954 and the outbreak of the Algerian War, France 
had suffered great turmoil at the hands of two world wars, an interwar period that was 
riven with political division and difficulty, and the struggle post World War Two to 
reassert its national identity.   
 
The French army had been known prior to World War Two as ‘la Grande Muette’ or 
‘The Great Mute’.  Menard explains: 
  
The Great Mute was an army that had no politics; its function was to 
execute the orders of the government without reflection. To obey was the 
duty of the soldier, and the chain of command ultimately reached the 
civilian Chief of State.24 
 
Indeed the military had been under civilian control since 1815, after the reign of 
Napoleon I, and continued as such until 1939.25  Contrasted with the Spanish army 
which were noted for their activism and rhetorical patriotism, the French army were 
noted for their passivity, even in the midst of political strife, and it is noted that the 
revolutions of 1830 and 1848 were political rather than military, both ‘in inspiration 
and execution’.26 
 
The greatest departure from the idea of the army as ‘the great mute’ in French 
society came in 1940.  Though obedience had hitherto been counted on a given, the 
professionalism and ability of the French army had suffered in the aftermath of World 
War One given the detrimental economic situation and a sense of war weariness that 
crept over French state and society.27  As a result, when Nazi Germany invaded 
France in 1940, the army was ill prepared and suffered massive losses.  The terms of 
the armistice with Germany stated that the French army would be passively obedient 
to the new premier of the puppet regime, Marshal Philippe Pétain.28  However, 
                                                 
24 O.D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 1967), p. 
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26 Ibid, p. 5. 
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General Charles de Gaulle was unwilling to obey orders and accept capitulation 
escaped from Bordeaux to London on 17 June 1940 and called over BBC radio for 
the army to join him in his disobedience.29 De Gaulle states of his decision: 
  
I thought, in fact, that it would be the end of honour, unity, and 
independence if it were to be admitted that, in this world war, only France 
had capitulated and that she had let the matter rest there.  For in that 
case, whatever might be the issue of the conflict - whether the country, 
after decisive defeat, would one day be rid of the invader by foreign arms, 
or would remain enslaved - its self-disgust and the disgust would inspire in 
others would poison its soul and its life for many generations.30 
 
With this call to stand up against the collaborationist Pétain and his Vichy regime, 
General de Gaulle established a precedent that was to be the cause of much 
controversy and unrest little over a decade later.31  De Gaulle, through his rallying cry 
to like-minded officers and enlisted men and the establishment of the Free France 
Army chose honour before obedience.  It was the same prioritisation chosen by 
General Raoul Salan and others some years later when they decided that the 
defence of Algérie française should trump unthinking loyalty to their military superiors 
and to the civilian government of France.   
 
In the aftermath of World War Two, the army was obviously in a precarious position 
as it struggled to come to terms with the defeat at the hands of the Germans in 1940, 
the split between Pétainists and Free France.32  Kelly states that in the army, post 
Second World War: 
 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 
30 C de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, (trans) J. Griffin, and R. Howard, 
(New York: Carroll & Graf, 1998), p. 81. 
31 De Gaulle certainly understood the gravity of his decision and did not take it lightly but it is apparent 
from his memoirs that the choice he made was one he firmly and clearly believed to be the right one 
from the outset (see C De Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, especially pp. 
53-80.  It must be remembered however, that as with all autobiographical and memoir material, the 
outcome and eventual consequences of important decisions often tempers how these decisions are 
remembered and represented. 
32 O.D. Menard, The Army and the Fifth Republic, p. 30. 
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One now had any number of dichotomies operating: old versus new, 
socially liberal versus socially retrograde, metropolitan versus colonial, 
total war versus guerrilla war strategists, nationalists versus Europeans, 
Gaullists versus anti-Gaullists, and so on.33  
 
As in Spain, with the loss of empire, civilian politicians and military leaders 
exchanged accusations that the other was responsible for their defeat.34  The army 
had lost its position of prestige in French society.  Additionally, their experiences in 
World War II and its backwash as well as the ensuing First Indochina War from 1946 
to 1954 created in the military mentality an alienation from continental France, who 
came to regard their presence in the colonies as a symbol of their greatness. Again, 
here we can see the similarities with the disposition of the Spanish Army after the 
loss of their colonies, the infighting that the Spanish state suffered between executive 
and military branches over who should shoulder the blame for their defeats, and the 
centring of national identity among the military on territorial integrity, as described in 
the previous chapter. Kelly also highlights that the Indochina conflict created an 
activist segment of the French Army, ‘disillusioned, technical ultras, susceptible to 
dangerous political intervention but essentially uninterested in the political process as 
such’.35 This group of ‘ultras’ were to form a sizeable percentage of those who made 
their way into the ranks of the OAS. 
 
Having briefly discussed how French Algeria came about, how the Algerian War 
began, and the character of the French state and its military, let us now turn to 
discuss the emergence of the OAS.  It is not my intention to discuss all political 
developments from the beginning of the war until the emergence of the OAS, but 
rather to highlight the important events which were instrumental in the organisation’s 
development.   
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The Algerian War and Pied Noir Discontent 
 
Against the background of the growing dissatisfaction with the Fourth Republic and 
the government under the premiership of Pierre Pflimlin and the continuing Algerian 
War, rumours were circulating in Algiers in May 1958 that French diplomats were 
planning to negotiate with the leadership of the FLN.36  With tensions at a high point, 
demonstrations were called for the 13 May in both Paris and Algiers, but it was in 
Algiers that the protests reached fever pitch.  Thousands of Algerians, both Muslim 
and European flocked to the city centre and around the Forum, the centre of 
government administration in the city with chants of ‘Algérie française’. The protests 
were met with half-hearted responses from riot police who were eventually replaced 
by 3rd Colonial Paratroops, much to the delight of the protestors.37  General Raoul 
Salan, the Commander in Chief of the military in Algeria was authorised by the 
President of the Council of Ministers to take charge of the maintenance of order, 
effectively declaring the retreat of the civilian government of Algeria and placing 
control in the hands of the army.38 The collapse of the discredited and crumbling 
Fourth Republic came as Gaullist elements amongst the army were able to enact a 
bloodless transfer of power to General de Gaulle.39  This came through plans from 
Gaullist army Generals for a military action against the Republic, headed by General 
Massu.  Dubbed as ‘Operation Resurrection’, it was not to be a military putsch in the 
traditional sense, but through exerting pressure on the government to bring about the 
legal investiture of De Gaulle.40  In the end, no action was required from the Gaullist 
army faction, and the investiture occurred peacefully and legally, bringing the General 
to power and the Fourth Republic to an end on 29 May.41 The days of ‘La Grande 
Muette’ were well and truly over.  General Raoul Salan, commented in a thinly veiled 
threat that ‘it would be impossible to predict [the army’s] reaction if the new prime 
minister were not firmly committed to the maintenance of French Algeria’.42  
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Algeria under de Gaulle was not as the pieds noirs had expected, however.  It 
became clear by 1959, as the Algerian war rumbled on that de Gaulle was not as 
wedded to the idea of French Algeria as was previously thought. Jean Paul Sartre 
quipped in May 1958 that what de Gaulle wanted for Algeria ‘depended on the day 
and on the audience’. 43 De Gaulle, speaking on the issue, began to mention 
something of an ‘association’ between Algeria and France, which sounded rather 
different to ‘French Algeria’ and in September 1959 expressed his preference for a 
‘government of Algerians by Algerians’.44    Coinciding with these controversial 
moves, Salan, who had been the Commander in Chief of the army in Algeria was 
recalled to France to take a newly created position.  It became clear that the move 
was designed to take the vehemently pro-Algérie française Salan out of his position 
of power and influence, to allow for the softening of de Gaulle’s position.45  Upon 
Salan’s retirement in June 1960, he sensed the betrayal and reconnected with the 
pro-Algérie française elements within the army, moving back to Algeria for a period 
before moving to Madrid. 
 
De Gaulle’s speech in September 1959 had provoked the ire of senior military figures 
in Algeria.  General Massu, who was angered by the judicial processes underway 
against some of his men who stood accused of the torture of prisoners, made a 
comment to a German journalist indicating his belief that de Gaulle had little 
understanding of the situation in Algeria and implying that the army would not 
unconditionally obey de Gaulle as President of the Republic.46  As a result, General 
Massu was eventually transferred out of Algeria.  However, the nationalist movement 
in Algeria held Massu in high esteem. Demonstrations were once again organised, 
this time by civilian activists Joseph Ortiz, a café owner, and Pierre Lagaillarde, a 
student activist and eventual founding member of the OAS.  The French nationalist 
movement, buoyed by the support of the French nationalist student activists led by 
Lagaillarde assembled barricades in Algiers city centre on January 24th 1960 in an 
attempt, much like the 13 May occupation of the Governor General’s building the 
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previous year, to provoke the intervention of the Army on their side to avoid 
bloodshed.47  The incident became known as the ‘Week of the Barricades’ (la 
semaine des barricades).  Joining the nationalist civilian activists were many of the 
part-time reservist force, the Unités Territoriales, who were known to be widely 
sympathetic to the sentiments of Algérie française.  
 
Gunfire eventually broke out between the police and the activists, claiming the lives 
of six civilians and 14 police officers and injuring 24 civilians and 123 police. The 
appearance of the paratroops eventually quelled the violence though they took no 
decisive action against the demonstrators behind the barricades.  This action, 
designed to damage the authority of de Gaulle and bring the army in on the side of 
the protestors and those in favour of a permanent French Algeria, eventually died 
out.  It became clear that despite the obvious sympathy from sections of the army, 
that only the Foreign Legion and the paratroops were behind the activists.48  
Indicative however of just how divided the French military establishment was over the 
issue of the Barricades week can be concisely summed up in events as the turmoil of 
this event drew to a close.  Geoffrey Bocca recounts how Lagaillarde, in leading his 
‘troops’ away from the barricades to resume something close to normal life in conflict 
stricken Algiers, was given a guard of honour by the 1st REP, the paratroop unit 
widely regarded as the most aggressive and effective at the army’s disposal.  He 
states succinctly, ‘What Lagaillarde had done to deserve a guard of honor was not 
easy to establish unless the massacre of fourteen trapped gendarmes was reason in 
itself’.49 
 
In the aftermath of Barricades week, those in the army who were seen by de Gaulle 
as having been slow to respond to the violence were punished, albeit leniently, and 
the civilian leaders of the rabble, including Lagaillarde, Jean-Jacques Susini and 
Jean-Claude Perez were detained, but soon let out on bail which they violated by 
leaving for Madrid, where they reconvened with Ortiz who had escaped by stowing 
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away on a freighter, and Salan amongst others, and began to plot the next attempt to 
cause de Gaulle’s downfall.50 
 
De Gaulle believed that nothing of any substance had been done prior to his return to 
power to handle the Algerian problem, something which he appeared keen by both 
his words and deeds to combat.51  Despite abortive plots by the militant movement 
Front de l'Algérie Française (FAF) to assassinate De Gaulle on a visit to Algeria in 
December 1960, his resolve was unhindered. The announcement on 27 February 
1961 following meetings with Tunisia’s President Habib Bourguiba that they had 
achieved ‘positive and rapid progress’ towards direct negotiations between France 
and the GPRA, the Algerian Provisional Government must have acted as a red rag to 
the Madrid-based conspirators’ bull.52  
 
The emergence of the OAS 
 
The OAS came into existence after a series of meetings in Madrid beginning in 
January 1961.53 Chaired by Pierre Lagaillarde and attended by around fifty pieds 
noirs representing numerous right wing organisations frustrated at the failed efforts to 
push their agenda on French involvement in Algeria, they decided on the name for 
the organisation and Raoul Salan gave his approval for the new group.  The OAS 
went unnoticed for a while, with little more to mark their formation than some graffiti 
daubed in public spaces in Algiers.54  The first concrete signs that the state had 
about the emergence of this group, constituting a ragbag of rightists came in April 
1961.  Government officials and police chiefs were alerted of their existence as tracts 
printed by the OAS announcing their arrival and calling for people to join them were 
pushed into their letterboxes.55  In the aftermath of a series of small plastic 
explosives bombs in Algiers later that month, the OAS published a tract claiming 
responsibility for the attacks and warning that these actions were only a prelude to 
more destructive actions which were yet to come.56 
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Attempts had been made at discussions as early as March 1956 between the French 
government and the FLN, but had broken down amidst the controversy of the 
skyjacking of a plane carrying Ahmed Ben Bella, bound for Morocco.57 Links had 
been reestablished in both 1960 and early 1961, and were more fruitful, paving the 
way for the crucial Evian talks.58   Both parties finally agreed to commence 
negotiations in Evian, near Lake Geneva on 7 April.  The OAS were outraged at what 
they saw as the slippery slope to capitulation.  On the day the talks were announced, 
the OAS murdered the mayor of Evian as a symbol of their disapproval.59  The talks 
were delayed by the FLN’s refusal to participate if the MNA, its closest rival 
organisation, were involved in the talks.60  On the 11 April, de Gaulle made a 
statement at a press conference at the Élysée in Paris.  He stated that Algeria was 
costing France more than the benefit derived from holding onto it, and that France 
had no economic rationale for continuing their involvement there.  He continued that 
France would not object to Algerians ‘constructing an independent state that would 
be sovereign in terms of internal and external relations’, a position which represented 
a clear step away from previous statements and previous official French policy.61 
 
Sympathetic factions to the cause of French Algeria within the military staged an 
attempted coup on 21 April.  The idea had been in planning for some time but was no 
doubt spurred on by the statement that de Gaulle had made, which they saw as 
inflammatory. The attempted coup, known various as ‘The Algiers Putsch’ and ‘The 
Generals’ Putsch’ ultimately failed in seizing control of the military away from the 
government.  It was led by General Maurice Challe, who had been instrumental in the 
fight against the ALN, the armed wing of the FLN, in a previous phase of the conflict 
and had become upset with the approach of de Gaulle towards Algeria and had 
retired from the army in February 1961.  He was joined in the plot by General Salan, 
Jouhaud (who was a five-start air force commander, and General Zeller.  Evans 
notes that all of the above had either retired from the army in disgust at the rapidly 
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softening policy on Algeria or had been retired because of their forceful pro-French 
Algeria views.62 
 
The French state had, before the putsch attempted to infiltrate the activist elements in 
Algeria that they had identified as likely to cause trouble. However the rapidity with 
which the putschists acted and the effectiveness of the units involved (perhaps 
somewhat understandably given that it was elite units like the paratroopers who 
represented the core of the putschist forces), took the government somewhat by 
surprise.63  Despite being joined by hundred of officers, and making some operational 
successes in Algeria, the Generals’ Putsch failed.  Anti-fascist groups and other 
leftists demonstrated against the putsch in Paris, while pieds noirs, chanted pro-
French Algerian slogans on the streets of Algiers, highlighting the disparity between 
the two capitals and the degree to which the latter were out of touch with sentiment in 
the homeland. 
 
Of crucial importance during the attempted putsch were the actions of de Gaulle 
himself.  De Gaulle intervened by broadcast, condemning the behaviour of the 
architects of the coup and their supporters and forbidding ‘every Frenchman and 
above all, every soldier, to carry out any of their orders’64 and calling for ‘every means 
to stop these men, pending their final elimination’65.  The effect of de Gaulle’s stern 
warning was dubbed a ‘transistor victory’ for the general.66 The conscript soldiers of 
the French army, of which there were hundreds of thousands, had listened to the 
broadcast and overwhelmingly decided against complicity in the coup.  In addition to 
the condemnation of the army officers leading the putsch in the strongest of terms, 
De Gaulle invoked Article 16 of the French Constitution.  The article, allowed De 
Gaulle to declare a state of emergency, empowered the police force to extend 
detention periods from five to fifteen days, and effectively allowed internment for 
those deemed by the police to be engaged in or encouraging ‘a subversive enterprise 
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directed against the Republic’.67 De Gaulle’s experience as a military general, his 
personal charisma, and the respect he commanded from the military and civilians 
alike was to be key in shaping the conflict between the OAS and the French state, 
and indeed the outcome of the Algerian War as a whole.  
 
In response to the attempted coup, Challe and Zeller were arrested, along with 200 
officers, with the generals given sentences of 15 years. 68  Salan and Jouhaud 
escaped capture, and henceforth threw all their anti-Gaullist energy behind the OAS.  
Crucially, the French government had the sense of mind to disband three of the 
rebellious regiments that had been instrumental in the putsch, the 1st REP and two 
other paratroop regiments.69  Whilst many of the soldiers in these regiments left to 
join the OAS, undoubtedly this was preferable to having rebel regiments within the 
military armed by the state whose loyalty could never again be trusted.  In addition, 
there was a wider purge of the army at this point, although its effectiveness was 
hindered.  The purge depended on the passage of information from within the army’s 
ranks, and many enlisted men were reluctant to give evidence against their superior 
officers.70 
 
Alistair Horne draws attention to the consequences of the putsch, stating that the 
very thing the putsch leaders had been trying to prevent, independence for Algeria, 
was now much more certain because of their actions: 
  
The breaking of the army in Algeria and its ensuing demoralisation 
deprived de Gaulle of any tool for ‘enforcement’. The April 1961 putsch, 
says Bernard Tricot, ‘made even more inevitable the result which it had 
wanted to prevent, at the same time reducing the chances of attaining it 
under acceptable conditions’.71 
 
Additionally, the experience of the putsch showed the government that the OAS, 
when they eventually began to present a more sizeable challenge, could not be 
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defeated through reliance on a wavering military alone.  This is reflected in the 
response to the OAS violence. As Bocca evocatively put it: 
  
...the OAS sucked on the nipple of the Army.  Officially the Army stayed 
aloof, and officers resisted their former comrades who lobbied them.  But 
the fact was that the Army, had it wished, could have crushed the OAS in 
24 hours.  By doing nothing, it gave the Organization room to move in and 
air to breathe.72 
 
With the conclusion of the putsch, the atmosphere was now clear to resume 
negotiations with the FLN.  The French government conceded to the FLN over the 
involvement of their political rival, and negotiations began on 20 April.73  It was to be 
the first concession of many by the French in Evian. 
 
It is important not to overstate the capabilities of the OAS and the level of threat they 
posed to the French state and their intended plans in Algeria.  It is true that at the top 
level, the so called Comité Supérieur, there were a number of former army generals 
and colonels who had fought in the Second World War, as well as in the colonial 
battles in Indochina and Algeria.  It is also true that amongst their number were many 
officers, highly decorated and at one time, well respected for their valour and 
expertise, but structurally the OAS was unsound.  The clashes of personalities was 
apparent from the outset, enforcing discipline in the ranks of the OAS was difficult 
and communication was for the most part, a nightmare.  In addition, the strategies 
they adopted faltered on numerous occasions.  The FLN and Algeria’s Muslim 
population, sensing the French state in decline did not respond as the OAS had 
hoped.  No war of attrition was sparked and by the time the OAS made its first foray 
into armed action, de Gaulle had already realised that French Algeria was 
unsustainable.   
 
However, it would be unwise, thus to suggest that the ultimate failure of the OAS and 
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their project was inevitable, or that they would fail quite so miserably.74 Had the OAS 
been able to achieve more than the complicity of individual members of the army and 
instead been able to win over regiments to their cause, they may have been able to 
force de Gaulle’s hand.  Had the OAS been able to win over entire regiments as they 
had planned, and present to the President of the Republic a scenario where the 
disengagement of the French state from Algeria would have sparked a far greater 
and far bloodier military coup d’etat than had been the case with the previous 
attempts, the outcome might have been much different.  Faced with this 
consequence, de Gaulle might have opted for a middle way rather than be deposed 
or perhaps face death.   Martha Crenshaw highlights that the OAS had also 
considered their secondary goals; ‘...possible goals included the overthrow of the 
metropolitan government and installation of a rightist regime, secession from France, 
or partition’.75 Indeed, General Salan commented to Alistair Horne in 1973 that the 
realistic goal of the OAS may have been somewhat less than their stated aim of the 
full retention of the status quo for Algeria; ‘I thought that we could somehow orient 
opinion in France towards some kind of solution like South Africa - a kind of 
Apartheid for Algeria’.76 
 
Whatever their overarching desire for Algeria, the OAS had not the luxury of taking 
time to discuss and develop grand strategy.  Given the rapid and turbulent rate of 
change in French governmental policy towards Algeria and the development of the 
situation on the ground, the OAS had to react to a changing and unstable political 
atmosphere.  As such, they concentrated primarily on short-term goals.  They hoped 
that through their bombing campaigns and targeted assassinations that they could 
destabilise the burgeoning discussions between the Gaullist government and the 
FLN.77 It was hoped that creating tension during these preliminary talks would 
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prevent any negotiated settlement, which would prove disastrous for the OAS and 
their pied noirs supporters.78 
 
The coup, planned and hatched by the rebellious generals and colonels had failed 
miserably, and the regiments that had once been sympathetic to the cause of Algérie 
française had either been disbanded, redeployed out of Algeria, or heavily disciplined 
for their disloyalty.  These regiments haemorrhaged personnel who were unwilling to 
accept the disciplinary measures and many of the deserters, especially legionnaires, 
joined the ranks of the OAS to continue the fight for French Algeria.79  The loyalty to 
de Gaulle of the enlisted soldiers who had little to gain and everything to lose by 
backing their mutinous officers, the indecision of sympathetic officers, and the lack of 
action by the putsch leaders had shown that the appetite and conditions for a coup 
d’etat was unlikely to re-emerge.  However, the OAS were unprepared to admit that 
their cause was a lost one and instead they redoubled their efforts.80 Buoyed by their 
new recruits and feeling the relief of the pieds noirs, that the organisation’s leaders 
had not been arrested or scared off following the putsch, they resumed operations. 
Daily attacks known as plastiquages; small plastic explosive bombings became a 
feature of life in Algiers and Oran once again, as they had been for a time before the 
putsch.81  The French government were, no doubt, alarmed by the renewed vigour of 
OAS attacks as the organisation sought now to conduct a campaign of terrorism 
parallel to that of the FLN.82  There had also been some changes in approach by the 
OAS.   They now considered the French army as an ‘army of occupation’, upon which 
they declared war.83  Somewhat contradicting this position, they began a brutal 
campaign of terrorism against the Muslim community at large.  They hoped in doing 
so, that they would spark a cycle of tit-for-tat violence and polarise the European 
settlers from the Algerian Muslims entirely and that in such an atmosphere, the army 
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would reassert their control and intervene on the side of the OAS and the pieds 
noirs.84 
 
Alistair Horne comments on the severe lack of capacity by the security force in 
Algeria to deal with OAS attacks, despite the 25,000 gendarmes and Compagnies 
Républicaines de Sécurité (CRS), specially trained riot police riot troops at their 
disposal, they struggled to enforce order and prevent attacks.85 The security forces in 
Algeria were of course, largely sympathetic to the cause of French Algeria, which 
frustrated senior officers loyal to de Gaulle who found their efforts to counter the OAS 
were ineffective as a result of the unreliable troops.86 As a mark of how seriously the 
French government took the threat from the OAS, a new security drive was initiated.  
Nine companies of the CRS riot police were transferred from France to support units 
of gendarmes, zouaves (light infantry army units) and dragoons that were already in 
place in Algeria. 87 The CRS troops, whilst being more reliable than the Algerian 
based units as they lacked the sympathy the latter had with the putschists, were 
unfamiliar with the atmosphere and geography.  A manhunt organised to round up 
the missing generals and putsch leaders was largely ineffective, returning none of the 
elusive men.88 
 
Despite the endeavours of the government to root out the activists, the OAS were 
thriving. The so called ‘Delta Commando’, under the command of Roger Degueldre, a 
former Lieutenant with the First Foreign Legion Parachutists (the Premier REP that 
had been disbanded in the aftermath of the General’s Putsch) were at the fore of the 
OAS activities.  Consisting of fewer than one hundred former military personnel as 
well as civilian pied noirs89, these Delta units, whilst being the most effective and 
dangerous in the OAS were not entirely trusted by the leaders of the other OAS units 
and those in overall control.90  While formally Delta commando was supposed to act 
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only on orders from the Comité Supérieur, the reality was that they often acted of 
their own accord on the basis of information passed by sympathisers within the 
government.91 Spurred on by the commencement of negotiations at Evian at this 
time, Delta Commando began in May 1961 to carry out ponctuelles, or 
assassinations. In reaction to the new approach of the OAS, the French army, 
despite its divided loyalties and tendency for split personalities was increasingly 
relied on in operations against the OAS.92 In September 1961 alone, the Delta 
Commando claimed the lives of fifteen and injured 144.93   
 
A small anti-OAS unit of ten men was formed by Commissaire Louis Grassien, 
formerly of the Rheims police.94 Using informants in the OAS they began to expand 
their understanding of the organisation. One of the Delta’s early victims was the 50-
year old Police Inspector, Roger Gavoury.  Gavoury had raised his head above the 
parapet as an enemy of the OAS, taking the initiative to call in suspects and the 
wives of suspected OAS activists for questioning.  There was little shock in Algiers 
when he was found stabbed to death in his apartment, murdered by OAS Delta 
Commandos.95 Grassien’s anti-OAS unit sprang into action, using the intelligence 
they had gathered.  Gendarmes surrounded a villa in Algiers were some of those 
responsible for the attack were hiding out just two days after the assassination, 
arresting three of the group after a shootout.96 
 
As the scale and frequency of OAS attacks intensified throughout the autumn of 
1961, however, it became apparent that Grassien and his small, tight unit of anti-OAS 
specialists would not be enough to stem the rising tide, and they were eventually 
recalled to France.  However, on what was supposed to be their last night in Algiers, 
a unit of Degueldre’s Deltas ambushed a bar where Grassien and his men were 
drinking, killing René Joubert.97 
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Les Barbouzes and the extra legal use of force 
 
Despite the best efforts of the French state to counter the violence from the OAS, the 
terrorists frequently struck back in the aftermath of arrests with vicious and deadly 
attacks.  They made use of the large population of supporters, both active and tacit, 
to melt back into the shadows and disappear.  And so in this climate, with the ad-hoc 
plans of the French state faltering, and the determination of the state to secure a 
solution failing, the ‘barbouzes’ arrived in Algiers. 
 
Lucien Bodard of France-Soir reported on November 29, 1961 that the French 
government intended to step up the fight against the OAS before they could 
‘contaminate France’.98  The plan, Bodard reported was to decapitate the OAS, 
arresting the ten men identified as leaders of the organisation.  The story referred 
more specifically to a unit at the command of Michel Hacq, known as Mission C, 
tasked by the Interior Ministry with filling the void left by the departure of Grassien 
and his men99. 
 
Parallel to this movement though was another, tougher and shadier unit.  Hacq’s 
Mission C was to work autonomously to avoid the seepage of intelligence back to the 
OAS that had frustrated regular police work in the past in Algeria.  Working in 
collaboration with Mission C, though with a much more aggressive and violent brief 
was a group branded by military intelligence as ‘Speciaux’.  The media and pied noir 
community of Algeria soon assigned them another name ‘Barbouzes’, a name which 
literally meant ‘fake beards’.100  
 
There had been many rumours of strangers and secret agents moving among the 
European community abounded in the paranoid atmosphere of Algiers and Oran 
previously. One former Delta Commando operative and one time Premier REP officer 
Gabriel Anglade suggested in an interview with Alexander Harrison in 1979 that 
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Barbouzes had collaborated with Grassien’s men to torture OAS suspects.101 No 
doubt the rumours of ‘spook’ activity were catalysed by Bodard’s article in France-
Soir. The first clear signal however, that the Barbouzes had arrived came in response 
to the assassination of Joubert, with the bombing in mid-November of six cafés in 
Algiers which were well known for their ‘ultra’ and pro-OAS clientele.102 Indeed, 
another interviewee of Harrison’s states that it was the execution of police officials 
such as Gavoury and Joubert that led the government to rely on the Barbouzes, an 
opinion which appears to fit with the wider literature on the subject.103 
 
The Barbouzes had come into existence by an awkward process. The Gaullist 
Mouvement pour la Communauté (MPC)104, had been launched in the spring of 1959, 
with the express aim to foster greater cooperation and harmony between the Algerian 
Muslim and European communities and to promote Gaullist policy on the Algerian 
issue.105  Given $30,000 by Paris to organise in Algeria’s cities and towns to spread 
leaflets and posters with pro-cooperation slogans, as well as guns for personal 
protection, MPC activities got underway under the leadership of Jacques Dauer, 
based in Paris.106   
 
However, Lucien Bitterlin, a Gaullist and former radio producer oversaw MPC 
activities in Algeria.  It soon became apparent that the plastiquages attacks on 
Algiers cafés were the work of MPC members, including Bitterlin.107  These MPC 
activists were joined by a motley crew of hard men.  Among their number were 
Vietnamese mercenaries formerly of the Bande Noire, famous for their torturing of 
Vietminh prisoners in Indochina,108, Jewish pieds noirs, and muscle men from Algiers 
gymnasiums and underworld.109 Hennisart claims that some of the Barbouzes were 
drawn from the ranks of the Gaullist organisation, the Service d’Action Civique (SAC), 
something which Porch contests, given the high proportion of pro-Algérie française 
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members in that particular movement.110  Bocca refers to the Barbouzes as a 
‘shadowy offshoot of the SDECE’111, the Service de Documentation Extérieure et de 
Contre-espionnage; the French equivalent of the CIA. Greenwood too asserts that 
they were a subdivision of the SDECE,112 though Faligot and Krop proclaim that while 
there may have been shady organisations working in conjunction with Military 
Security, that SDECE were too concerned with developments south of Algeria at that 
time, in what was then termed ‘black Africa’.113 Whether the Barbouzes could be 
accurately called an ‘offshoot’ of this organisation is unclear, given the French state’s 
unwillingness, even today to admit to the group’s existence.  What is clear, however 
is that the French military intelligence establishment gave them some support in 
terms of weaponry and highlighted some targets for their attention.114 
 
As such, the Barbouzes acted in a similar way to the GAL did in the Spanish and 
French Basque country in their attempts to hunt down ETA leaders and decapitate 
the movement.  Both the GAL and the Barbouzes had the effect of intimidating those 
that they hunted out, distracting them from their campaign of violence.115  Similarly, 
both Spain and France kept the financing of their ‘extra-legal’ operations obfuscated 
for the period of their operation, 116 and denied their existence.117 In both cases these 
‘death squads’ proved less than the efficient method they were hoped to be.  In 
Algeria, the arrival of the Barbouzes, having been signposted in the media and 
somewhat anticipated by the pieds noirs did not go unnoticed.  The presence of 
strangers amongst the tight-knit European communities of Oran and Algiers raised 
suspicions, and the informal channels of intelligence helped the OAS Delta 
Commandos identify and locate their adversaries easily. It did not take long before 
the OAS Delta Commando launched counter offensives on the villas where the 
Barbouzes had stationed themselves.  By the end of January 1962 the Barbouzes’ 
campaign was over. A spectacular attack in which the OAS Deltas replaced a printing 
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press shipped from France and bound for the Barbouzes’ villa with a large bomb, the 
resulting explosion killed everyone in the villa, around forty people. 118 A few days 
later, an OAS Delta detachment ambushed the Barbouzes in a seedy hotel, killing the 
remainder and bringing the abortive strategy of the French state to an end.119 
 
The experiment with a heavy, extra-legal use of force was abandoned as a strategy 
to decapitate the OAS.  The strategy on its own merits, had been a failure. The 
Babouzes, whatever the nature of their secretive relationship with the state 
intelligence agencies, were ineffective in killing OAS operatives. The principal effect 
the Barbouzes had was to inflame pieds noirs passions against the government.120 
They did however, act as a distraction.121  In the paranoid atmosphere that existed in 
Algeria at that time, and the constant suspicion within the OAS that they were being 
targeted for assassination by Gaullist forces, former allies and colleagues who had 
turned against them, the Barbouzes were easily identified and the dealt with before 
long.  It was the other secretive force in Algeria that bore more fruit for the French 
state, and which existed secretly but operated largely within the remit of the law and 
without the scandal or intrigue that the Barbouzes caused.  The aforementioned 
Mission C, (also known as Force C), under the control of Michel Hacq had more 
success.122  Operating contemporaneously with the Barbouzes, Mission C managed 
to round up 600 OAS members, including 69 killers, shaking the OAS to its 
foundations. 123  It was to be this intelligence-led approach, despite the existence of 
double agents and some operatives with Algérie française sympathies that was to be 
most effective in the battle to contain OAS violence.124  The operations of both the 
Barbouzes and Mission C coincided with a period where the French were keen to put 
the OAS under pressure.  Serious negotiations with the FLN had taken place at Evian 
and there were to be further talks.  It appears that at this point, the French 
government sought to keep the OAS on the back foot.  The OAS were seeking to 
engage the Muslim population in a war of attrition at this point, hoping to drive an 
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even greater wedge between Muslims and Europeans in Algeria and slow the 
advance towards a negotiated settlement between France and the FLN.  Putting the 
OAS under pressure from these secretive units, while of questionable morality and 
legality, especially in the form of the barbouzes, it meant that their efforts at spoiling 
the negotiations were rendered useless.  
 
The OAS in France 
 
Of course, Algeria was not the only theatre of operation for the OAS.  They strove to 
extend their operations to the metropole, bringing the fight for French Algeria onto the 
streets of France itself.  They attempted to strike fear into the hearts of Gaullists and 
the apathetic public who perhaps were tired of the rhetoric and political turmoil that 
the troublesome far-flung department unleashed upon them.  The Algerian war had 
been raging since 1954, and the appetite for continued involvement there, at least in 
metropolitan France was beginning to wane.  That the attachment to French Algeria 
was diminishing was no surprise.  The French general public had lost the stomach for 
the wars in Indochina and in the North African colonies before the outbreak of the 
Algerian crisis.125 Gil Merom highlights that while the plaudits for handling the 
Algerian disengagement were heaped upon de Gaulle six months after the Evian 
Accords, and despite de Gaulle’s speeches indicating the shifting policy of 
government towards Algeria, he did not overwhelmingly shape the public opinion.  
His speeches represented rather than moulded the public’s perspective of Algeria.126  
 
OAS operations in France struggled from the outset.  Despite the long term rhetoric 
about the indivisibility of the national territory and the constitutional position of Algeria 
as part of metropolitan France, the public were becoming apathetic.  The appetite for 
robust action to protect French Algeria was low.  There were pro-Algérie française 
demonstrations by right wing organisations like the ‘Committee of Vincennes’ in 
November 1961 which was supported by right wing politicians127, and the rhetoric of 
those on the political extremes in the National Assembly, such as Jean Marie Le 
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Pen.128 While these politicians made the metropolitan branch of the OAS feel 
vindicated in their actions, this sentiment was out of touch with wider opinion. 
Lacouture points out that even before the open emergence of the OAS, that many 
French citizens had little appetite for the anti-democratic general’s putsch.129 It was 
felt that the parachutists that the generals had threatened would arrive in Paris, and 
which the Government had taken pre-emptive moves to counter, would receive 
something extremely short of a warm welcome.   
 
OAS units in France thus could not rely on the broad base of support as they could 
within the European communities in Algeria.  In France, the OAS fish had no sea of 
sympathisers to swim in.  While there are no precise indicators of the level of support 
for the OAS in France, that their actions drew hostility from the French Left as well as 
from those without strong political conviction in France itself means that the climate in 
which they operated in the metropole stood in stark contrast to the tacit complicity 
they received from pieds noirs and elements of the French state in Algeria.130  
Despite their ardent supports and generous financiers they were ‘operating in an 
alien milieu.131 They had to remain almost entirely underground, avoid trails of 
paperwork, and travel only when absolutely necessary.  The OAS in France could not 
count on police sympathy or ambivalence as they could in Algeria.132 This made 
waging a wide-scale and effective campaign of terrorism impossible in the metropole.  
This is not to say that the OAS were dormant in France.  They carried out a series of 
attacks throughout the period of their existence. The organisation was bifurcated with 
two men claiming overall leadership in France. One grouping was under the control 
of Pierre Sergent, a former Premier REP officer.  Sergent’s attacks, mainly 
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support was diffuse and the networks upon which they relied to successfully operate were small and 
few. 
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uncoordinated plastic bombs risked alienating potential supporters.133 Additionally, 
Sergent had attempted to recruit members from smaller activist groups springing up 
around France but soon found that here, the OAS did not have the monopoly on anti-
de Gaulle sentiment.134André Canal, was thus sent by Salan to give the OAS in 
France a greater sense of direction.  Canal’s group proved to be the more effective 
and deadly.  As this power struggle between rival factions in France was being 
addressed, a man named Gingembre, an OAS courier close to Salan, was arrested 
in Maison Blanche airport on 7 September 1961 by plain clothes detectives and 
Colonel Pierre Debrosse, garnering important OAS files which was to assist police on 
both sides of the Mediterranean in their quest to defeat the OAS.135 
 
Attacks in France took the familiar format of plastiquages against symbolic 
opponents were carried out.  Outspoken critics like Pierre Lazareff, the editor of 
France-Soir, and Jean-Paul Sartre, had their homes damaged by OAS Métro plastic 
bombs.136  Canal’s group’s most devastating attack came in January 1961 when 
Paris was shaken by no less than 18 bombs, in a coordinated series of attacks 
known as ‘la nuit bleue’.137 Aside from the bombings, which whilst disruptive, did little 
more than alienate the French public, there were also some key assassinations and 
attempts by the OAS in France.   
 
Evian Accords 
 
In a symbolic attack at in March 1961, when de Gaulle and his government were 
working to establish talks at Evian with the FLN to bring a negotiated end to the 
conflict, the OAS bombed the home of the mayor of Evian, killing him.138  Despite the 
recurrent plastic bomb attacks which shattered windows of businesses and homes, 
and the occasional assassination of a target was not likely to have much effect.  In 
France, these attacks had effect beyond perhaps delighting those who already 
supported the OAS and appalling the vast majority of people who disagreed with their 
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aims and tactics.  Indeed, Horne highlights the ‘extraordinary lethargy’ on the part of 
the metropolitan police.139  Porch suggests that this lethargy might have been 
because their targets were primarily those on the left, such as Sartre, and that the 
OAS campaign in France was solidifying public opinion behind de Gaulle for 
disengagement.140 
 
As such, the French state and the efforts of the government to find a solution through 
negotiation with the FLN would survive these kinds of attacks.  There was fear 
however, that if the OAS stepped up their campaign by attacking infrastructure, as 
the FLN had done, and by targeting key state personnel, that the could become more 
problematic.  Through de Gaulle’s resoluteness to solve the Algerian question, it had 
been made clear that he would not flinch. If de Gaulle himself could be taken out of 
the equation, the situation might be very different.   
 
The idea of assassinating de Gaulle had been mooted by many of a pro-Algérie 
française persuasion since shortly after his return to power.  Indeed ultra groups 
appear to have set in motion the preparations for two attempts to assassinate the 
general at his home in Colombey-les-deux-Eglises as early as 1960, when it had 
become apparent that de Gaulle was perhaps not as firmly wedded to the idea of 
maintaining the status quo in Algeria as they had expected.141  
 
In the wake of these plots, de Gaulle, famous for his stubbornness and lack of 
vigilance about his personal safety,142 ordered no extra security precautions.143 
However, de Gaulle’s Special Security Service, his close protection team with the 
assistance of the local gendarmerie often provided discreet protection by plain 
clothed operatives on many occasions.144 The first assassination attempt attributable 
to the OAS happened in 1961.  In charge of the attack, which took place on 8 
September, was former army colonel Jean-Marie Bastien-Thiry.  Having been tipped 
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off by a colonel working in the Elysée, the OAS conspirators were notified that de 
Gaulle was travelling back to his private residence at Colombey-les-deux-eglises.145 
On the road between Crancey and Pont-Sur-Seine, the would-be assassins struck 
with a roadside bomb.  A thirty kilo bomb with a petrol and soap flakes ignitor was 
detonated but the main charge failed to detonate.146  De Gaulle and his wife were 
uninjured and the convoy sped away.  After this attempt, de Gaulle amended his 
travelling plans, making the journey between Colombey and Paris mainly by air.  The 
General was to be targeted again on a number of occasions during the final days of 
the OAS and even by some OAS cells operating on their own accord after the formal 
truce and end to hostilities, when they finally accepted the fate of Algeria.  One attack 
in August 1962 in which de Gaulle’s motorcade was riddled with bullets came 
painfully close to taking the life of the General. 147  This attack, which was the basis 
for the depiction in Frederick Forsyth’s Day of the Jackal, was an attack designed out 
of anger, in search of revenge.  A successful assassination of de Gaulle at that point 
would not have stood in the way of Algerian independence, which had been formally 
declared after the self-determination referendum in July of that year.  However, given 
the dominance and influence that de Gaulle had over French politics during this 
period, the OAS might have changed the course of world history in an instant.  The 
continued vitriol from the OAS for the General was made clear in a letter mailed from 
the Assembly post-office in Paris threatening that de Gaulle, the ‘perjured tyrant’ 
would be killed ‘today or tomorrow, despite every obstacle, the traitor de Gaulle will 
be struck down like a mad dog’.148 
 
The Evian negotiations had not gone the way the French government and negotiating 
team had planned.  The first round of talks highlighted some of the sticking points, 
primarily the position of the Sahara, its inclusion in any new Algerian republic, and 
the possibility of the continued French exploitation of oil reserves discovered there.149 
Between the first and second full round of talks that began in February 1962 at Les 
Rousses near Evian, much had changed.  At these talks, the FLN conceded that 
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French involvement in Algeria post-independence would be inevitable, given that it 
would require financial aid.150  De Gaulle had accepted the previous September that 
the retention of the Sahara was unrealistic, and that the Gouvernement Provisoire de 
la République Algérienne, (GPRA) in exile in Tunis would never accept their 
negotiating team from the FLN relinquishing this territory and acceding to the partition 
of Algeria.151  Lacouture highlights de Gaulle’s ‘immense fatigue’, that he suffered in 
the summer of 1961, pointing to the trials concerning the Algiers Putsch, the stressful 
first round of negotiations at Evian, and the inflammation of the political turmoil by the 
OAS as contributing to this fatigue.152   Despite the efforts of the OAS to forestall and 
avert what now seemed to be inevitable, in the abandonment of French Algeria, they 
only added to the pressure on the General.  The general pressure, and no doubt the 
attempt on his life that summer near Pont-sur-Seine,153 meant that de Gaulle was 
increasingly anxious to find a solution to the debacle.  As such, the OAS contributed 
to de Gaulle’s resolve to grind out the most advantageous position for France from 
the negotiations being weakened. At the second round of talks, the focus of de 
Gaulle and the French negotiating team was on securing the rights and safety of the 
European community that would be left behind.154  
 
In February 1962, an OAS metro unit had set out to target the house of Minister of 
Cultural Affairs, André Malraux at Boulogne-sur-Siene. The plastiquage detonated, 
although the Minister was absent that day.  Instead, the explosion maimed a four 
year old girl, Delphine Renard. 155  The attack sparked a spate of protests at a time 
when public demonstrations were banned.  Protesters chanting anti-OAS slogans 
clashed with police in central Paris who took the lives of eight protestors and 
wounded over 100 more.156 
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In March 1962, the final stage of negotiations got underway and it was not long 
before there was the basis for an agreement.  By 18 March, the Evian Accord was 
signed by representatives of the French government and FLN representatives.157  At 
the same time, a Franco-Algerian ceasefire agreement was also signed and became 
effective the next day.158  The French government and FLN negotiating teams had 
been careful to ensure that the OAS would not achieve their aim of turning the two 
communities in Algeria against each other entirely.  As such, during the transition, the 
responsibility for order remained with the Algerian provisional executive, to be 
enforced by Muslim auxiliaries of the gendarmerie, and not with the ALN.159  The 
situation was a sensitive one however, and both parties to the agreement knew that 
the French army might have to be deployed in Oran and Algiers for the purposes of 
maintaining order.  It was to be a difficult balance to strike, as Pickles points out.  
France were keen to keep the French army out of the battle against the OAS, given 
the levels of sympathy for the group amongst the army’s ranks, even after the purges 
and transfers of personnel. 160 Similarly, the reliance on Muslim auxiliaries, anxious 
about the transition was problematic, potentially playing into the hands of the OAS 
who were struggling to portray the conflict as a straight fight between Muslim and 
European at this point.  The Muslim auxiliaries, fearful of what might happen to them 
in an independent Algeria of the FLN’s making were at high risk of deserting and 
taking independent action against the OAS to ‘provide evidence of their bona 
fides’.161  As such, the period between the signing of the Evian Accords in March 
1962 and the referendum to ratify it in France and Algeria, which was to take place 
on 31 June,162 was to be a turbulent period with much at stake.  
 
Upon the announcement that agreement had been reached in Evian, the OAS moved 
to put in action its plan of last resort.  Salan had prepared a plan and the OAS called 
for a general strike amongst the European community.  They turned the European 
neighbourhood of Bab el Oued into a liberated zone, and targeted gardes mobiles 
and patrols of conscript soldiers, disarming them.  The government’s forces struck 
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back with tank and place bombardments to break the insurrection, and the OAS 
withdrew.  The enraged army fired upon a demonstration organised by the OAS on 
26 March, killing 46 people. 163  In these days between the signing of the Evian 
agreement and the referendum, the conflict between the forces of the state and those 
of the OAS came the closest they ever had to full scale war. 
 
The death of French Algeria 
 
Predictably, the agreement at Evian enraged the OAS.  While de Gaulle’s public 
statements over the course of 1961 and 1962 had been well received by the general 
public in France, the OAS were unlikely to be convinced by the rhetoric adopted.  The 
discourses adopted by the French government in late 1961 and 1962, which spoke of 
‘le courant de l’histoire’ (the tide of history), in relation to the forthcoming 
disengagement from Algeria without much further elaboration was unlikely to 
convince or comfort the OAS and the pieds noirs.164  However, the OAS had been 
under increasing pressure.  In the autumn of 1961, Colonel Debrosse, head of the 
Gardes Mobiles, had eliminated most of the pieds noirs from his units and had 
replaced them with reliable men from France.165 Despite the widescale resignations 
from the French army in that autumn in protest at the direction de Gaulle’s 
government appeared to be moving with the negotiations and public statements on 
Algeria, few of the thousand officers made their way into the ranks of the OAS, 
instead preferring to travel home and readjust to civilian life.166   
 
October 1961 had seen the arrest of the Madrid based leadership of the OAS.  The 
Spanish government grew tired of the influx of French activists. In the wake of the 
Pont-sur-Siene attempt on the life of de Gaulle, the Spanish authorities had arrested 
another OAS commando at the border, bound for France in an apparent plot to 
assassinate the general.  Pre-existing links between the Spanish security forces and 
the OAS leaders were exploited and 17 French activists were arrested in one evening 
of operations, including Lagaillarde, Antoine Argoud and Joseph Ortiz.167  The arrests 
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set the suspicious minds in the OAS into overdrive with Lagaillarde being convinced 
that Salan, who had vacated Madrid for Algeria some time previously, had conspired 
to bring about their arrest.  Despite the tensions between the various leadership 
groups in the organisation, there is little evidence to suggest that this is the case.168  
Nevertheless, the arrests and the suspicions increased the centrifugal force that had 
threatened to obliterate the OAS from its inception. Four of the activists were 
transferred by the Spanish government to the Canary Islands, 800 miles from 
mainland Spain where they could play a minimal role in OAS activities.   
 
In April 1962, the security forces made some major breakthroughs, arresting 
Degueldre after a gardes mobiles patrol found one OAS operative on his way to brief 
Degueldre and others at a meeting.  They were subsequently led to the building 
where the meeting was being held, and the Delta leader was arrested as he 
attempted to slip through the police lines.169 Other high-ranking men that had been 
present at the meeting evaded capture.  The arrest of Degueldre underlined for many 
in the OAS that they were almost defeated.170    Raoul Salan, the figurehead of the 
OAS and symbol of resistance against the Gaullist agenda on French Algeria was 
arrested around two weeks later.  Plans had been afoot amongst some in the OAS to 
form an alliance with the MNA, in the hope that they could penetrate the Muslim 
stronghold in Algiers, the Casbah and target FLN leaders in a last ditch attempt to 
derail the delicate negotiations in Evian.171  The plans had been fomented by a man 
called Lavanceau, an old friend of one of Salan’s aides, Achard.172 However, 
Lavanceau was now an undercover operative for Sécurité Militaire. At a meeting 
arranged for mid April 1962, 250 gardes mobiles surrounded the apartment where 
Salan and his assistant Ferrandi were waiting, and the pair were arrested and later 
transferred to France.173  The old boy network that the OAS had once expertly used 
to plan their attacks and evade arrest had worked against them and decapitated the 
organisation. 
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Military trials were conducted in France in the spring and summer of 1962.  A trial in 
April convicted Edmond Jouhaud, a senior OAS leader in the pied noirs bastion of 
Oran, who had been arrested after a critical operation by the French army under the 
orders of General Katz in Oran only a month before.  The High Military Tribunal 
sentenced Jouhaud to death on April 13, just days before the swoop was made on 
Salan in Algiers, but the sentence was never carried out.174  Salan’s own trial, in front 
of a civilian court in May 1962 returned a guilty verdict, but after a spirited defence, 
citing mitigating factors; that Salan had found himself with the choice between writing 
his own death warrant or abandoning his ideals, he was sentenced, not to death but 
to life imprisonment.175 A few days later, Jacques Susini, one of the high-ranking 
OAS leaders still evading captivity announced an OAS truce. Roger Degueldre was 
not as lucky as Jouhaud and Salan.  Condemned to death by the Military Court of 
Justice for his OAS involvement, he was executed in July 1962.176 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has traced the origins and trajectory of the campaign of terrorist violence 
by the OAS and the struggle of the French state to counter it.  We have seen how 
different the context of the OAS violence and the state response has been to our 
previous case study in Spain.  Nevertheless, the differences which have been 
highlighted throughout tell us as much about counter terrorism and the nature of the 
state as the similarities. 
 
The struggle of the French state against the OAS is a complex one.  France was 
faced with attacks on both flanks, from the OAS on one side and the FLN on the 
other.  There was also a gradually changing tide of opinion on engagement in Algeria 
both at home in metropolitan France, and internationally, where a continued colonial 
relationship with full rights for an advantaged European minority was rapidly 
becoming unacceptable.  Additionally, France had been battling the FLN for a 
number of years when the OAS emerged.  In many ways, the growth and birth of the 
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OAS was itself a symptom of ineffective management of the Algerian war.  Whatever 
de Gaulle’s initial plan for French Algeria, in the aftermath of the Generals’ Putsch, it 
became apparent that with the divided loyalties of the army, coupled with the 
changing tide of opinion in France and internationally, that a defeat of the FLN and a 
return to the status quo was highly improbable.  Ironically, the acts of the Algérie 
française activists in the Generals’ Putsch likely had an influence in the decision to 
move from the originally stated aims of negotiations and a vote on the future of 
Algeria after five years of the conclusion of the conflict between the French forces 
and FLN, towards the position where talks had to be held immediately.   
 
The actions of the OAS, and the fear that Algeria would descend from a position of 
conflict between the FLN and the French security forces, to a bona fide civil war 
between the European and Muslim communities in Algeria hastened the negotiations 
and appears to have weakened the resolve of de Gaulle and his negotiation team to 
hold out for the most advantageous outcome for the French state.  Therefore, 
negotiation with the OAS was not something that the French government considered, 
or indeed something which would bear much fruit.  The reality of the stalemate that 
had been reached with the FLN meant that de Gaulle and his governments must 
have realised that it was impossible to give the OAS what they wanted without 
causing further damage and cost to the state and to its international standing.   
 
Despite the divided loyalties of the military, and the divergent views of Algeria that 
existed between the wings of the French state, the key aim of the French government 
in countering the OAS was on minimising their impact and preventing them from 
having a deteriorating effect on the prevailing political atmosphere in Algeria.  This 
proved to be difficult, given the divided loyalties of the security forces at each level, 
from locally recruited police forces through to the secret service and in the military.  
That the state would encounter difficulty in its struggle against the OAS came as little 
surprise.  De Gaulle had been made extremely aware of the fractious nature of his 
state apparatus, both through witnessing the movement in 1958 which brought him to 
power, and also the Generals’ Putsch which attempted to oust him from office in 
1961.  Even from the early days of the de Gaulle premiership, through his selective 
promotions and reassignments of key Algérie française army officers, de Gaulle 
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showed his awareness that the task at hand would be made easier by ensuring that 
those most likely to rebel were outside the sphere of influence.  Again in the 
aftermath of the Generals’ Putsch, de Gaulle acted again, disbanding the most 
rebellious units of the army, and redeploying others elsewhere so that obedience to 
him would be maintained. 
 
The security forces often found themselves on the back foot when attempting to 
combat the OAS. Information leaks through the still extant ‘old boys network’ from 
agencies of the state to former officers now within the ranks of the OAS foiled their 
attempts to arrest key players on many occasions, including one attempt to trap 
Salan early in the life of the OAS which might have proved detrimental to the health 
and morale of the OAS had it been successful.  With the announcement that 
negotiations would be forthcoming at Evian, the task of the French security forces 
was to prevent the OAS from disrupting the talks themselves or destabilising Algeria 
to such a degree that the FLN would withdraw.  There was little in the way of clearly 
devised and worked out micro-policies and the war of words against the OAS was not 
exactly nuanced.  Nevertheless, the deployment of well selected resources to Algeria 
was an important step, keeping the OAS at bay so that the atmosphere was right to 
achieve agreement at Evian.  Locally recruited police forces were reinforced with 
gendarmes and riot police from metropolitan France.  While these men were 
unfamiliar with the political climate in Algiers and had little prior knowledge of Algeria, 
they were much more reliable on account of the generally weak Algérie française 
sentiment in the metropole.   
 
The French state blundered, with the use of the barbouzes, who proved to be 
hopelessly ineffective, easily spotted, and played into the hands of the pieds noirs 
who were enraged by the actions of this covert, illegal death squad in their towns and 
cities. The decision to deploy the barbouzes can unfortunately not be discretely 
pinpointed.  It did however come at a time of mounting pressure for the French state, 
as FLN and OAS violence intensified, and with outrage at the situation and 
disaffection with the government in metropolitan France growing with regards to the 
Algerian crisis. The introduction of the barbouzes, who called themselves ‘Le Taliòn’ 
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(retaliation),177 represented a poorly thought out, knee-jerk reaction to rising OAS 
violence, and one which painfully backfired for the French state, just as the use of the 
GAL had backfired for Spain. 
 
Michel Hacq’s Mission C took a much more nuanced approach and proved to be 
more effective in rounding up key OAS leaders.  Operating inside the law, with a 
small team of professionals was the key to Hacq’s successes.  Similarly, Debrosse’s 
move to purge the ranks of units under his command of pieds noirs to make them 
more trustworthy and effective paid off, with police units arresting large numbers of 
OAS operatives in the latter half of 1961 and in 1962. During the period where 
negotiations were ongoing with the FLN, it was the intelligence-led approach of these 
highly professional police forces, where efforts had been taken to break the linkages 
between them and the OAS, and to work within the remit of the law, that were most 
effective.  So too, the French government’s general reluctance to engage the French 
army directly against the OAS avoided testing the loyalty of the army, and sympathy 
for the OAS began to die within the army when they became the targets of OAS 
operations themselves.  When the FLN and French negotiating team eventually 
signed the Evian agreements, even those soldiers who felt betrayed by the 
government and who decided to resign their commissions did not flood the ranks of 
the OAS as they had after the Generals’ Putsch, but rather disengaged with the 
Algerian question on a personal basis and returned to their families and civilian jobs 
in metropolitan France. 
 
The French state was not encumbered by the need for a long-term policy to militarily 
or politically defeat the OAS, as was the case with the Basque Country.  Though 
OAS violence continued after Algerian independence, it dissipated quickly when the 
ultimate futility became clear.  Indeed, the attacks of the OAS after Algerian 
independence have the hallmarks of retributive rather than instrumental attacks. 
 
The OAS, were much different to ETA.  In Spain, the political realities meant that 
ETA’s aims had to be carefully considered and some attempt to convince their 
natural constituencies that there were other ways to achieve their objectives had to 
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be made.  For the French, it became apparent to the government that French Algeria 
as they had known it was all but lost by the time the OAS really began to inflict 
serious damage in both Algeria and France.  That independence would come so 
quickly and that France would have retained so little of what it had intended to at the 
start of negotiations was not known at that time, but, was only hastened by the efforts 
of the OAS as France granted a series of concessions to ensure a conclusion to their 
war with the FLN.  And so, while efforts were made to wean the pieds noirs away 
from the grip of the OAS, in the form of pro-government propaganda and Gaullist 
organisations, these were rendered almost obsolete by the levels of control the OAS 
had over the European community in Algeria, and only ever formed part of an ad hoc 
policy to mitigate inter-communal violence as a backdrop for talks and formal 
negotiations with the FLN.  De Gaulle’s statements on the OAS were however well 
received in metropolitan France, and while he did not manipulate as much as convey 
the majority sentiment on the violence in Algeria, it no doubt had an effect in shoring 
up support for the government agenda.  
 
However, in Algeria, just as in Spain, it was the intelligence-based approach by 
professional police forces that proved most effective against the terrorist groups in 
question.178  So too, the cooperation of neighbouring states helped, though in Algeria 
this took the form of a single set of arrests by Spanish police in Madrid that dealt a 
blow to the OAS hierarchy, whereas Spain’s success in acquiring more long term 
commitments of assistance from France in closing the net on havens for ETA 
members played a much more significant role.  Furthermore, the use of extra-legal 
death squads in both Spain and Algeria proved to be an abortive and short-sighted 
policy which created animosity and widened the chasm between those who might 
have been sympathetic to the terrorist organisations and the state, rather than 
effectively ending the campaigns of terrorism. 
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The example of the French state response to the OAS is an interesting one, more so 
as an example of the difficulties caused by the disunity of the state than as a case 
study of effective state response to terrorism.  It highlights the disunity of the state on 
multiple axes, between France and the colonial administration, between the military 
and the government, between conscripted and professional soldiers, and between 
those soldiers with colonial experience, and those without.  Furthermore, the Algerian 
case highlights the role that charismatic individuals can play in shaping the state and 
its actions, both in the case of Generals Charles de Gaulle, and Raoul Salan, whose 
ability to rally state personnel and sections of the pubic around them based on their 
reputation and their totemic personalities, as much as their authority within the state.  
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Chapter Three 
The UK State Response to Terrorism in the Northern 
Ireland Conflict 
 
We come and we go.  The people who we now control have lived this life 
for five troubled years.  Every four months ‘their’ soldiers change.  The 
training that we do prior to a tour of Northern Ireland may be standardised 
but the temperament of each and every Regiment will change according to 
its territorial background and character.  This results in basic 
communication between the army and people having to be re-established 
every four months. 
 
Officer of ‘The Black Watch’, Royal Highland 
Regiment, British Army 19741 
 
The conflict between Irish republicans and the British state has a long and bloody 
history.  Perhaps no other case study quite so clearly illustrates the importance of the 
response to political violence and the nature of the state that responds.  The events 
in Dublin in Easter Week 1916 shows how one marginal band of extremists, initially 
detested for the havoc caused by their conspiratorial plans for an abortive revolution 
can be transformed into martyrs and icons of the struggle against colonial oppression 
through the response of the state. The focus of this chapter, however will focus on 
state response in the most recent phases of the conflict for Irish independence from 
the United Kingdom state, from the 1960s to the present day.  Before we assess the 
state responses though, it is necessary again to examine the characteristics of the 
United Kingdom state and the context in which the conflict known as ‘the troubles’ 
broke out. 
 
Formed by the Acts of Union in 1800 which joined the Kingdoms of Great Britain with 
the Kingdom of Ireland, the United Kingdom state has had a much more stable 
                                                 
1 quoted in A. Sanders, and I.S. Wood, Times of Troubles, p. 69. 
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existence than our other case studies, Spain and France.  In many ways, despite the 
Acts of Union, the island of Ireland has always been ancillary to the United Kingdom 
in some ways.  Historically, while there was resistance to the expansion of the British 
state across Ireland and Britain at various junctures in history, it has been Ireland 
which gave the most resistance to colonisation by Britain, and to incorporation within 
the United Kingdom.  While independence movements, both peaceful and violent 
have existed in many parts of Britain and Ireland against incorporation into the British 
Empire and later into the United Kingdom, it was the pacification of Ireland that 
created the most difficulty for the central London-centred state and while the granting 
of Free State status to 26 of the 32 counties, later declaring their full independence 
as the Republic of Ireland reflected the reality of the failure of the United Kingdom to 
successfully incorporate Ireland, it was not successful in creating peace, stability and 
acceptance of British rule in the remaining six Irish counties in the United Kingdom, 
which came to be known as Northern Ireland.  
     
Aside from with reference to Ireland, the legitimacy of the United Kingdom state has 
seldom been seriously challenged.  The UK, in contrast to our other examples of 
Spain and France, is marked by its political stability.  It has not struggled in modern 
times with coups and attempted putsches, authoritarian regimes, and martial law. Nor 
has the United Kingdom been invaded or occupied by external forces.  What it does 
share with Spain and France however, is a substantial colonial history, and the 
subsequent erosion of its empire.  Throughout the twentieth century, the United 
Kingdom saw the decline of the British Empire, with a series of colonial territories 
achieving independence.  There had been conflicts in the mid 20th century in British 
Mandate Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden, amongst others and the 
British army, who would later play such a pivotal role in the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, had been at the forefront of efforts to quell political violence.    The 
experience of the British army in these colonial conflicts differed somewhat from the 
experiences of the Spanish and French armies in theirs.  That is not to say that the 
British army were more restrained in the manner in which they dealt with the 
insurgents pushing for independence.  The British army utilised similarly brutal and 
repressive techniques in many of their campaigns as the Spanish and French had 
used in theirs.   
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As Mumford puts it, ‘the chivalrous behaviour of British polite society could never be 
transferred to conflict zones around the world’.2 There was even the explicit 
recognition by the military establishment that the level of force that could be used in 
the United Kingdom was much less than in the colonies.  A document published by 
the War Office in 1949 noted: ‘The degree of force necessary and the methods of 
applying it will obviously differ very greatly as between the United Kingdom and 
places overseas’.3 Huw Bennett comments that despite official rhetoric concerning 
the use of minimum force, that it played a less central role and has been less 
restrictive with regards to the actions of soldiers than commonly represented, 
contesting that soldiers prefer reliance on previous experience rather than abstract 
concepts such as that of ‘minimum force.4  Furthermore, Bennett highlights the 
‘dangerous flexibility’ in national law and military doctrine during the Mau Mau 
Uprising, and states that though there was official rhetoric regarding the type and 
extent of force to be used, that political and military created a permissive atmosphere 
where mass atrocities could be carried out through the failure to halt abuses brought 
to their attention in Kenya.5 There was however, a developed pragmatism concerning 
empire in the British state.  At elite level in the state, there was the gradual realisation 
that the benefits of retaining the empire had to be weighed against the costs of 
preventing its breakdown. 6  
 
With the counter-insurgency campaign in Malaya, we see the introduction of the 
‘hearts and minds’ strategy by the British army, in which they sought not to defeat the 
insurgents not simply by weight of arms, but through attempt to convince the civilian 
population that resistance was futile, that the British forces would and could offer 
them protection, and that it was in their best interests for the British counter-
insurgency campaign to succeed.7 And yet, it seems that the importance and 
centrality of the ‘hearts and minds’ strategy has been overstated too.  David French 
                                                 
2 A. Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare (London: 
Routledge, 2012), p. 7. 
3 War Office, Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, (1949), p. 5, cited in H. Bennett, 
Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 88 
4 H. Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau, p. 83. 
5 Ibid, p. 160.  
6 A. Mumford, The Counter-Insurgency Myth, p. 7.  
7 Ibid. 
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states that efforts to win over the native populations through such approaches were 
usually ‘under-funded and under-resourced’,8 and hampered by the unwillingness or 
inability of the military to accept that ‘insurgents were pursuing a legitimate political 
programme, even if they were doing so by what the British regarded as illegitimate 
means’.9  Despite the difficulty in changing the organisational culture of the British 
army, and amending how soldiers thought and acted in these colonial conflicts, we 
see little evidence of the kind of hyper-nationalistic attitudes within the British military 
that came to bear in elements of the Spanish and French.  The decline of British 
Empire evoked little of the same strength of feeling that we see amongst Franco’s 
Africanistas or the activist elements of the French army. 
 
Background to the Northern Ireland conflict 
 
Historically, across the island of Ireland, the legitimacy of British rule has always 
been contested.  Ireland had technically become a lordship of the English Crown 
after the conquest of Ireland in the twelfth century.10 However, the control of the state 
in the twelfth century was not a modern pervasive control and authority that we see 
today, and in practical terms English control of Ireland remained limited to the eastern 
and southern-central regions, while Irish lords held substantial control over other 
areas and local customs continued to flourish. 11  The idea that the ‘state’ needed to 
monopolise authority in Ireland was not present in the 12th century, and the English 
garrison were content so long as their political control was not challenged too 
strenuously by the local elites.12   The situation changed in the 16th century when 
Henry VIII assumed the title ‘King of Ireland’ which signified his intention to subject 
Ireland to complete control.13  Throughout the early seventeenth century, state 
control was gradually increased in Ireland by significant programmes of plantation.  
Irish resistance to the pervasion of English control and dominance in Ireland took the 
form of the significant rebellion of 1641 which proved abortive, but it was the United 
Irishmen Rebellion of 1798 that is the first that can be considered truly republican.  
                                                 
8 D. French, The British Way in Counter-insurgency: 1945-1967, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011),  p. 175 
9 Ibid, p. 179. 
10 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, (London: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 3. 
11 R. English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland, (London: Pan Books, 2006), p. 40 
12 Ibid.  
13 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 3.  
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Inspired by the French Revolution and led predominantly by Protestant radicals from 
Belfast, the United Irishmen attempted to break the link between Britain and Ireland.  
The 1798 rebellion may have had in essence the desire to unite ‘Catholic, Protestant 
and dissenter’ under the French Revolution ideals of liberté, egalité and fraternité, in 
opposition to the Crown but sectarian attacks by bands of Catholic Defenders, 
supporters of the rebellion showed that the United Irishmen had miscalculated the 
socio-political atmosphere and anger from the majority Irish Catholic community at 
the Anglican ascendancy in Ireland, and the rebellion failed.  Its leaders, particularly 
Theobald Wolfe Tone, who committed suicide in captivity after the rebellion failed, 
was to become a totemic figure for future generations of Irish republicans. In 1801 
the Act of Union which joined the Kingdoms of Ireland and with the Kingdoms of 
Great Britain saw a greater penetration of state power and involvement in areas such 
as education and public health.14  Throughout the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, the greater penetration of the state was accompanied by the call 
from more moderate nationalist voices for Catholic relief.  While Catholics by the 
1820s could own land and vote in elections, they were still barred from holding the 
offices for which they could vote.15  The Catholic Association, founded by Catholic 
barrister Daniel O’Connell in 1823 was to be the vehicle that brought the popular 
participation in politics to Catholics for the first time. The organisation lobbied for 
Catholic Emancipation, funded by subscriptions from Catholics of all classes.16 
Having achieved Catholic Emancipation by 1829, O’Connell channelled his efforts 
into campaigning for the repeal of the Act of Union.  Founded in 1840, the Loyal 
National Repeal Association drew on the success of O’Connell’s previous 
endeavours to push for Irish independence through peaceful but extra-parliamentary 
means of mass demonstrations known as ‘monster meetings’.  While O’Connell had 
not achieved a repeal of the Act of Union by the time of his death in 1847, he had 
awakened a generation to Irish nationalism, and had made significant gains in the 
removal of discriminatory laws.  Others in nineteenth century Ireland attempted to 
break the link with Britain through force, with Robert Emmet’s rebellion in 1803, 
(perhaps the death rattle of United Irishmen’s rebellion), the 1848 Young Irelander’s 
rebellion and the Fenian Rising of 1867 all being suppressed quickly, but nonetheless 
                                                 
14 Ibid, p. 290. 
15 R. English, Irish Freedom, p. 128. 
16 Ibid. 
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maintaining the tradition of violent opposition to the British state in Ireland and 
providing venerable martyrs for future generations of militant Irish nationalists.   
 
The late 1800s were a tumultuous time for the relationship between Britain and 
Ireland, Charles Stewart Parnell’s Irish National Land League agitated for reform to 
Land Laws and while the demonstrations and rent strikes advocated by the Land 
League were non-violent, the activities of the organisation and the response of 
landlords meant that the non-violence of the Land League was accompanied by 
episodic violence as confrontations frequently boiled over.17  The IRB’s rising of 1867 
may have been a failure, but by the 1880s they had reformed and regrouped and 
Fenian violence at that time added to the pressure upon the state.  As a result of the 
violence, the campaigns of civil disobedience orchestrated by the Land League and 
the lobbying in parliament by the Irish Parliamentary Party throughout the 1880s and 
1890s for Home Rule for Ireland, Irish affairs had come to dominate a 
disproportionate amount of time at Westminster.  Ireland had become a thorn in the 
side for successive Westminster governments. Despite the incorporation of Ireland 
into the United Kingdom at the start of the 19th century, there was still a sense that 
Ireland was somehow extrinsic to the core of the UK. For Liberals, Home Rule for 
Ireland was seen as a possible solution.  A separate parliament to deal with Irish 
affairs could reduce Irish discontent and eliminate ‘the sense of Irish “exceptionalism” 
that had unbalanced British politics since the Union itself’.18  While Home Rule Bills 
had been brought by William Gladstone’s Liberal Party in 1886 and 1893, they were 
defeated in the House of Lords.  In 1910 however, Liberal Prime Minister Herbert 
Asquith announced the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill.  The Parliament Act 
1911 had removed the ability of the House of Lords to veto legislation, but rather only 
delay it over three sessions.19 Thus the third Home Rule Bill, introduced in 1912 
received royal assent as the Government of Ireland Act 1914.20  However, the 
outbreak of World War One meant that the decision was taken to suspend the Act 
until after the war.  Events in the intervening years ensured that the Act would never 
take effect. 
 
                                                 
17 R.F. Foster, Modern Ireland, p. 408. 
18 C. Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 31. 
19 C.C. O’Brien, States of Ireland (St Albans: Panther Books Ltd, 1974), p. 85. 
20 C. Townshend, Easter 1916, p. 30. 
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The Protestant community in Ireland, predominantly descendants of the successive 
waves of settlers from England and Scotland were generally suspicious of Home 
Rule and opposed to legislative attempts to establish a Dublin parliament.  They 
feared that a Dublin parliament would create a political climate of extreme hostility to 
the Protestant minority and that their religious freedom would be restricted.  Indeed, 
there were many Irish nationalists who by the early twentieth century framed their 
desire for the independence of Ireland in a religious context and who desired that an 
independent Ireland would be a Catholic Ireland.21  While many leaders of both 
constitutional and revolutionary Irish nationalist movements in the past had been 
Protestants, this was a trend that had tailed off with the death of Charles Stewart 
Parnell in 1891 and the nationalist movement since then had taken on more stridently 
Gaelic and Catholic overtones, which no doubt contributed to the suspicion of the 
Protestant and Unionist community.  Furthermore, the Ne Temere decree of 1907 
and Motu Proprio decree of 1911 issued by the Roman Catholic Church had the 
effect of underlining the implications on the political system if the Dublin legislature 
did take on a stridently Catholic character as feared.22 
 
In the north-east of Ireland where the Protestant and Unionist community were 
strongest in number, owing to the Plantation of Ulster, successive waves of 
immigration from Scotland and England, and the commercial strength of Belfast, 
prominent Unionists formed the ‘Solemn League and Covenant’, orchestrating the 
signing of the ‘Ulster Covenant’ in September 1912 which vowed to prevent the 
imposition of Home Rule in Ulster, by weight of arms if necessary.23  The following 
year saw the founding of a militia, the Ulster Volunteer Force by the Ulster Unionist 
Council, a move which was mirrored by the formation of a nationalist militia, the 
National Volunteers in the south of the country.24  The UVF had a large number of ex-
service personnel, with 62 per cent of the divisional, regimental and battalion 
commands behind held by former British army officers.25 While the plans for Home 
Rule were eventually suspended, owing to the outbreak of World War One, the threat 
                                                 
21 see for example, R. English, Irish Freedom, pp. 239-44 on the increasingly Catholic religious 
dichotomy associated with Irish nationalism in the late 19th and early 20th century.    
22 G. Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party: Protest Pragmatism and Pessimism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2004), p. 31. 
23 Ibid, p. 34 
24 Ibid, pp. 36-7. 
25 H. Strachan, The Politics of the British Army, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 112. 
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that the UVF might mobilise when the Government of Ireland Act was enforced 
caused senior British Army officers stationed at the Curragh camp in Kildare to 
threaten resignation rather than coerce their former colleagues and comrades in the 
UVF, for whom they had much sympathy.26  With the outbreak of World War 
however, the plans for Home Rule were shelved and the UVF joined the British Army 
en masse as the 36th (Ulster) Division. 
 
At the height of World War One, in April 1916, the Irish Volunteers, the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood and the Irish Citizen Army launched a rebellion against the 
UK state in Dublin, declaring an Irish Republic.27  The decision had been taken to act 
during the war, recognising that the British Army would be ill prepared for the 
insurrection.  A countermanding order issued just before the Rising was due to take 
place, as a shipment of 20,000 guns was intercepted the day before and thus while 
the rebellion went ahead, the rebel forces were weaker than expected.28  It is 
impossible to say what the outcome of the Easter Rising of 1916 may have been had 
the weaponry landed as planned and if the countermanding order had not been 
issued.  In any case, the Rising was quickly suppressed by the British Army,29 with 
the surrender being announced only five days after rebel leader Patrick Pearse had 
proclaimed the Irish Republic.  In the aftermath, those men who were deemed to be 
leaders of the rising were court-marshalled and executed.     Despite the recognition 
and warning by some senior state personnel about the possible backlash, the court 
martial and executions took place with no apparent clear guiding premise as to who 
should and who should not be executed.30  Emblematic of the break down in 
communication was the execution of James Connolly who, having a shattered ankle, 
had to be placed in a chair to face the firing squad.  Few cases serve as a better 
example of the potential effect of overzealous state response to political violence as 
                                                 
26 Ibid, p. 114-5. 
27 For detailed considerations of the Easter Rising of 1916 and the wider Irish Revolution, see, C. 
Townshend, Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London: Penguin Books, 2006), F. McGarry, The 
Rising: Ireland: Easter 1916, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), C. Townshend, The Republic: 
The Fight for Irish Independence (London: Allen Lane, 2013), J. Augusteijn, (ed.) The Irish Revolution, 
1913-1923, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), F.J. Costello, The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath, 1916-
1923: Years of Revolt (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2003), D. Fitzpatrick, The Two Irelands: 1912-
1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and M. Hopkinson, The Irish War of Independence 
(Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2002). 
28 J.J. Lee, Ireland 1912-1985: Politics and Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 
p. 24. 
29 C. Townshend, Easter 1916, p. 269. 
30 Ibid, pp. 280-2. 
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this.  Before the Easter Rising of 1916, those who would use violence in attempts to 
break the link with Britain had been viewed as zealots.  The outrage caused by the 
haste and extent of the executions of the rebels meant that the radical party Sinn 
Féin were to effectively replace the Irish Parliamentary Party as the ‘dominant voice 
of the nationalist Irish community’.31 
 
The ensuing Irish War of Independence which later took place between 1919 and 
1921 reached a controversial negotiated settlement when a delegation of Irish 
insurgent leaders and British politicians signed the Anglo Irish Treaty.  Once again 
however, the treaty paved the way for the partition of Ireland into two states, the 
southern, 26 county Irish Free State, and the north-eastern 6 county ‘Northern 
Ireland’, which was to have devolved institutions but remain part of the United 
Kingdom, seen as a way to pacify Ireland’s nationalist and unionist communities.   
 
Between 1921 and the 1960s, there were many attempts by Irish republicans, 
unhappy with the partition of what they saw as the indivisible Irish nation, to reunify 
Ireland.  However, the Irish Free State continued on a separate path, and concerned 
itself with nation building, declaring itself an independent Republic in 1949. A later 
manifestation of the Irish Republican Army who had waged the war of Independence 
against Britain attempted to pressurise the United Kingdom into relinquishing control 
over Northern Ireland on a number of occasions, but their campaigns were 
ineffective.  With the failure of their ‘border campaign’ known by the IRA as 
‘Operation Harvest’ in 1962, they announced the failure as due to the lack of support 
of the Irish population.32   
 
The devolved institutions in Northern Ireland that were established in the 1920s were 
unique to the United Kingdom at the time.  The Northern Ireland Parliament and 
Government handled almost all the day-to-day administration of the newly formed 
political entity, with only matters such as defence, and some forms of taxation 
reserved to Westminster.  The demographic make up of Northern Ireland, as well as 
the wide scale disenchantment with the newly created entity which many Catholics 
held to be illegitimate meant that the Ulster Unionist Party formed every government 
                                                 
31 R. English, Irish Freedom, p. 281. 
32 R. English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA, (London: Pan, 2012), p. 75. 
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of Northern Ireland until the devolved institutions were suspended in 1972.  Just as 
Ireland pre-partition had been viewed as peripheral to the United Kingdom, Northern 
Ireland was too, and ambivalence from Westminster coupled with the strong unionist 
majority and nationalist disaffection led to Northern Ireland taking on a strongly 
unionist tinge.33  Politically, Northern Ireland had little in common with the rest of the 
United Kingdom.  The absence of the major British political parties in the shape of the 
Conservative Party and the Labour Party meant that no politician from Northern 
Ireland ever belonged to the party of government at Westminster.  The inability of the 
mainstream British parties to win votes in Northern Ireland almost certainly added to 
their apathy and lack of understanding on local politics and social issues. Indeed, a 
parliamentary convention developed soon after partition whereby Northern Ireland 
issues were not discussed at Westminster.  The idea was that since Northern Ireland 
had its own regional parliament, that it could be left largely free from intervention and 
supervision by Westminster.34  This situation was notably different to the French 
case, where ‘the colon influence in the Radical Party was often used to spike 
parliamentary influence in Algeria’.35 
 
Whether or not the devolved institutions in Northern Ireland represented a ‘state 
within a state’, is a matter of some contention.  During the conflict, it has indeed been 
referred to as such by many scholars.36  Others however, tend to see it as sub-state 
organisations.  Now, with the benefit of hindsight as well as the new devolved 
institutions in Wales and Scotland, as well as Northern Ireland, it might seem strange 
that we refer to any of these institutions as constituting a ‘state within a state’.  
Rather, as we have discussed, the state not being a unitary means that it often has 
organs of the state, be they military, judicial, police, or in this case political and 
legislative devolved institutions, which have characteristics and a nature of their own. 
In this light, Northern Ireland itself will be treated not as a ‘state within a state’, but 
merely the devolved branch of the United Kingdom state that between 1921 and 
                                                 
33  Ibid, p. 66.  
34 F. Wright, Northern Ireland: A Comparative Analysis (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1987), p. 112. 
35 Ibid. 
36 see for example Michael Farrell’s book Northern Ireland: The Orange State (London: Pluto Press, 
1976), also Richard English ‘The State and Northern Ireland’, in The State: Historical and Political 
Dimensions, by R. English and C. Townshend, (eds.) (London: Routledge, 2002). 
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1972 had responsibility for the administration of the activities of the state on a 
regional level.   
 
As a result of the nationalist disengagement and the strong unionist tinge of the UK 
state institutions in Northern Ireland, nationalist dissatisfaction grew.  Northern 
nationalists were subject to discrimination in Northern Ireland.  Gerrymandering 
occurred in some local electoral wards which prevented nationalists from having the 
influence over important local government issues that they would have had in a more 
fair system.37  Indeed, Northern Ireland still exercised rate payers franchise at local 
elections, and thus Catholics, who were less likely to own property and thus pay rates 
were disproportionately disenfranchised, thus skewing representation on some local 
councils in urban areas.38  The largest problem emanating from gerrymandering at 
local council level was the allocation of social housing, which in many cases gave 
preference to Protestants over Catholics who may have been in greater need.  
Additionally, Catholics were under represented in jobs in local council bureaucracies 
employment in local government. 
 
Civil Rights 
 
Nationalists across Northern Ireland began campaigning for redress of these issues, 
which they saw as fundamental to issues of civil rights.  An umbrella organisation 
called the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was set up in 1962.39 It 
campaigned for redress of these issues under the principal slogans of ‘one man, one 
vote’ and ‘British rights for British citizens’.  The civil rights movement, led by NICRA 
came at a time when Unionism was already uneasy.  Many traditionalists and 
independent Unionists were suspicious that the more liberal and reformist Terence 
O’Neill who had been Prime Minister since 1963 was jeopardising the unionist 
position.  O’Neill had made a number of conciliatory gestures towards the Catholic 
community, including the aforementioned visit to a Catholic primary school and 
                                                 
37 B. Purdie, Politics in the Streets: The Origins of the Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland, 
(Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1990), p. 102. 
38 Sunday Times Insight Team, Ulster, (Harmonsworth: Penguin Special, 1975), p.35, cited in C. 
Hewitt, ‘Catholic Grievances, Catholic Nationalism and Violence in Northern Ireland during the Civil 
Rights Period’, The British Journal of Sociology, 32/3, (1981), p. 363. 
39 B. Purdie, Politics in the Streets, p. 121. 
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conducting the first meeting between the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland and the 
Irish Taoiseach since the birth of the two separate political entities.  Unionists 
believed that rather than agitation for redress of the perceived discrimination, that 
NICRA had been formed as an opportunistic Trojan horse, attempting to destabilise 
and dismantle the state institutions of Northern Ireland.  Despite their aim of being 
non-denominational and non-sectarian, the overwhelmingly Catholic make up of 
NICRA, coupled with their failure to campaign about cases of discrimination from 
Nationalist-controlled councils only served to cement the fears of the Protestant 
community.40  Indeed, the Protestant community’s fears were not entirely 
unsubstantiated. Richard English asserts that NICRA emerged as the brainchild of 
the IRA’s Wolfe Tone Societies.41   For many republicans, the civil rights campaign 
was to be a stepping-stone to a united Ireland.  The plan was to ‘break through to the 
Orange masses and explain imperialism’s real motivation, thus liberating them at last 
from their illusions and allowing them to join the national struggle’.42  NICRA’s 
message of being non-sectarian was somewhat lost upon the unionist community, 
understandably so when their first official demonstration was in protest at the banning 
of a Republican Easter 1916 Commemoration parade.43  NICRA achieved an 
enormous level of support from across the nationalist community.  Whatever the 
intentions of some of its founders, it became a movement with a broad base, and the 
reactions of the Northern Ireland government and security forces were overzealous in 
response to their marches and demonstrations.  The banning of Civil Rights marches 
incensed the nationalist community. The brutality of the police force in Northern 
Ireland at marches, the majority Protestant, Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) 
mobilised many Catholics who had previously been politically apathetic. Of particular 
note was the brutality of the RUC in Derry on 5 October 1968.  The march planned by 
NICRA for that day had been banned by Stormont Home Affairs Minister, William 
Craig. The demonstration went ahead, and they found their route blocked by the 
police.  Demonstrators, including several of the protest’s leaders were struck with 
batons.44  Footage of the heavy handedness of the police against largely unarmed 
                                                 
40 G.Walker, A History of the Ulster Unionist Party, p.163. 
41 R. English, Armed Struggle, p.90. 
42 H. Patterson, The Politics of Illusion, (London: Serif, 1997), p.112. 
43 http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/chron/ch68.htm (accessed 29.8.2013). 
44 S. Prince, Northern Ireland’s ’68: Civil Rights, Global Revolt and the Origins of the Troubles, (Dublin: 
Irish Academic Press, 2007), pp. 2-4. 
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civilians, many of whom were singing protest songs, was captured by several news 
agencies and broadcast shortly after across Northern Ireland.  Bardon comments that 
‘at a stroke’, the images destabilised Northern Ireland, characterising what followed 
as a ‘near-revolutionary crisis’.45   Shortly after, under pressure from British Prime 
Minister, Harold Wilson, a package of concessions which addressed many of the 
concerns of the civil rights movement was ushered in, causing further dismay and 
division amongst the Ulster Unionist Party, and greater levels of suspicion from 
Unionists and Loyalists outside the party. The pressure from Wilson marked a 
departure from previous stances by Westminster governments whereby they would 
decline to intervene in ‘matters that were the sole responsibility of Stormont’.46  Early 
the following year, People’s Democracy, a hard-left organisation founded by students 
of Queen’s University Belfast who were associated with NICRA but remained highly 
critical of the more moderate stance of their umbrella group took the decision to 
March from Belfast to Derry.  Against advice from NICRA leadership, warning that the 
route through many staunchly loyalist areas would provoke sectarian violence, the 
march went ahead.  The predictions of sectarian violence turned out to accurate.  
The culmination of the violence occurred at Burntollet Bridge between Claudy and 
Derry.  The marchers were attacked by a group of 200 loyalists armed with stones 
and bottles and when they tried to escape the onslaught into nearby fields, they were 
forced back onto the road by the RUC wielding batons.  Several of the marchers 
were badly injured, and the police provided little protection through the attack, with 
some suggesting that they mingled with the assailants in a friendly manner.47  In the 
aftermath, many of assailants were identified as off-duty members of the B-Special 
Constabulary.48 Further concessions were granted by O’Neill in the aftermath of the 
Burntollet incident, under threat from Prime Minister Wilson to withhold part of the 
annual subvention from the Stormont government.49 An inquiry led by Lord Cameron, 
                                                 
45 Ibid, p. 655. 
46 P. Rose, ‘Sending in the Troops’, in The Northern Ireland Question in British Politics, by P. Catterall 
and S. McDougall. (eds.), (London, Basingstoke; Macmillan, 1996), p. 91. 
47 J. Bardon, A History of Ulster, (Belfast: Blackstaff, 2007), p. 660. 
48 ‘The B-Specials’ were part time reserve police officers of the Ulster Special Constabulary, a 
paramilitary style police force established in 1920.  From the foundation of the USC, the B-Specials 
had been almost entirely Protestant, with many of the initial recruits coming from loyalist paramilitaries 
such as the UVF.  The Ulster Special Constabulary quickly gained a reputation for sectarianism and 
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a Scottish judge into the recent unrest, and the agreement to ‘One man, one vote’ 
and universal suffrage in local elections in April of 1969.50 
 
Bew et al’s comments that for a short time in 1968 to 1969 that the Catholic 
population became ‘a united militant political force’, is perhaps exaggerating the scale 
of mobilisation, but nonetheless conveys something of the scale of discontent among 
the Catholic community at that time.  They were enraged that what they saw as 
peaceful protests aimed at achieving equality and civil rights were being brutally 
repressed by the security forces and government of Northern Ireland.  For some, 
despite the reforms brought in by O’Neill, the brutality at the hands of the state 
security forces was a signal that ‘the Orange state’51 of Northern Ireland was 
irreformable.  As a result, republican sentiment grew, especially in the most deprived 
Catholic urban areas.52  Inter-communal tensions were at an all time high by the end 
of the 1960s, with riots becoming a more frequent occurrence and violence and 
attacks on nationalist communities by loyalist gangs provoked the formation of local 
vigilante groups in Catholic areas. The locally recruited security forces, the Royal 
Ulster Constabulary and the B-Specials had been stretched almost to breaking point.  
The breaking point came in August 1969.  Riots broke out in Derry between 
nationalists and the RUC in the aftermath of the Protestant Apprentice Boys of Derry 
parade in the city, and demonstrations, which descended into riots spread to Belfast, 
Dungannon, Armagh and some smaller towns.  With their resources stretched and 
with no sign of a let up, James Chichester Clark, who had succeeded O’Neill as 
Northern Ireland Prime Minister implored British Prime Minister James Callaghan and 
the Westminster Government for the deployment of the British Army, a request which 
was reluctantly granted.53 
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Deployment of the British Army 
 
Upon their deployment, the army took the lead on peace-keeping duties, under the 
General Officer Commanding, Lieutenant General Ian Freeland.  As such, both the 
RUC and the USC B Specials were subject to his orders.54  However, the relationship 
between the Catholic community and the British Army would soon sour.  The inter-
communal strife that had occurred in August 1969 acted as an impetus for the IRA, 
who had been militarily inactive since the end of the ‘Border Campaign’ in 1962 
search to replenish their depleted and outdated cache of weaponry.55  Some 
republicans began to see a potential role for the IRA as the defenders of the Catholic 
community, in the hope that this would bolster their popularity and give them the 
support they needed to achieve their objectives through a renewed military 
campaign.  However, the IRA with Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff since 1962 had 
taken the IRA in a more socialist direction.  Goulding presided over a more 
intellectual turn in the IRA leadership.  The analysis of the IRA under Goulding had 
been that the British state had fostered sectarianism as a means to keep the 
proletariat of Northern Ireland divided and stop them from uniting in revolution against 
their bourgeois oppressors.  As such, despite the inter-communal violence in 
Northern Ireland’s major towns and cities, and the heavy handedness of the RUC, 
the IRA Dublin leadership were reluctant to enter the affray as the defenders of the 
Catholic community. 56 
 
The issue of the role of the IRA in Northern Ireland during the early days of the 
conflict was to be divisive.  The ranks of the IRA in Belfast became swollen as young 
men and women from the nationalist community joined the organisation, and the 
expectation of IRA action in defence of the northern nationalists exacerbated the 
existing tensions in the republican movement.57    At the IRA’s General Army 
Convention in December 1969, the organisation split over the issue. Delegates from 
Northern Ireland felt that the Dublin leadership were too detached from the prevailing 
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unrest in the north and thus did not understand the grievousness of what the Catholic 
population faced. In May of that year, the Dublin leadership of the IRA refused to arm 
units in Northern Ireland, fearing that the discovery of guns would discredit the civil 
rights campaign and negatively affect its momentum.58 These IRA traditionalists, 
critical of the Dublin leadership also disagreed with the Marxist ideology and the 
‘obsession with politics’ that Dublin leadership of the organisation had developed.59  
As a result, the army split into two factions.  The more militant faction was to become 
known as the Provisional IRA, with the remainder known as the Official IRA.  At the 
time, it was anyone’s guess as to which of the two rival organisations would become 
the largest and most influential, eventually, it was the PIRA that was to prevail, 
claiming 80 per cent of the IRA’s members in Belfast, shortly after the split.60  The 
split in the IRA was mirrored some months later in the political wing of the movement, 
Sinn Féin, at the 1970 Ard Fheis (Party Convention).61  The Provisional Republican 
movement set up a six county Northern Command, based in Belfast. In the months 
after the split, the ‘dissident’ Provisional movement was to grow rapidly.62   
 
The deployment of the British army had been welcomed by many nationalists at first. 
Many felt that the intervention of the more professional and less obviously partisan 
troops would mean that Catholics would be protected from Protestant vigilante 
attacks on their communities and from the partial treatment at the hands of the locally 
recruited security forces.  However, shortly after their deployment, several actions by 
the British army spoiled the initially good relationship with the nationalist community 
and played directly into the hands of the IRA. 
 
The first event which served to dramatically deteriorate relations between nationalists 
and the British army was a curfew put in place in the staunchly republican Lower 
Falls area between 3 and 5 July 1970. The decision to impose a curfew came in the 
aftermath of inter-communal rioting which ended in three Protestants who were part 
of a crowd attacking St Matthews Catholic Church in the Short Strand area of Belfast 
                                                 
58 T. Geraghty, The Irish War, p.19 
59 J.B. Bell, The Secret Army, p.366. 
60 T. Geraghty, The Irish War, p.10. 
61B. Hanley and S. Millar, The Lost Revolution, p.146.  
62 J.B. Bell, The Secret Army, p.367. 
 
114 
  
being shot dead by the IRA.63   Operationally, the curfew was a success, as it 
allowed the British army and the RUC to conduct house-to-house searches and 
locate IRA guns and ammunition.  However, the heavy-handed and overzealous 
manner in which the searches were carried out served to alienate the nationalist 
community and reinforce the age-old republican propaganda about the behaviour of 
British troops in Ireland.  As Richard English states, the move was ‘arguably decisive 
in terms of worsening relations between the British Army and the Catholic working 
class’.64    
 
The following year, after considerable pressure from Northern Ireland Prime Minister 
Brian Faulkner, Westminster authorised the use of internment without trial in Northern 
Ireland.  Internment had been on the statute books in Northern Ireland since 1922, 
with a series of Acts known as The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Acts (Northern 
Ireland) 1922-43, 65 and had been deployed successfully in Northern Ireland in the 
past to round up IRA suspects during the 1956-1962 ‘Border Campaign’ or ‘Operation 
Harvest’ as it was known to the IRA.  At that point in time, the IRA had little in the way 
of community support, and the manner in which internment was used was selective, 
resulting in very little backlash.66  However, in 1971, internment in Northern Ireland 
took on a very different character.  It resembled more the British Army’s colonial 
practices of internment without trial, rather than its previous implementation in 
Northern Ireland. While Clutterbuck suggests that internment without trial had been 
used selectively and sparingly in Malaya,67 David French asserts that generally it had 
been used by the British Army in a haphazard way in colonial conflicts, highlighting 
mass arrests based on poor intelligence, which offered little chance of eventual 
conviction.68  Operation Demetrius, as the initial swoops of internment were known in 
1971, though not nearly as widespread as in most of the colonial conflicts, bore many 
of the same characteristics.   
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It was designed to target the Provisional Irish Republican Army, but the RUC Special 
Branch intelligence was outdated and the security forces simply were not able to 
identify suspects accurately.69  The operation began on 9 August 1971 and was 
carried out by the British army in conjunction with the RUC.  The arrests were 
directed solely at the nationalist community at first, and while 342 arrests were made 
in the first day, less than 100 of those arrested were PIRA or OIRA volunteers.70  
Understandably, the use of internment without trial appeared to many as a wide scale 
persecution of the nationalist community.  Additionally, stories were soon to emerge 
about the mistreatment of suspects in detention. The use of what members of the 
British security establishment referred to as ‘in-depth interrogation’,71 involved the 
use of stress positions, sensory deprivation, sleep deprivation, disorientation 
techniques and subjection to white noise.72  A case was later taken by Ireland against 
the UK to the European Court of Human Rights.73 The court held that these 
measures amounted to ‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ but that they fell short of 
the threshold required to be considered as torture.74  The use of this kind of ‘intensive 
interrogation’ was another cutting and pasting of British army tactics from their 
colonial counter-insurgencies, having been developed in Kenya and then 
subsequently implemented in the British Cameroons, Swaziland, Aden and Brunei. 75 
Allegations of mistreatment of those interned added fuel to the fire, despite the 
strenuous denials by the British army of any such foul play.76  While the British army 
attempted to explain away the bulk of these allegations by attributing them to a clever 
propaganda campaign ran by the IRA,77 the actual instances of mistreatment fitted so 
neatly into long-standing historical discourses of rebellion against, and suppression 
by the British colonial forces, that the IRA scarcely had any work to do in propagating 
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the resentment.  Internment without trial had been requested by Faulkner despite 
reports from RUC Special Branch that it was not yet required.78  Indeed, even the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) of Northern Ireland at the time, Sir Harry Tuzo, 
is recorded as feeling that internment at that point in 1971 was ‘militarily 
unnecessary’.79 McCleery posits that Faulkner was coming under significant pressure 
from hard line unionists within and outwith the Ulster Unionist Party to take a hard 
line against republicanism, something which his two immediate predecessors as 
party leader and Prime Minister had failed to do, losing the support of their party.80  It 
had been sanctioned by a newly elected British Prime Minister, Edward Heath who 
was keen to take a ‘no nonsense’ approach to the IRA in Northern Ireland.  As a 
policy, it largely failed to disrupt substantially the activities of the IRA.  The arrest of 
many unconnected or only marginally linked to the republican movement radicalised 
many moderate Catholics at the time, and whether this was the case because of poor 
intelligence, as some claim, due to the spiriting away of the most important IRA 
figures before the initial swoops, or as a way for RUC Special Branch to deal with 
political opponents of all shades, as McCleery suggests, the impact was clear.81 
Catholics were further radicalised, and any prospect of a return to the honeymoon 
period that characterised those early days after the arrival of British troops on the 
streets of Northern Ireland died.  In the months after the introduction of internment, 
the level of violence spiked dramatically.  Gun battles between the PIRA and the 
British army continued and over the course of 1971, nine IRA volunteers and 33 
civilians were killed by the security forces, with the IRA claiming the lives of 56 
members of the security forces.82  
 
If heavy-handedness in the day to day activities of the British army were straining 
relations between them and the nationalist community, compounded by the initially 
one sided and ineffective use of internment without trial, it was to be the events of 
Bloody Sunday 1972 that was to cement the status of the British army as the enemy 
of the nationalist community.  A civil rights march had been planned for Derry on the 
30 January 1972, and had been banned by the Northern Ireland Home Affairs 
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Minister Bill Craig.  Unrest had broken out at some previous marches and the British 
army were to be present.  In support of some other regiments, the First Battalion of 
the Parachute Regiment were to be on the ground, tasked with arresting trouble 
makers, should civil unrest break out.  The Parachute Regiment were a curious 
choice for this kind of peace keeping and arrest role.    They were widely considered 
amongst the most effective regiments at the British army’s disposal due to their 
distinguished service in the colonial conflicts in Palestine, Cyprus, at Suez, Radfan 
and Aden.83  Indeed, the Parachute Regiment had been one of those selected for the 
initial deployment to Northern Ireland in 1969, patrolling the troubled loyalist area of 
the Shankill Road.84  However, they were not a regiment known for the subtlety, 
being widely regarded by high-ranking military officials as one of the most aggressive 
and brutal fighting forces in the British army.85  After some minor civil unrest, with a 
small minority of the marchers that day breaking away from the main pack to confront 
the army at the barricades, the Parachute Regiment opened fire, killing fourteen 
unarmed, Catholic civilians.  The chronology of events on Bloody Sunday is one of 
the most contested issues in the history of the conflict.  However, initial reports that 
the army were fired upon first by the crowd, and that some of those killed that day 
were armed, have been found to be untrue by the Saville Inquiry, published in 2010, 
the longest running and most expensive public inquiry in British history.86  
Furthermore, the Saville Inquiry confirmed in 2010 what the nationalist community in 
the Bogside in Derry and across Ireland had believed for many years, that the killing 
of those civilians was unjustified.  Bloody Sunday took on ‘iconic importance in the 
Northern nationalist psyche’87, and the attempts to whitewash the event through the 
discredited Widgery Inquiry only served to strengthen the sense that the ancient and 
inalienable tenets of British justice did not extent to Northern Ireland. 
 
The international attention that the United Kingdom had been attracting throughout 
the civil rights campaign with pictures of the heavy-handedness of locally recruited 
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security forces had caused Westminster considerable embarrassment.  In the 
aftermath of Bloody Sunday, it perhaps became apparent to Westminster that the 
conflict in Northern Ireland could not simply be suppressed in the manner they had 
hoped.  Stormont had proved ineffectual in taking the lead in dealing with the unrest. 
As such, the UK government at Westminster suspended Stormont, initially for a 
period of one year in March 1972.   It was to be almost three decades before 
Northern Ireland returned to a functioning devolved government from this period of 
direct rule.88  The move to direct rule from Westminster meant that Northern Ireland 
would be governed by a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who took on the 
legislative and executive functions that the Stormont government had fulfilled, while 
the Northern Ireland Office; civil servants based in both Belfast and London took over 
many of the other tasks performed by a government.89  Given the expansive remit of 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, the individuals filling those roles from 
1972 until 2000 wielded not only considerable power but also considerable influence 
over the trajectory of the troubles.  Of course, the Secretary of State was always 
subject to the policy objectives of cabinet, and especially the Prime Minister, the 
individual personalities and character of various secretaries no doubt had a massive 
impact on the course of the conflict.  The first Secretary of State was to be William 
Whitelaw.  While the move to direct rule might have removed some of the problems 
that Stormont had caused, in the sense that policy on Northern Ireland would now 
wholly be decided based on security concerns, rather than it had been as before with 
the dual concerns of security and maintaining electoral and party support, it was not 
without its own issues.  For one, the PIRA saw the ‘collapse’ of Stormont as a direct 
result of their armed campaign of violence, and were strengthened in their resolve to 
achieve the reunification of Ireland in what had now become a straight fight (as they 
saw it) between them and the British state.90  As Westminster had not had to 
intervene directly in Northern Ireland’s affairs for a period of fifty years, successive 
administrations had become detached from the political climate in Northern Ireland.  
The fragmentary nature of the state meant that cabinet minsters‘ understanding of a 
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complex, deeply historically rooted and ever evolving conflict was bound to be less 
than optimum.  However, with direct rule now in place, and the realisation that there 
was unlikely to be a quick fix to Northern Ireland’s problems, the state’s 
understanding and approach to the conflict began to improve, albeit slowly.   
 
Much like the Spanish state response to early Basque violence, until the suspension 
of Stormont, the UK state had no overarching policy but containment of violence.  It 
became apparent with the suspension of Stormont that a more long-term solution 
was required.  1972 was the single bloodiest year in the Northern Ireland conflict, 
with 496 fatalities.  An IRA bombing campaign had begun the year previously and 
continued through 1972 unabated.  The PIRA’s principal targets were not military or 
police targets, but rather symbolic and economic targets, designed to make life in 
Northern Ireland as abnormal and disrupted as possible.  Additionally unprotected 
buildings were much softer targets.  In one of the most horrific days in Northern 
Ireland’s history in 1972, the PIRA detonated more than twenty bombs across Belfast 
in a series of coordinated attacks lasting only ninety minutes.  As was customary with 
the PIRA, advanced warnings of the bombs and their placements were given but the 
sheer scale of the attacks on that day meant that the security forces were 
overwhelmed and almost powerless to respond.  Nine people were killed and dozens 
more were injured.91  According to the claims of Brendan Hughes, a former senior 
PIRA man, the attacks were at least partly planned by Gerry Adams, the man who 
was to become President of Sinn Féin, instrumental to the party’s eventual 
acceptance of using solely peaceful means in the late 1990s, and whose role was 
key in achieving the permanent cessation and disbandment of the PIRA in 2005.92  
Bloody Friday, as it became known acted as a turning point.  In the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, nationalists had presented as a broad and fairly united force.  This 
attack however, being the most deadly in a series of PIRA bombs in Northern Ireland, 
drove a wedge between constitutional and militant brands of nationalists.  
Additionally, the British army launched Operation Motorman in its wake.  Since the 
introduction of internment without trial in 1971, ‘no-go’ areas had been established in 
republican strongholds across Northern Ireland.  The areas, which were de-facto 
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liberated areas behind improvised barricades, behind which the security forces had 
no control.  They were often patrolled openly by members of the PIRA and local 
vigilante groups and thus attempted incursions into these areas to conduct searches 
or carry out arrests would be met with heavy gun-fire.  They acted as effective bases 
from which the PIRA could launch attacks and the strength of the PIRA campaign in 
the early 1970s owed much to these ‘no-go’ safe havens scattered throughout 
Northern Ireland’s most urbanised areas.  Bloody Friday acted as incentive, catalyst 
and justification for breaking these no-go areas and bringing them once more under 
the control of the security forces.93  The army put the plan to break no-go areas, 
known as Operation Motorman, to Secretary of State William Whitelaw and less than 
two weeks after Bloody Friday, the barricades were broken down by 12,000 soldiers 
with bulldozers and tanks.  The overwhelming numbers and force with which the 
British army arrived to break the no-go areas meant that the IRA did not offer 
resistance, but rather chose to spirit away their guns and ammunition.94  Ed Moloney 
asserts that Operation Motorman marked a watershed in the conflict, after which the 
PIRA were always on the defensive.95 Indeed, Operation Motorman and the removal 
of the barricades indicated a shift in military and security policy, shifting from a 
counter-insurgency, ill defined and directed as much at the wider population than at 
those in paramilitary organisations, to a counter-terrorist campaign.96 
 
Direct Rule 
 
The beginning of the period of direct rule saw the UK state begin to take a multi-
faceted approach to ending the campaigns of terrorism being waged in Northern 
Ireland.  Cunningham points to a number of statements from junior Northern Ireland 
ministers indicating the need for a holistic approach to handling the conflict.97  Ellison 
and Smyth point to the role that Frank Kitson, a senior British army officer had in the 
reorientation of the security approach to Northern Ireland at this time.98 Kitson had 
been involved in a number of the British army’s colonial campaigns and had even 
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penned several works on counter-insurgency, including Low Intensity Operations,99 
which was widely used as a handbook by the CIA and NATO.100  Kitson had served 
in Northern Ireland from the deployment in 1969.  As such, he had witnessed the 
strategy that the army had adopted in Northern Ireland and its counter-productivity.  
Kitson outlines in Low Intensity Operations the need for a ‘unified approach’, to 
include both political and military initiatives.101  
 
While it was the PIRA and other republican organisations that would emerge over the 
1970s such as the Irish National Liberation Army, INLA which directly threatened the 
state, loyalist terrorism from organisations such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) 
and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) were having a damaging effect on security 
and stability in Northern Ireland, and the security forces in Northern Ireland began to 
take the threat from loyalist organisations more seriously in the early 1970s, and 
loyalist paramilitary suspects began to be interned in 1973.  However, the way in 
which violence from paramilitaries of the opposing communities was treated by the 
state was somewhat skewed, with violence from republican paramilitaries treated as 
more serious than that of loyalists.  While the detrimental effect of the UVF was 
recognised early in the conflict, with the organisation being proscribed shortly after 
they killed three people in 1966, evaporating much of their support,102 the Ulster 
Defence Association, which used the UFF as its nom de guerre was not proscribed 
until 1992, despite their obvious involvement in attacks on Catholic civilians.103 
 
Throughout the early 1970s the RUC were being somewhat reformed in the wake of 
the Scarman and Cameron Inquiries and the Hunt Report. and the Ulster Special 
Constabulary (USC) had been disbanded and replaced with the Ulster Defence 
Regiment.104  Efforts were being made to make the RUC look more like its sister 
forces in Great Britain.105 Around 1972, the Westminster government began to adopt 
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policies in an attempt to stabilise the situation and reduce political unrest.  By this 
point, the government had realised that the unequal and heavy-handed way that 
internment had been utilised in the early days of the policy the year before had been 
counter-productive, and as such, they scaled back its usage and even arrested and 
interned some loyalist suspects in 1973.    Parliament approved a piece of legislation 
in December 1972, which replaced the Special Powers Act, under which internment 
was used.  The Detention of Terrorists (NI) Order 1972 made some small limitations 
on internment without trial, stating that cases had to be presented to a commissioner 
by the Chief Constable within 28 days of arrest. 106  However, the commissioner 
could recommend further detention, and the Order’s protocols fell substantially short 
of accepted legal process.107 Special category status had been introduced for 
prisoners too in 1972, affording prisoners convicted of terrorism related offences a 
range of benefits in prison above and beyond what normal criminals (often termed 
‘ordinary decent criminals’ or ODCs for short) would receive.108  Special Category 
Status afforded freedom from prison work, the right to wear their own clothing, and a 
certain degree of freedom of association with the prison.  It had been one of the few 
points that Whitelaw had conceded to during the talks with the IRA earlier that year 
before the breakdown of the brief ceasefire.   The efforts of the government were 
focused on how to return Northern Ireland to a state of relative peace and normality.  
The Northern Ireland Office had published a paper in October of 1972, called The 
Future of Northern Ireland, which summarised the options available and found that a 
return to some sort of devolved institution would be the most plausible.  In order for 
this to be achieved however, the paper recognised that there would need to be some 
changes to the system, and not merely a reinstatement of the previous institutions, so 
that it would have cross-community support.109 In contrast to the French and Spanish 
states in handling their own campaigns of terrorism and political violence, the United 
Kingdom, made a much greater use of legislative measures to counter terrorism.   
 
Most of the legislative reforms introduced in the early 1970s were to incorporate the 
recommendations of the Diplock Commission. The Diplock Commission was headed 
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by a senior British judge and was tasked with finding legislative measures that might 
be effective in a more long-term strategy to bring terrorists to book.110  The Diplock 
Report was published in December 1972 and made a number of recommendations 
which were to be adopted in various pieces of legislation throughout the mid 1970s.  
The recommendations made were controversial, and whilst they went some way to 
ensuring that more terror suspects in Northern Ireland were subject to the criminal 
justice system, the legislation enacted as a result of the Diplock Report created a 
scenario where the system these suspects were subject to was very different from 
the regular British legal system.  Most of the recommendations were incorporated 
into the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973.111  Those charged with 
scheduled offences would be tried by a judge, sitting without a jury.  Additionally, 
some provisions in the new Act reversed the burden of proof, for example on the 
admissibility of confession evidence, the burden was now on the defendant to prove 
that confessions had not been given freely but only after torture, or inhuman or 
degrading treatment.112  Similarly, where proscribed materials such as firearms, 
explosives, and incendiary devices were found on property, it was up to the occupier 
of the property to prove that they were held for lawful purposes or that they were 
ignorant of their existence.113  With regards to powers of arrest, detention and 
internment, the EPA made some modifications to the legal position as established 
under the Special Powers Acts, but it was rather a solidification and slight 
amendment to the regime, rather than a substantial liberalisation of the existing 
system.114  The EPA was amended several times throughout the 1970s, but its basic 
form stayed the same.115 
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Sunningdale and the UWC Strike 
 
Whilst the suspension of Stormont was to be a temporary measure, soon after the 
imposition of direct rule from Westminster, it became clear that if there was to be any 
return to devolution, that the institutions would require a complete overhaul.  As 
William Whitelaw, the first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland stated, ‘my basic 
remit was to break the mould of Northern Ireland politics, of which the Stormont 
Government was a cornerstone’.116  Even at this juncture, and despite the 
tremendous amounts of violence that had occurred in Northern Ireland up until that 
point, there was still a failure by the political branch of the state to comprehend the 
full extent of the division in Northern Ireland and the enormity of the task at hand.  
Only after his first visits to Northern Ireland did William Whitelaw himself grasp the 
scale of the problem. 117  The United Kingdom government thus were concerned with 
finding a way in which power and responsibility could once more be devolved to 
Northern Ireland in the near future, though their efforts were to fail for the next 26 
years.  In 1973, meetings with the representatives of the Ulster Unionist Party and 
Social Democratic and Labour Party provided the basis for a potentially workable 
devolved Northern Ireland Assembly.  An entirely new set of political institutions 
would be created, with a unicameral legislature.  Additionally, the majoritarian politics 
which had allowed nationalist grievances to fester was out.  The new system would 
be a power-sharing assembly, where nationalists would be represented on the 
Executive.  As well as this, in an extra move to placate nationalists, there would be a 
cross-border dimension, which came to be known as the Council of Ireland.  While 
the exact format of the Council and what its role would be was never fully elucidated, 
it proved to be a red rag to many Unionists.  As a result, the Sunningdale Agreement, 
which was an intergovernmental agreement between the UK and Ireland to ratify the 
treaty compounded the fears of many hardline Unionists.  The UUP were divided on 
the issue and it threatened to split the party permanently.  The Agreement was 
ambiguous in certain areas, especially over the role of the Council of Ireland, and the 
ambiguity frightened many unionists who perceived the overall Agreement as 
detrimental to their interests.118  However, despite the widespread discontent over the 
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Sunningdale Agreement, the newly elected Labour government were keen for the 
power-sharing efforts to succeed and pressed ahead.   
 
A strike, orchestrated by an organisation calling itself the Ulster Workers Council was 
organised in May 1974.  The UWC was a loose coalition of anti-Sunningdale 
unionists, loyalist trade unionists, and paramilitaries determined to bring Northern 
Ireland to a standstill and thereby forcing either the Council of Ireland to not be 
ratified by the newly formed Assembly, or for a new Assembly election to be held 
(which would have resulted in the election of a large number of anti-Sunningdale 
unionists, effectively making the new institutions unworkable.119  The change of 
government at Westminster meant that the Labour party and its personnel were in 
charge of managing a situation that they had little previous experience of dealing with 
directly.  Merlyn Rees, the new Secretary of State for Northern Ireland chose not to 
try and break the strike and picket lines with the security forces, much to the ire of the 
SDLP.120  However, given the level of animosity from unionists towards the 
Sunningdale Agreement and the devolved institutions, it may have been the case that 
devolution was dead in the water before the strike ever began.121  Additionally, the 
clear linkages between the UWC and loyalist paramilitaries meant that any attempt to 
break the strike by force might have resulted in extremely ugly scenes, jeopardising a 
great number of lives, and worsening cross-community relations.  Perhaps too, the 
new Wilson administration with its inexperience in Northern Ireland did not want to 
risk provoking loyalists into greater violence, thus sparking a ‘war on two fronts’ in 
Northern Ireland, and resulting in negative press for the administration so early in its 
term.122  As a result, the power-sharing executive collapsed, leaving a constitutional 
solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland seeming improbable for the foreseeable 
future.  Indeed, the attempt to create power-sharing institutions at that time may have 
been doomed to failure.  Despite tentative talks between the IRA and UK government 
representatives in 1972 and a short-lived truce123, the atmosphere was such that 
even if the Sunningdale Agreement and the power-sharing institutions had survived 
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the UWC strike, the conflict was unlikely to abate.  As Frank Steele, a Secret 
Intelligence Service (MI6) officer who attended the meetings in 1972 between UK 
government and IRA representatives said of early 1970s ‘this sounds a callous thing 
to say, but I don’t think either community had suffered enough to want peace, to 
make peace an absolute imperative’.124  Sunningdale thus might have been doomed 
to failure as a result of the lack of support and the unwillingness of unionists to allow 
concessions for fear of a gradual slide into a united Ireland.  Nevertheless, some 
have remarked that the success of the UWC strike and the Ulster Unionists standing 
against power-sharing meant that ‘Protestant machismo’ ‘had probably been 
sufficiently asserted by [its] success’.125 
 
Under the Conservative administrations, there had been a militarisation of the 
security scenario in Northern Ireland, with the army taking the lead in most operations 
including foot patrols, house searches, intelligence gathering and undercover work.126 
The security forces received little direction from Westminster,127 perhaps on the 
understanding from government that the forces that had acquired so much 
experience in dealing with civil unrest and insurgency in the colonies would have little 
problem in Northern Ireland.  
 
Intra-state Tension 
 
There was a great deal of tension between the police and military arms of the state, 
owing somewhat to the reduced role that the RUC were expected to play, no doubt 
inflamed during the occasions where operational mistakes or ill devised plans such 
as the Falls Road Curfew and Bloody Sunday handed republicans a propaganda 
coup.  The animosity was not reserved to rank and file police officers and army 
privates either, extending into the officer class, fluctuating depending on the 
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personnel in charge of particular units expected to cooperate with each other.128  
Generally, cooperation had been difficult and the army refused to share their 
intelligence with the locally recruited forces, even with the RUC Special Branch, 
something which created great resentment and made life difficult for the police.129  
On an operational level the army and police were at ‘loggerheads’, as one officer in 
the RUC Special Branch counter terrorism unit, established in the early 1970s130 
known as E4A put it, but that there was also a real lack of trust between Ministry of 
Defence top brass and RUC, especially its Special Branch.131 
 
However, by the time Labour came to power in 1974, the RUC had been reformed, 
as a result of the Scarman and Hunt Reports, which also were the driving force 
behind the disbandment of the B-Specials making way for the Ulster Defence 
Regiment.132 Additionally, it had become clear that the military’s counter-insurgency 
style approach had been inflammatory and, despite some operational level 
successes (such as Operation Motorman) had failed to reduce the level of violence 
sufficiently.  The Gardiner Inquiry established by the new Labour government in 1975 
recommended that the RUC were now ‘rehabilitated’ and would respond in a more 
nuanced way in order to reduce disturbance, and by 1976, they were placed back in 
the lead role for security operations.133   The idea of putting the RUC and UDR back 
in the principal role for security operations fitted into a wider strategy.  The 
government felt that, by scaling down military activities and reducing the prominent 
presence of the army in an attempt to restore the appearance of normality would 
perhaps normalise the situation on the ground somewhat and perhaps make the 
future development of a feasible political settlement possible.134  Indeed, there was 
the feeling that the PIRA were being defeated in the cities, especially since the 
destruction of the no-go areas, and so the climate was ripe for a switch to police 
primacy.  The levels of conflict-related fatalities had indeed dropped since its peak at 
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the height of the unrest in 1972, falling from almost 500 to 267 by 1975.135   Thus 
from the mid 1970s overall, the conflict in Northern Ireland began to be treated more 
as an issue of security, and of law and order, than the less obvious counter-
insurgency style that prevailed in the early 1970s.   
 
The Gardiner Inquiry had also made further suggestions regarding the prison system.  
In 1972, during the short-lived PIRA ceasefire, negotiations between the UK 
government and representatives of the PIRA had secured ‘special category status’ 
for paramilitary prisoners.  Calls for Special Category Status had emerged as veteran 
republican Billy McKee and four of his PIRA comrades commenced a hunger strike in 
Crumlin Road gaol in May of that year.136  The hunger strike quickly gathered 
support, being joined by five more men in Crumlin Road gaol, forty internees in Long 
Kesh internment camp, and six female prisoners in Armagh Women’s Prison.137  The 
campaign received substantial support outside the prison, demonstrated by marches, 
political rallies and demonstrations. Against this backdrop, Secretary of State for 
Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw permitted special category status for prisoners 
who had been convicted of scheduled offences.   
 
The idea was to take the heat out of the emerging stand off at a delicate period, and 
prevent the nationalist community at large from rallying round the PIRA prisoners on 
hunger strike for their demand to be accepted as political prisoners, and to capitalise 
on the PIRA ceasefire.138 While the move was indeed effective in defusing the stand 
off and created better relations between the SDLP who had been canvassing the UK 
government for concessions, but as Whitelaw himself recognised, special category 
status was to cause a significant headache for his successors.139 In line with the 
other recommendations the Gardiner Inquiry made, it also added that Special 
Category Status should be removed.  The idea was to criminalise political violence, in 
the hope that the portrayal of terrorism as nothing else other than crime, would drive 
a wedge between paramilitary organisations and the communities they relied on for 
                                                 
135 D. McKittrick, S. Kelters, B. Feeney, C. Thornton and D. McVea, Lost Lives (Edinburgh: 
Mainstream, 2007), p.1552. 
136 F.S. Ross, Smashing H-Block, (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press), p. 8. 
137 Ibid, p. 10.  
138 W. Whitelaw, The Whitelaw Memoirs, p. 94 
139 Ibid. 
 
129 
  
support. Those committing acts of political violence were to be seen as nothing other 
than ‘convicted terrorists’.140  Through the reintroduction of police primacy thus, and 
the criminalisation of terrorism, it was hoped that Northern Ireland would be 
normalised, striking a blow against the paramilitaries, who relied the disruption of 
every day life and the depiction of Northern Ireland as a war zone. 
 
The conjoined policies of police primacy, criminalisation and normalisation bore fruit 
throughout the mid to late 1970s, with increasing numbers of terrorist suspects 
arrested, charged and sentenced through the criminal justice system.  As a result, 
levels of violence were dropping and some of the paramilitary organisations were 
being deeply wounded by the shift in approach.  The shift in policy by the UK 
government throughout the 1970s thus changed the atmosphere substantially in 
Northern Ireland. However, critics noted some key contradictions to the idea that 
Northern Ireland was becoming ‘normal’.  While terrorists were to be treated as 
ordinary criminals in the prison, they were often convicted under the expansive body 
of emergency legislation, and sentenced by Diplock courts, sitting without a jury.  The 
RUC may have replaced the British army in frontline duties, but the RUC had 
undergone changes, and with the creation of specialist units to combat terrorism, 
they were more militarised and muscular than most police forces.  Most obviously, 
that the RUC were armed with semi-automatic rifles for daily duties meant that they 
were a far cry from the British ‘bobby on the beat’ image that had been envisioned for 
them in the Hunt Report.  In short ‘the force increasingly resembled an army of sorts, 
resulting in profound tension between the increase in its capacity to “take on” 
paramilitaries and its simultaneous claim to be a “normal” civil police force’.141 
 
Margaret Thatcher and the Hunger Strikes 
 
With the 1979 UK general election, came a new Conservative Government under the 
premiership of Margaret Thatcher.  That Thatcher left an indelible mark on the United 
Kingdom barely needs repeating.  Her style of government, and a close personal and 
overtly ideological engagement with the contentious political issues that arose during 
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her eleven years as Prime Minister has altered the United Kingdom politically, 
socially and economically.  Despite the Conservatives’ aversion to public 
expenditure, it was recognised that Northern Ireland was a special case, and thus it 
was spared from the neo-liberal economic policies that were the hallmark of 
Thatcher’s domestic policy for the rest of the United Kingdom.142  Nevertheless, 
Thatcher’s tenure as Prime Minister was to see some of the most controversial and 
divisive episodes in the Northern Ireland conflict.  She became a totemic figure, the 
personification for republicans of the intransigence of the UK state, and for unionists, 
of the malevolence of a Westminster government that cared little for Northern 
Ireland’s position within the union.  In many ways (though by no means in terms of 
the vehemence of their policies), she was the embodiment of the UK state for the 
period of her tenure, in the way that Franco represented the Spanish state and de 
Gaulle the French.  Furthermore, it was not simply that she was a figurehead, but 
rather that her very personal and impassioned engagement in Northern Ireland’s 
crisis drove the conflict in a very particular direction, for which she was much reviled. 
Even before Thatcher became Prime Minister she had been affected personally by 
the conflict in Northern Ireland.  In 1975, a prominent supporter of hers, Ross 
McWhirter was killed by the PIRA.  As a result, Thatcher was given police protection 
for the first time, underlining the real threat that republican paramilitaries posed to her 
life. 143 Just four months before the election which brought her to power in 1979, her 
key ally and close friend Airey Neave, who had been tipped to become the Secretary 
of State for Northern Ireland, was killed by an INLA bomb attached to the rear of his 
car which had been parked in the car park of the House of Commons.144  Speaking to 
press outside her house on the day of the attack, Thatcher commented ‘Some devils 
got him. They must never, never, never be allowed to triumph’.145 
 
Overall, Thatcher’s time as Prime Minister was to be marked by a series of events 
which affected her deeply, strengthened her resolve to find a solution to the Northern 
Ireland conflict, and which were to influence the course of the conflict greatly. Only a 
number of months after her election, on 27 August 1979, the PIRA mounted two 
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spectacular attacks.  A bomb placed aboard a boat at harbour in Mullaghmore, 
County Sligo in the Irish Republic, claimed the life of Lord Louis Mountbatten, his son, 
his fourteen year old grandson and a fifteen year old local boy. 146 On the same day 
in Northern Ireland at Narrow Water, Warrenpoint near the border with the Republic 
of Ireland, a PIRA bomb attack claimed the lives of 18 British soldiers, including 16 
from the loathed Parachute Regiment.  Thatcher was deeply affected by both attacks, 
being a great admirer of Mountbatten, who was a cousin of Queen Elizabeth II, and a 
strident supporter of the army’s  campaign in Northern Ireland.   
 
These attacks, (particularly the bombing at Warrenpoint), prompted a rethink in 
approach to security in Northern Ireland.  From the army’s point of view, Narrow 
Water served as evidence that the RUC in the lead role did not have the capacity to 
prevent serious terrorist attacks.  Thatcher flew to Northern Ireland and held 
meetings with both the RUC and Army leadership to discuss how to proceed.  
Thatcher granted the requests of the RUC, who called for 1,000 new recruits, which 
would enable them to greatly increase their strength on the ground and maintain the 
image of police primacy.  At the same time, at the request of the GOC Lieutenant 
Creasy, Thatcher appointed Maurice Oldfield, a former director of MI6 to oversee the 
security forces in Northern Ireland.  Oldfield quickly established a unit known as ‘The 
Department’, which had representatives of all branches of the security forces in order 
to facilitate closer cooperation between the Army and the locally recruited forces.147  
With this augmented approach to security, with a more muscular RUC, (gendarmerie) 
in the lead position, with the security forces overseen by a former military and 
intelligence man, the response to terrorism in Northern Ireland was to take on a very 
particular character throughout the 1980s, as will be discussed later.   
 
Since the removal of special category status in 1976, some republican prisoners in 
the Maze prison outside Belfast had been protesting against the new regime where 
they were subject to the same rules. By 1979, the PIRA were suffering greatly from 
the increase in arrests and convictions, which was constraining their ability to carry to 
                                                 
146 A. Sanders, and I.S. Wood, Times of Troubles, p. 141. 
147 G. Ellison and J. Smyth, The Crowned Harp, p.109.  See also S. Greer, Supergrasses: A Study in 
Anti-terrorist Law Enforcement in Northern Ireland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 46-9, for more 
detail on the changing nature of security cooperation in the aftermath of the Warrenpoint attack and 
the particular responsibilities and composition of ‘The Department’. 
 
132 
  
out effective attacks.148  They had been wounded by the reforms of the police, and 
the new focus on high-grade intelligence that came with it.  As a result, it became 
necessary for the PIRA itself to reform.  It moved away from its traditional hierarchical 
structure and adopted a more cellular system in the late 1970s, with a view to making 
infiltration more difficult and less disruptive to the organisation when it did happen.   
 
By the time Thatcher came to office, the conflict in Northern Ireland had already been 
‘Ulsterised’, with police primacy, and terrorist suspects were increasingly 
‘criminalised’, arrested under the specialist emergency legislation.  Thatcher 
continued with this programme, with a view to normalising every day life in Northern 
Ireland as much as possible.  She realised that the paramilitaries thrived on the 
creation of terror and the disruption of normal life as much as possible, especially for 
the IRA who sought to make Northern Ireland ungovernable and thus her answer was 
normalisation. Before her election, Thatcher had been an integrationist, seeing the 
logical extension of the policies to normalise British rule in Northern Ireland as the 
incorporation of Northern Ireland politically into the rest of the UK.  However, when 
she took the reigns as Prime Minister she allowed her successive Secretaries of 
State for Northern Ireland to continue attempts to find a devolved political solution to 
the conflict.149   
 
A further part of the normalisation of law and order in Northern Ireland focused on the 
status of prisoners serving sentences for scheduled offences.  During the ill fated 
negotiations in 1972 between the PIRA and the Labour government representatives, 
the government had conceded ‘political’ or ‘special category’ status for all prisoners 
who had been convicted of scheduled offences.  It was introduced against the 
backdrop of reports of hunger strikes in the Crumlin Road Gaol in Belfast by 
republican prisoners.   The problem arose when, as part of the policy to normalise 
Northern Ireland through the use of police in front line duties, and the use of the 
criminal justice system, the decision was taken to criminalise paramilitary prisoners, 
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and that thus they must have the same prison system as ‘ordinary decent criminals’.  
The removal of Special Category Status for newly sentenced prisoners began in 
1976, and the first prisoner to stage a protest against the new regime was Kieran 
Nugent. Nugent was a member of the PIRA who had been sentenced to three years 
for hijacking a vehicle.  Upon his entry to the Maze/Long Kesh prison in September 
1976, he refused to wear prison uniform or carry out prison work, as was now 
required of all newly sentenced prisoners.150 For both the United Kingdom state and 
republicans, the removal of special category status was seen as a way to de-
legitimise the republican ‘armed struggle’, and to plausibly deny the political nature of 
their violent campaign.151  Several newly sentenced prisoners followed Nugent’s 
precedent, and were allowed to wear only a blanket, resulting in what became known 
as the ‘blanket protest’.152  The increased emphasis on criminalisation outside the 
prisons by the state meant that a steady stream of republicans were being sentenced 
and sent to Long Kesh/The Maze, with many of these men joining the blanket 
protest.  By 1978, the number of prisoners involved in the protest had reached 
250.153  The transfer of senior PIRA member Brendan Hughes into the H Blocks of 
the Maze prison in 1978, from the Nissen huts where prisoners were held on remand 
before their trial, resulted in the ratcheting up of the campaign.  The blanket protest 
progressed to a ‘no wash’ or ‘dirty’ protest, amidst allegations that prisoners ‘slopping 
out’, emptying their latrines and using the shower facilities were being physically 
abused by prison warders. The fact that all the IRA prisoners in the H Blocks of the 
Maze/Long Kesh were Catholic, while the prison staff were almost entirely all 
Protestant meant that confrontations took on bitterly sectarian overtones.154  
Prisoners went unwashed for long periods of time, and chamber pots were emptied 
of liquid under the door of cells, whilst excrement was smeared on the walls.   
Despite the calls for reinstatement of Special Category Status, the UK government 
remained resolute. Margaret Thatcher herself weighed in on the issue stating: 
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We are not prepared to consider special category status for certain groups 
of people serving sentences for crime.  Crime is crime is crime, it is not 
political, it is crime.155 
 
However, supporters of the prison protests highlighted the duplicity of the 
criminalisation policy.  As the National H-Block Committee stated: 
  
...if there were two kinds of law, two kinds of court, two kinds of justice, 
there were two kinds of prisoners.156 
 
Outside the prison, republican paramilitaries began directly targeting prison staff, 
killing 19 from the time when Merlyn Rees removed Special Category Status in 1979, 
until the end of the hunger strikes in 1981.  Loyalist paramilitaries increased their 
attacks on Catholics in response, with activists in the H-Block Committees being the 
primary targets 157With no indication that the so called ‘five demands’ of republican 
paramilitary prisoners on strike in the H-Blocks were going to be conceded, the 
protests were scaled up to a new level.  Brendan Hughes stated years later that 
nationalist Ireland ‘knew instinctively where this [the strikes] were heading if a 
resolution was not found’.158  On 10 October 1980, the leadership of the striking 
paramilitary prisoners announced a hunger strike, which began 17 days later.  The 
tactic had several precedents in Irish republican history, having been used 
infrequently by previous generations of imprisoned republicans.  The prison 
leadership believed that, faced with prisoners prepared to starve themselves to death 
to attain Special Category Status, the British government would capitulate. Indeed, it 
was not the case that the republican prisoners at the outset believed that they would 
die,159 rather it was a risky effort to achieve their aims through the forcing of an 
ultimatum.  
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Upon the announcement of the hunger strike, the UK government remained publicly 
steadfast. Margaret Thatcher stated in her autobiography: 
 
  All my instincts were against bending to such pressure, and certainly there 
could be no changes in the prison regime once the strike had begun.  
There was never any question of conceding political status.160  
 
Despite the steadfast image that the government wishes to present publicly, efforts 
were being made behind the scenes to find a resolution.  Thatcher herself appeared 
to be conflicted, noting on internal government documents the importance of making 
no concessions, and that the government’s aim should be ‘to break the strike’, while 
at the same time listing the concessions that had already been offered.161  Before the 
strike was commenced ‘civilian type’ clothing was offered, not just to paramilitary 
prisoners but to all prisoners in Northern Ireland, but this fell short of the demand by 
those on the strike to wear their own clothes, and thus, was rejected and the first 
hunger strike commenced.162   
 
With the commencement of the hunger strike, the nationalist community drew close 
to the unified front that had been witnessed during the civil rights era. Indeed, it has 
been noted that H-Block Committees, formed to draw attention to the plight of the 
republican prisoners in Northern Ireland’s prisons were able to draw crowds 
comparable to the civil rights era demonstrations to their marches by November 
1980.163  When the strike was underway, and contrary to her public statements of 
resoluteness on the issue, Thatcher sanctioned secret talks between MI6 and the 
Sinn Féin leadership.  While she did not engage with the Provisional Republican 
movement directly, the communication channel had her blessing.164  The first hunger 
strike ended on the 18 December 1980, with one of the hunger strikers, Seán 
McKenna critically ill.  The ending of the first strike is mired in controversy, with 
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republicans claiming that despite the rhetoric of the UK government, a deal had been 
offered that was close enough to the original stated five demands for them to call off 
the strike.165  The strike was called off by Brendan Hughes, but it soon emerged that 
the UK government had no intention of granting the demands.  In March 1981, a 
second hunger strike commenced, led by Bobby Sands, a PIRA member who had 
been convicted of possession of illegal arms.  This time the strike was more 
organised, with volunteers joining the strike in intervals, with each dying hunger 
striker being replaced by another in the hope that the prospect of a steady stream of 
deaths in the H-Blocks would force the UK government to capitulate.  An opportunity 
arose to test the support of the hunger strikes amongst the wider nationalist and 
republican community in April when veteran independent republican MP Frank 
Maguire died suddenly.   
 
Sands stood for election as an ‘anti-H Block’ candidate.  The more moderate 
nationalist SDLP did not field a candidate in the by-election and Sands was elected 
by a narrow margin of around 1,400 votes ahead of the Unionist candidate Harry 
West. Despite this clear message of support for the hunger strikers, not just from 
militant republicans, but from across the broader nationalist community, the UK 
government remained steadfast and refused to grant special category status.166 Ten 
hunger strikers died, catapulting them from young idealist terrorists to the status of 
martyrdom amongst the republican community and making the name of their leader 
and first to die, Bobby Sands, famous beyond Britain and Ireland.  The strike ended 
on 3 October 1981, when it became apparent that the government had no intention of 
giving in to the demands, and amidst the intervention of a number of the hunger 
strikers’ families to save them from death by calling for them to be fed when they lost 
consciousness. 
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Tactically, the 1980 and 1981 hunger strikes had been a defeat for the republican 
movement.  The UK government had shown their resolve to stand against terrorism 
and  for the continuation of their policy of ‘criminalisation’.  However, as mentioned, 
the cohesion of the wider nationalist community in support of the hunger strikers and 
their plight was to have lasting political effects on Northern Ireland.  The massive 
attendances at rallies, the huge turnout at the polls, and the overwhelming crowds at 
the funerals of the ten dead hunger strikers illustrated to Sinn Féin that it was 
possible to mobilise large numbers of people behind the aims and objectives of 
republicanism when violence wasn’t the central focus.  As Marianne Elliott so 
eloquently stated: 
 
  Now Margaret Thatcher’s famous intransigence provided the perfect foil to 
the image being built of the noble rebel, battling against insurmountable 
odds... A failing movement would emerge re-fortified when Britain fulfilled 
its traditional role in republican mythology.167 
 
The use of hunger strike by Irish republicans in furtherance of their political objectives 
had many precedents over the course of the twentieth century, many of which aimed 
to coerce (or simply protest against) the British state in Ireland. 168  Despite the 
wealth of historical precedents and experience that the United Kingdom state had 
amassed, once again the UK’s political elites had miscalculated.    
 
Despite the previous failure of the efforts to establish power-sharing institutions in 
Northern Ireland as a means to solve the crisis, the successive Westminster 
administrations continued to struggle to find means by which a political settlement 
could be found.  No sooner had plans for the so called ‘Sunningdale’ Assembly been 
frustrated, that plans to establish a ‘Constitutional Convention’ were set in place in 
1975, but despite the engagement from some of Northern Ireland’s political parties, 
their reluctance to move away from their initially stated positions and negotiate 
potential concessions for fear of being branded as ‘sell outs’, 169 or outflanked by 
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more radical parties,170 and against the backdrop of renewed and invigorated 
campaigns of violence from the PIRA and other paramilitaries, meant that the 
Convention achieved little and was shelved by Merlyn Rees in 1976.171 
 
Before her election as Prime Minister, Thatcher had been ambivalent towards the 
idea of devolved rule for Northern Ireland.  With the death of her close friend and 
colleague, and vehement integrationist Airey Neave in 1979, however, she became 
more open to calls for devolution. Since his appointment to the role of Secretary of 
State for Northern Ireland in September 1981, after a cabinet reshuffle, James Prior 
had been working to establish what he termed ‘rolling devolution’, by which power 
would gradually be devolved to a power-sharing institution in Northern Ireland.  He 
felt that it was important that in the aftermath of the hunger strikes, that an effort be 
made to make some concrete progress Thatcher felt the venture was ‘worthless’172, 
however, the elections to Jim Prior’s ‘Rolling Devolution’ Assembly in October 1982 
was the first outing at the polls since the death of the ten hunger strikers and the 
results startled the UK government.  Sinn Féin, standing in the election received a 
vote of 64,191 first preferences, around 10 per cent of the total.173  It was the first 
time that a political party attached to a violent paramilitary organisation had achieved 
a sizeable mandate at the polls.  The impressive polling by Sinn Féin in the 1982 
Assembly election was no doubt due in large part to their riding on the crest of a 
wave of support from the hunger strikes a year previously.   
 
Over the 1980s, the UK state’s approach to Northern Ireland was to change 
substantially.  It became apparent to Thatcher, that a solution had to be found, and 
with Prior’s ‘rolling devolution’ experiment failing like many of its predecessors, 
Thatcher herself took onboard the need to find solutions by other means.  At the 
same time that Thatcher and her government colleagues in Westminster were 
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pursuing a constitutional settlement and improved security through the inter-
governmental channel with Dublin, across the early 1980s, the lower rungs of the UK 
state were developing their own particular characteristics and reactions to violence 
on the streets of Northern Ireland.   
 
On the streets 
 
The shift to criminalisation, normalisation and police primacy in the mid 1970s, had 
taken its toll on the PIRA campaign.  The dynamics of the conflict had changed 
somewhat. The use of the packages of counter-terrorism legislation and the focus on 
achieving convictions through a somewhat augmented criminal justice system had 
been paying dividends for the state.  Additionally, the removal of the British army 
from frontline duty as a result of police primacy had made it difficult for the PIRA to 
successfully target soldiers in gun attacks.   The RUC, now at the forefront of security 
operations had changed tack.  Chief Constable Newman expanded RUC Special 
Branch, giving them a greater responsibility for intelligence gathering and 
surveillance, tasking a new unit within Special Branch, called E4A with responsibility 
for ‘deep surveillance’ and established a specialist unit of SAS trained RUC officers 
who were initially deployed along the South Armagh border with County Louth in the 
Republic of Ireland.174  The newly formed units and new strategic approach 
represented a more hard-line RUC, almost the equivalent of Spain’s Guardia Civil or 
a gendarmerie than the British bobby that had been envisaged in the reports of early 
commissions. The RUC attempted to take over as much responsibility for the 
handling and uncovering of intelligence as they possibly could in the late 1970s: roles 
which were previously carried out by the army.175 As such, the new hard-edged RUC 
became much more effective in disrupting PIRA operations.176 IRA personnel that 
were arrested were subject to prolonged interrogation, accommodated by the EPA 
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and the PTA.  By 1977, the PIRA were feeling the strain.  A report from IRA General 
Head Quarters was intercepted by Gárdaí in Dun Laoghaire, it reported that; 
  
  The three and seven day detention orders are breaking Volunteers, and it 
is the Republican Army’s fault for not indoctrinating Volunteers with the 
psychological strength to resist interrogation.  Coupled with this fact, which 
is contributing to our defeat, we are burdened with an inefficient 
infrastructure of commands, brigades, battalions and companies.  This old 
system with which Brits and [RUC Special] Branch are familiar has to be 
changed...We must emphasize a return to secrecy and strict 
discipline...We must gear ourselves towards long-term armed struggle 
based on putting unknown men and new recruits into a new structure.  
This new structure shall be a cell system.177 
 
The shift to a cell system by the PIRA, which occurred in the late 1970s was thus a 
response to the increased success that the security forces were having in 
apprehending PIRA suspects, foiling attacks and achieving convictions.  While the 
cell structure was not universally adopted, with significant sections retaining the more 
traditional hierarchy based along the British army model, the changes proved to be 
significant.  The cell structure meant that a ‘volunteer’ would only necessarily be 
aware of the entity of a handful of other members, thus making the information they 
could divulge if apprehended much more limited.  Overall it was a great success.178  
The ability of the PIRA to carry out successful attacks rose in the late 1970s, and 
early 1980s, with some particularly large attacks, such as those on Mountbatten and 
at Warrenpoint, presenting the image of an organisation that was largely undefeated, 
despite the significant arrests. 
 
The rethinking of British security policy in Northern Ireland in the aftermath of the 
Warrenpoint and Mullaghmore attacks meant that despite the outward appearances 
of policy primary and ‘normalisation’ the military began to take an increasingly 
important role in undercover operations once again.  Indeed, it is claimed that despite 
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the poor relations between some elements of the RUC and the British army, that 
some units cooperated between the forces so closely that they practically merged. 
The reform of the PIRA and the reduced arrest and conviction rates in the early 
1980s were frustrating the security forces.  Faced with substantial numbers of PIRA 
operations, several disparate trends emerged in the 1980s, that however described, 
certainly did not represent the ‘normalisation’ of policing. 
 
From 1981, there was an increased reliance on what were known as ‘Supergrass 
trials’, trials where members of paramilitary organisations were offered inducements 
such as reduced sentences if they cooperated with the RUC to name and testify 
against their accomplices to achieve conviction of individuals in connection with 
terrorist offences. Initially, the ‘supergrass’ system was extremely successful, with 
high conviction rates in the early trials.  Indeed, over the period of 1981 to 1983, 
evidence from around 25 ‘supergrasses’ led to the arrest of over 600 suspected 
paramilitary members.179 After a while though, the unwillingness of the judiciary to 
convict on the basis of uncorroborated confessions waned.  Additionally, the 
subsequent withdrawal of statements by supergrasses meant that some trials fell 
apart and convictions were not achieved,180 and eventually the system was 
abandoned amidst criticism from senior lawyers and front-bench Labour MPs in 
opposition.181 The supergrass system appears not to have been a formal policy at 
government level, with Northern Ireland Office officials asserting that it was simply an 
operational decision taken by the RUC.182  However, Michael Cunningham highlights 
that given the sheer scale of the programme in the early 1980s, that it is unlikely that 
the supergrass system was able to proceed without at least the tacit approval of the 
Attorney General.183   
 
Throughout the early 1980s, the PIRA campaign continued against the backdrop of 
the largely ineffective supergrass trials.  The resilience of the paramilitary 
organisations in Northern Ireland and their adoption of new strategies in reaction to 
UK policy meant that whilst levels of violence had fallen from their peak in 1972, that 
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significant disruption to daily life, and fatality rates per capita were still high.  The 
muscular and secretive units of the RUC and British Army that had been formed in 
the late 1970s, in conjunction with the SAS scaled up their operations in the 1980s in 
an attempt to directly take the fight to the republican paramilitaries and thwart their 
operations.  Relying on a combination of high-grade intelligence, obtained through 
the acquisition of disgruntled paramilitary operatives, and through surveillance 
techniques, the campaign fought by the security forces in the 1980s took a robust 
approach. 
 
Shoot to kill 
 
The intelligence and counter-terrorism activities of the UK state in Northern Ireland 
however were more sinister at times than overzealous military and police units 
overstepping the mark and blurring the lines between minimum force and punitive 
force.  Similar to the experiences of the GAL and Barbouzes from the Spanish and 
French states respectively, the United Kingdom appears to have operated a military 
organisation firmly embedded within the apparatus of the state which carried out 
assassination operations. In the summer of 1971, an SAS trained unit called the MRF 
was established.184  There is some debate around whether Brigadier General Frank 
Kitson, the author of Low Intensity Operations, the military’s counter-insurgency 
handbook, who had developed and deployed similar techniques during the Mau Mau 
uprising in Kenya, had any direct role in the creation of the unit.185   Either way, the 
unit was placed at his disposal and bore the hallmarks of colonial counter-insurgency 
‘counter-gangs’.186 The acronym MRF is variously stated to mean Military 
Reconnaissance Force, Military Reaction Force, Mobile Reconnaissance Force, or 
Mobile Reaction Force. 187 The MRF used ‘imaginative if not “amateurish” 
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intelligence-gathering measures’,188 running agents and setting up front business 
including massage parlours and a laundry service, through which they obtained leads 
and forensic intelligence.  The MRF subsequently used this intelligence and 
intelligence gathered from agents recruited from the republican movement to target 
suspected IRA members in assassination attacks.189  The group frequently used 
weapons more commonly used by the various paramilitary organisations in Northern 
Ireland rather than the standard military issue Browning pistol and Sterling sub-
machine gun in attempts to conceal their operations.190   As with all shadowy state 
organisations operating outside the law, it is difficult to identify with certainty the 
extent of the MRF’s operations in Northern Ireland, and just how many deaths they 
were responsible for. While they were not the only covert intelligence-gathering 
organisation active in Northern Ireland at the time, in time they became the best 
known because of the nature of their activities and the manner in which they were 
uncovered.  Despite being active for a relatively short period of time, the organisation 
was responsible for a number of attacks and incidents. Catholic brothers John and 
Gerry Conway were injured in a gun attack on the Whiterock Road in Belfast in April 
1972 when the MRF mistook them for two wanted IRA men whom they had orders to 
shoot on sight.191 The following month Patrick McVeigh, an unarmed Catholic man in 
nearby Andersonstown was killed in a gun attack that wounded four others.192 In 
June of 1971, the MRF opened fire on a group of men standing at a bus terminal, 
injuring three taxi drivers and a passer-by.193  The MRF hit squad was apprehended 
by the RUC and arrested on this occasion but the soldiers involved in the attack were 
never convicted. The MRF suffered losses of its own when IRA/MRF double agents 
Seamus Wright and Kevin McKee broke under interrogation by the IRA and gave 
information about the activities of the ‘Four Square Laundry’ front company, used by 
MRF to gather forensics and other intelligence in republican strongholds.194 McKee 
and Wright were subsequently ‘court marshalled’ by the IRA, shot dead and buried in 
secret.  The IRA attacked the Four Square Laundry van on 2 October 1972, killing 
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Sapper Edward Stuart.  Another female colleague of his escaped the ambush 
uninjured.  Peter Taylor notes that the ‘end of the Four Square Laundry’ marked the 
end of the MRF’.195  Yet it was not the end of covert intelligence operations or robust 
counter-insurgency operations against suspected prominent republicans. 
 
The willingness of some sections of the security establishment to consider shooting 
unarmed civilians had been witnessed on Bloody Sunday.196  The SAS had been 
operational in Northern Ireland officially since 1974 but in reality, had an active 
presence from at least 1971.197 Indeed, operations by the SAS in Northern Ireland, 
usually engaging IRA members in gunfire, are well-documented and received 
significant negative publicity throughout the 1970s and after.  Criticism hinged on the 
level of force used by the SAS units, the secretive manner in which their actions were 
carried out, and some high profile incidents where SAS soldiers were discovered 
across the border in the Republic of Ireland, which was played upon by Sinn Féin and 
the republican press as evidence of their underhandedness and the perceived 
illegitimacy of their actions.198  The negative publicity garnered by the SAS operations 
throughout the 1970s meant that they were eventually scaled back, though their 
activities did not cease entirely.199 
 
In 1982 however, three events helped return the spotlight on the security forces, this 
time on the RUC, their use of force, and the use of specialist secretive units.  In the 
space of four weeks in November and December 1982, six people were killed by the 
RUC.  The first operation was carried out in Craigavon, County Armagh, where three 
IRA members failed to stop at an RUC vehicle checkpoint.200  The specialist unit 
HMSU (Headquarters Mobile Support Unit) a secretive sub-division of RUC Special 
Branch opened fire, riddling the car the IRA men travelled in with over 100 bullets.201  
Forensic tests in the aftermath indicate that RUC officers administered a coup de 
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grace, on at least one of those killed.202  The RUC unit involved in the shooting were 
taken away to be debriefed by their superiors before RUC Criminal Investigation 
Department had a chance to interview them, as was protocol in such incidents.  The 
IRA men in question fired no shots that evening and indeed, when the car was 
searched in the aftermath, it was discovered that all three men were unarmed.  The 
incident occurred just two weeks after the killing of three RUC officers a few miles 
away, of which two of the three IRA men gunned down, Sean Burns and Eugene 
Toman, were suspected.203  In this light, the operation in Craigavon looked less like 
the conduct of state operatives tasked with countering terrorism and restoring law 
and order, and more like a vengeful retribution attack on their colleagues’ killers.   
Two weeks later, HMSU opened fire on a hay shed outside Lurgan claiming the life of 
one teenager, Michael Tighe, and seriously wounding his friend Martin McCaughley 
in contested circumstances, and a further attack in December in Armagh City which 
killed two INLA members in similar circumstances to the Craigavon incident.  At trial, 
it emerged that the versions of events given by HMSU officers in the subsequent 
investigations had been falsified, with the officers involved being issues with a false 
version of events by their superiors.204 
 
John Stalker, Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police was tasked with 
an investigation into these alleged incidents of ‘Shoot to Kill’.  Stalker’s inquiry was 
‘seriously obstructed by the RUC’205, and in June 1986 he was removed from the role 
amidst allegations that he had been associating with known criminals, which were 
later proven to be spurious.  Stalker has since stated his belief that the appearance of 
these allegations against him were politically motivated, in order to remove him from 
the enquiry because of the waves his report would have created.206  Stalker’s view 
was that the RUC had indeed shot the men and that those involved concocted lies 
about the circumstances, but that there was no overarching ‘shoot to kill’ policy.207  
The investigation into the six deaths was completed by another senior British police 
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officer, however the report was never released to the public. 
 
The RUC effort to reassert control of the situation in the early 1980s had been 
disastrous.    Though their operations were scaled down, there were contentious 
operations carried out by RUC and Army units throughout the 1980s. Thus, despite 
the reforms and incorporated recommendations of the earlier reports on the state of 
policing in Northern Ireland, the RUC were understandably still objects of extreme 
suspicion in the eyes of the nationalist community.  The reluctance of the RUC 
hierarchy to engage fully with John Stalker’s inquiry, his abrupt removal from office 
amidst spurious accusations about previous alleged misconduct and the final report 
compiled which were never published led many to believe, despite the assurances of 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, that a ‘Shoot to Kill’ policy was in 
operation throughout the 1980s, and the nationalist community remained 
substantially alienated from the security forces as a result.  The UK state could 
scarcely have chosen a course of action to more thoroughly undermine their policy of 
the normalisation of Northern Ireland.  Additionally, in terms of effectiveness, the 
operations were largely futile.  Though the operation at Craigavon and in Armagh City 
killed members of the PIRA and INLA, and further high profile operations, such as the 
fire fight in Loughgall which took the lives of eight IRA members (as well as one 
innocent bystander caught in crossfire), and the SAS operation in Gibraltar (in which 
three IRA members were shot dead during a mission to plant a bomb in the British 
protectorate), were successful at thwarting individual terrorist attacks, they failed to 
diminish substantially the campaigns of violence by the IRA and other republican 
paramilitary organisations.208  As Ellison and Smyth highlight, whilst the undercover 
attacks may indeed have had a deterrent effect, bringing home to individual potential 
terrorists the cost of involvement in paramilitary organisations, there is no way to 
measure this, and no evidence that it was a more useful deterrent than subjecting 
suspects to the criminal justice system.209  Rather, it provided outrages and focal 
points for the liberal media, and republican propagandists, to highlight the incongruity 
of the public and secret sides of the UK state’s overall efforts to defeat terrorism in 
Northern Ireland, and played directly into the longstanding nationalist discourses 
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about the bias inherent in the security forces and the cruelty and injustice of the UK 
state and its idea of ‘law and order’.   
 
Collusion 
 
Other troubling allegations levied at the UK state began to re-emerge in the 1980s in 
Northern Ireland.  There had been suggestions since the early 1970s that there was 
a degree of collusion between the locally recruited security forces and loyalist 
paramilitaries.210 That some members of the locally recruited security forces held 
sympathies for the loyalist paramilitaries is not surprising.  Given the cleavages in 
Northern Ireland’s society, with the state security forces drawn almost entirely from 
the Unionist community, attacks by the republican paramilitaries on the security 
forces were viewed as base sectarian attacks on the Protestant community.  Loyalist 
paramilitaries often stated that attacks they made were in response to murders 
carried out by the IRA.  The conflict thus at times took on a hyper-local tit-for-tat 
character. Indeed, the suspicion created amongst the wider unionist and loyalist 
community at the signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement (discussed in detail below) no 
doubt caught some RUC officers in a difficult position, clashing during 
demonstrations with loyalists with whom they fundamentally agreed. It is 
unsurprising, that members of the locally recruited state security forces, for whom 
their role in the UDR or RUC was often more than a job, but rather an expression of 
their political identity, felt the desire to strike back at republicans, or indeed the wider 
Catholic community. Unable to do so within the confines of their role as state 
employees, some sought other means to satisfy this urge, and seek revenge for the 
murder of their colleagues or members of their wider community. 
 
Intelligence documents had been recovered in the early 1970s in the possession of 
loyalist paramilitary members, although the discoveries were seldom publicised, for 
obvious reasons.211  The killing of Pat Finucane in 1989, a Catholic solicitor, who 
RUC intelligence files indicated may have been a member of the PIRA, and another 
suspected PIRA member, Loughlin Maginn caused the allegations to resurface.  The 
British government had been aware of apparent linkages between members of the 
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security forces and paramilitaries since the mid 1970s, and had commissioned a 
report into ‘Subversion in the UDR’ in 1974.212  The report suggested that between 5 
and 15 per cent of all UDR members had links with loyalist paramilitaries, with 
‘widespread joint membership of the UDA’ and the UDR.213  Rather than take action 
to root out members of the security forces at this stage who had links with 
organisations carrying out the murders of Catholic civilians, it was rather suggested 
by one senior British Army adviser, that the UDR played an important role in 
channeling ‘into a constructive and disciplined direction Protestant energies which 
might otherwise become disruptive’.214  Indeed the De Silva report into alleged 
collusion in the murder of Pat Finucane, which reported in 2012, highlighted the claim 
that ’85 per cent of UDA intelligence in 1985 originated from sources within the 
security forces.215  After the deaths of Finucane and Maginn, the UFF who claimed 
responsibility for the attacks publicised the fact that they held intelligence documents 
which suggested the pair were members of the IRA, and a short while later, over 250 
intelligence files in their possession were leaked to the press and pasted on walls 
across Belfast.216  The Stevens Inquiry, led by a senior British police officer, was set 
up to investigate collusion in 1989 after these incidents.  Despite the report being 
unable to say how many intelligence documents had been passed to loyalist 
paramilitaries, it concluded that there was no evidence of ‘institutionalised 
collusion’.217  The proximity of the locally recruited security forces to the conflict itself 
and their own political and emotional sentiments led some RUC and UDR members 
to collaborate with the loyalist paramilitaries in the murder of prominent republicans 
and Catholic lawyers who represented them.  However, collusion was not a 
phenomenon contained to the Northern Ireland recruited security forces.  A further 
investigation by John Stevens, in 1993 highlighted the role of British Army informer 
Brian Nelson.  Nelson was a senior member of the UDA and had been recruited by 
the army’s intelligence unit FRU (Force Research Unit) as an informer.  It emerged 
subsequently at trial, that Nelson had been passed intelligence files from the British 
Army so that the UDA could more effectively target republican paramilitary members, 
                                                 
212 A. Cadwallader, Lethal Allies: British Collusion in Ireland (Cork: Mercier Press, 2013, p 35. 
213 Ibid. 
214 Ibid. 
215 Ibid, p. 359. 
216 A. Mulcahy, Policing Northern Ireland, p. 73. 
217 G. Ellison and J. Smyth, The Crowned Harp, p. 134. 
 
149 
  
rather than conducting random attacks on Catholic civilians, and that UDA arms 
shipments from South Africa, which Nelson had arranged were allowed to reach 
Northern Ireland, so as to protect Nelson’s identity.218 
 
Investigations into the deaths of prominent republicans and Catholic lawyers at the 
hands of loyalists perceived to have been assisted in some way, have largely 
confirmed the suspicion of many that state security force employees have been 
involved in the passage of security files to loyalists, that some personnel maintained 
dual membership of paramilitary organisations and state security forces, and that at 
unit level, some units of the security forces worked to protect paramilitary members 
from prosecution so as to maintain their infiltration of the organisation.  Had collusion 
been institutionalised, or sanctioned at upper echelons of the state, we would surely 
expect that the intelligence and assistance offered to loyalists would have been of a 
level that would have made them extremely effective at the targeting and 
assassination of high numbers of active republican paramilitaries. For the most part, 
loyalists throughout the conflict targeted and killed Catholic civilians, suggesting that 
they overwhelmingly lacked the intelligence and technical intelligence to carry out 
such attacks. Notwithstanding the idea that collusion was largely conducted by ‘bad 
apples’ in the security forces, there were elements of state policy that (perhaps 
unwittingly) facilitated this trend. 
 
There is little doubt, for example, that police primacy as a policy from the mid 1970s, 
put locally recruited security forces in primary control of intelligence gathering, and 
that personnel in these organisations, driven by their frustration, emotions or blind 
sectarianism, utilised this material to conduct attacks.  The RUC, UDR, and British 
Army hierarchy were aware to some degree of collusion within the ranks, but aside 
from some occasions where prosecutions were sought, did little to change the culture 
of the organisations that allowed this to happen.  This failure to stop the leak of 
intelligence files from state to paramilitaries played into the hands of republican 
propaganda and discourses about the dishonesty and injustice of the British state, 
and served to undermine efforts to professionalise, modernise, and normalise both 
the security forces in Northern Ireland and society in Northern Ireland itself. 
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The linkages in Northern Ireland between pro-state terrorism and the state itself were 
never of the scale or type as they were in Spain and the Basque Country with GAL, 
BVE and the AAA, nor was it similar to the campaigns carried out by secretive gangs 
of thugs recruited by the state as in French Algeria with the Barbouzes.  However, we 
find a commonality in all three scenarios where agents of the state deployed or 
assisted with the illegal use of force.  In all cases, the blurring of the lines between 
state and pro-state terrorism served to undermine the claim to the monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force by the state itself.  The blurring of the lines also served to 
reinforce stereotypes and discourses of their opponents, and while in some cases, 
the extra-legal use of force succeeded in killing members of terrorist organisations, it 
did little to reduce the support these organisations had, or bring their campaigns of 
terrorism definitively to a close.  
 
Brighton Bomb, Intergovernmental Negotiations and the Anglo-Irish 
Agreement. 
 
Thatcher had met with Irish Taoiseach, Charles Haughey in late 1980 and 
established the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council by November 1981.219 
Thatcher states in her autobiography that her interest in a relationship with the Irish 
government extended only as far as improving security.220 The hope was that closer 
relations between An Garda Síochána, the Irish police force, and the RUC would help 
prevent republican terrorist groups from using the Republic of Ireland as a launch site 
for their attacks, and a safe haven to escape after, much in same way that ETA made 
use of the Spanish-French border to evade the Spanish security forces. The UK 
government had already accepted by 1979, that a military defeat of the IRA was 
unlikely.  Given the events of 1981 and 1982 with the election of Bobby Sands in the 
1981 by-election, the striking visual image of the 100,000 mourners at Bobby Sands‘ 
funeral, suggesting (whatever the reality) that militant and constitutional strains of 
Irish nationalism might be fused together once again, and the gains at the 1982 
elections made by Sinn Féin for Jim Prior’s rolling devolution Assembly, that efforts to 
hamper the IRA and restore normality to Northern Ireland through internal security 
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and devolution alone were unlikely to bear fruit. In this atmosphere, and often 
contrary to Thatcher’s vitriolic criticism of suggestions from nationalists in Ireland on 
possible solutions to the Northern Ireland conflict that involved a greater role for the 
Republic of Ireland as derogations of sovereignty, Anglo Irish relations were 
strengthened throughout the early 1980s.221 
 
In October 1984, as UK government ministers and prominent Conservative Party 
members were asleep in the Grand Hotel in Brighton where they were staying to 
attend the Conservative Party conference.  In the early hours of the morning, a PIRA 
bomb exploded in the hotel, killing five people and injuring over thirty.222  The primary 
target had been Margaret Thatcher, and although she survived the attack unscathed, 
the attack sent shockwaves through the political establishment and indeed the wider 
world.  Despite the infiltration of the PIRA by military intelligence, specialist army 
units, and the RUC, and direct confrontations of PIRA units by heavily militarised 
sections of the RUC, the PIRA were still able and willing to carry on their ‘armed 
struggle’.  While the Brighton bombing fitted neatly with longstanding republican aims 
and objectives and was not the first nor the last time that the IRA attempted to take 
their armed struggle to the heart of the British political establishment, there was a 
visceral and personal element in the attempt to kill Thatcher and her cabinet.  The 
sense that the IRA were hitting back at Thatcher for her intransigence during the 
Hunger Strikes was palpable. 223   The attack had a profound effect on Thatcher, who 
once again lost close friends and political allies at the hands of Irish republicanism.224  
In terms of bringing home the urgency of achieving a lasting settlement to the 
ongoing crisis, the Brighton bomb must have had an impact, acting as a wakeup call.   
By November the following year, the Anglo-Irish Agreement had been signed.  The 
Anglo Irish Agreement allowed the UK government to bypass the local political 
parties which had been unable to sustain a devolved assembly amidst the instability 
of ongoing campaigns of violence and mutual suspicion, in favour of a more stable 
Agreement with the Irish government. As Jonathan Tonge put it;  
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The Conservative Party, hit hard by the IRA bombing at the Conservative 
Party Conference in Brighton in 1984, recognized that doing nothing was 
perhaps no longer an option.  The Anglo-Irish Agreement placed that 
problem of Northern Ireland in a permanently binational context.225  
 
The Anglo Irish Agreement (AIA) established an intergovernmental conference, a unit 
that met at ministerial level between the two governments.  The AIA limited Dublin’s 
role to consultative and advisory, sidestepping claims that it would be a derogation of 
sovereignty, though unionists opposed the AIA, feeling that it would give the Republic 
a ‘direct influence in the internal affairs of Northern Ireland’.226  More generally, the 
AIA affirmed that any change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would 
have to occur as a result of the consent of a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland, and that the Intergovernmental conference would strive to improve cross-
border cooperation on security, economic, social and cultural matters.227  The most 
important aspect however, was that it provided that a power-sharing assembly 
composed of politicians from both sides of the divide in Northern Ireland could take 
over some of the duties of the Intergovernmental Conference.228  This effectively 
created a situation for the UK government where, under the normal operation of the 
Intergovernmental Conference, they would benefit from increased contact and 
improved relations from the Republic of Ireland for the time being, and it also created 
an impetus for the local political parties in Northern Ireland (especially the unionist 
parties, given their unhappiness at the involvement of the Republic of Ireland in 
Northern Ireland’s affairs), to negotiate for the construction of a power-sharing 
assembly, in order to take some power back into local hands, something which had 
been the aim of successive British administrations throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 
 
The signing of the Anglo Irish Agreement fed directly into unionists long standing 
mistrust of the UK government and their paranoia that they were about to be sold out 
into some joint sovereignty arrangement or indeed, a united Ireland.  As a result, 
moderate and more radical strains of unionism banded together again briefly in the 
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mid to late 1980s, with organisations amalgamating loyalist paramilitary groups as 
well as members of the Unionist political parties to form loose coalitions that staged 
massive protests in Belfast in late November 1985.  While the protests were 
reminiscent of the 1974 Ulster Workers Council strikes, this time they were not 
sustained.  The effect of the strikes was less destabilising than in 1974, although 
demonstrations continued to occur throughout 1985 and 1986, accompanied by riots, 
intimidation, and shots from loyalist gunmen aimed at RUC officers tasked with 
policing the unrest.229    The IRA, also upset with the Anglo Irish Agreeement, and 
hoping that it would not result in the nationalist community coming to trust the UK 
state, intensified their campaign too, widening their category of ‘legitimate targets’ in 
1986 to include civilians engaged in any kind of economic relationship with the 
security forces.230 More moderate unionism, understanding the commitment of the 
UK government to the AIA eventually shifted their position from total opposition to it, 
to discussions of devolution of much of the functions of the Intergovernmental 
conference to a power-sharing assembly, with the intergovernmental conference 
retaining only cross-border security cooperation within its remit, a position which was 
fostered and encouraged by Secretary of State for Northern Ireland at the time, Tom 
King.231 
 
The UUP were moderating its position on the Anglo-Irish Agreement with its decision 
to find ways around it through the possibility of establishing a power-sharing 
assembly.  They had accepted the counter-productivity of continually restating their 
opposition to the political reality of the Anglo Irish Agreement and the 
Intergovernmental Conference.232  Loyalism however retained its paranoia and 
loyalist violence in the late 1980s was reaching new depths. Against the backdrop of 
an electorally buoyed Sinn Féin, an Anglo-Irish Agreement thrust upon them with no 
consultation by a government they already treated with suspicion, and the softening 
position of the UUP in relation to it, loyalist violence began to rise.  Deaths at the 
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hands of the loyalist paramilitaries spiked in 1986 to 17 from just five the year before, 
and continued to rise throughout the late 1980s and 1990s.233  
 
The road to peace 
 
Sinn Féin’s move into electoral politics in 1981, and the rise to the presidency of the 
party by Gerry Adams marked a new phase for the Provisionals.  Sinn Féin had also 
begun to realise the limits to their electoral success with modest polling in elections in 
1985 and 1987, which lagged behind the strength of their nationalist rivals in the 
SDLP.234 With setbacks mounting and the gradual realisation coupled with the 
gradual change in atmosphere in Northern Ireland from one of insurrection and near 
civil war in the early 1970s, to that of a long, drawn out, bitter war of attrition, with 
blunders such as the 1987 Enniskillen bomb, and attacks on the now widened 
category of ‘legitimate targets’ demoralising the IRA and weakening their support 
amongst the nationalist community,235 Sinn Féin took a new approach.   
 
The Sinn Féin President, Gerry Adams met in secret with SDLP leader John Hume in 
late 1987 and throughout 1988 with a few to establishing a common strategy on Irish 
unity and establish something akin to pan-nationalism on certain issues. 236  The 
SDLP used these meetings as an opportunity to emphasise the negative role that the 
PIRA had played in Northern Ireland, with Hume stating his belief that a cessation of 
IRA violence would create the conditions under which a united Ireland could be 
achieved through the channels set out in the Anglo Irish Agreement.237  
 
The resignation of Margaret Thatcher in 1990, replaced as Prime Minister by John 
Major was an important development.  Thatcher had, as a result of her trenchant 
unionism, her unflinching public rhetoric during the hunger strikes, and the derisory 
way she had dismissed attempts by the constitutional nationalist parties north and 
south to find a solution to the Northern Ireland conflict that was amenable to all, 
become an arch villain for many nationalists.  John Major was a very different Prime 
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Minister.  Although still a Conservative Prime Minister, his unionist rhetoric was much 
less strident, and he carried none of the political baggage that Thatcher had accrued 
in her eleven years in office.  Major made attempting to find a resolution to the 
Northern Ireland conflict a priority for his term in office.238 Furthermore, Major’s 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke spoke about the ‘legitimacy of 
the Republican tradition’.239  
 
Capitalising on the softening of the UUP position, Brooke established political talks 
between the SDLP, Alliance, and the UUP in 1990, and in doing so, stated that the 
UK government had ‘no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland’.240  
The statements by Brooke stood in stark contrast to Thatcher’s rhetoric of Northern 
Ireland being ‘part of the United Kingdom - as much as my constituency [Finchley] 
is’.241   By 1992, the more informal talks between the three parties had evolved into a 
more solid round of political negotiations, which after the 1992 general election, were 
chaired by Brooke’s successor, Patrick Mayhew.242 Privately, the UK government, 
being aware of the soul searching and perceived sense of self-weakness from Sinn 
Féin, re-established contact with the IRA.  The move came in 1989, despite Thatcher 
and later, Major’s publicly stated position that they would not talk to terrorists.243   
Through this back channel, the UK government were making it clear to the PIRA that 
Sinn Féin’s entry into the ongoing political talks was dependent on a cessation of 
violence by the paramilitary group.244  Meanwhile, the IRA were still unprepared to 
move away from their armed campaign and violence from both republicans and 
loyalists continued in the early 1990s. Keen to show, despite their secret talks with 
the UK government, that they remained undefeated, the PIRA sustained a bombing 
campaign in Britain, with an attack on the London Stock Exchange in 1990, an 
attempted mortar attack on Downing Street and other central London targets in 1991, 
and 1992, and again attacks in London and Manchester in 1993.  Importantly, the UK 
government were undeterred by the continued violence, and the back channel 
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remained open despite the ratcheting up of violence by the PIRA in the early 1990s.  
That the talks were being conducted in secret was no doubt crucial.  In December 
1993, the Irish and UK governments issued the Downing Street Declaration, in which 
they restated their commitment to the principle of consent, and the right to self-
determination, whereby the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only be 
changed when a majority of people there wished it to be the case.  John Major spoke 
in the House of Commons about the hope that Sinn Féin would renounce violence, 
accompanied by the symbolic surrender of some arms, to allow a dialogue to 
begin.245 
 
The following year, on 31 August, the PIRA declared a ceasefire.  Officially, the UK 
government responded tentatively, remarking on the lack of words that denoted the 
ceasefire would be permanent.246  However, the UK government’s faith in the 
ceasefire was indicated by the lifting of the broadcasting ban against political parties 
which refused to condemn paramilitary violence, and the reduction of British army 
support for RUC patrols.  Two months later, the loyalist paramilitaries, now under the 
umbrella of the Combined Loyalist Military Command announced a ceasefire as well.  
For the first time since the late 1960s, it appeared that an opportunity to achieve a 
lasting peace might be possible.  The road from the 1994 ceasefires to the Good 
Friday Agreement in 1998 was not an easy one.  Sinn Féin and the PUP and UDP, 
the parties representing paramilitary organisations were not immediately admitted to 
the negotiations on an agreed settlement, with the UK government initially 
demanding acts of decommissioning as a symbolic gesture that the paramilitaries 
had moved away from violence for good.  The issue of the decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons threatened to derail the process on a number of occasions, 
with the UUP feeling particularly uneasy about engaging with Sinn Féin without 
decommissioning first, lest they lose support to the more hard-line DUP, who 
remained outside of the negotiations.  The PIRA broke their ceasefire in 1996, with a 
massive bomb in Canary Wharf in London, demonstrating that their patience at the 
stalling peace process and indicating their ability to return to armed struggle.  The 
PIRA announced a second ceasefire in 1997, stating their commitment to removing 
British rule in Ireland, and also their hope that the renewed ceasefire would bring 
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about real political negotiations to achieve a lasting peace.247  The eventual 
agreement, signed on 10th April 1998.  The Good Friday Agreement (or Belfast 
Agreement) was signed by eight of Northern Ireland’s political parties, with the DUP 
being notably (though unsurprisingly) absent from the signatories.  It had been signed 
almost a year after Tony Blair’s Labour Party had come to power when the 
Conservatives were defeated in the 1997 UK General election.  Blair received 
plaudits for his role in achieving peace. The last push of the Labour government, with 
key roles played by Blair, his special advisor Jonathan Powell, and Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland, Mo Mowlam who had all been instrumental in fostering the 
agreement from the British perspective, with the Irish government playing a 
considerable role.  That the Good Friday Agreement would be achieved was not a 
foregone conclusion, and that it would prove durable was even more uncertain.  It is 
important however to note the important progress made by Blair’s predecessors in 
taking the initiative to maintain contact with the PIRA through their last violent throes 
in the 1990s, and in persevering until the vast majority of political parties were 
prepared to sit around the negotiation table. 
 
The GFA itself was, as the SDLP’s Seamus Mallon famously noted, similar in many 
respects to the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973. 248  It established a power-sharing, 
mandatory coalition executive selected proportionately from a 108 member Assembly 
which was elected by Single Transferrable Vote system.  As well as the internal 
power-sharing element, there was to be a cross-border element, found in the North 
South Ministerial Council, a diluted version of the Council of Ireland which had proved 
to be the divisive issue in 1973.  Additionally, a third strand provided for East West 
links, with the British Council, and British Irish Intergovernmental Conference, 
designed as a balancing to the cross-border element.  Crucially, the GFA mandated 
that the Republic of Ireland would need to relinquish their territorial claim to the six 
counties of Northern Ireland, located in Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, 
which were to be replaced with an aspiration to the reunification of the national 
territory.  In the lead up to the referendum, it became clear that nationalists and 
republicans overwhelmingly supported the Agreement, but that unionism was much 
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more divided on the issue.249  On referendum day, the turnout in Northern Ireland 
was 81 per cent, the highest ever recorded, while the Republic of Ireland recorded a 
much more modest 56 per cent turnout.  In Northern Ireland, 71.1 per cent voted in 
favour of the Agreement, while south of the border, 94.4 per cent voted in favour. 250  
While these results may appear like a resounding success, the statistics mask the 
high levels of discontent with the Agreement amongst the Unionist community, as 
well as a considerable level of republican discontent.251 
 
The Good Friday Agreement did not mark the end of terrorism in Northern Ireland. 
The general population of Northern Ireland enjoyed the peace brought by the 
ceasefires in 1997 and the air of optimism palpable after the announcement of the 
Good Friday Agreement, but in Northern Ireland, peace was a relative concept.  
Long-established paramilitary organisations remained heavily armed, British soldiers 
remained in Northern Ireland, and the RUC remained intact.  The decision to accept 
the Good Friday Agreement by Sinn Féin meant that any return to violence by the 
PIRA was untenable.  In recognising this, some of the more hardline members of 
Sinn Féin broke from the organisation.  The sister of hunger striker and republican 
‘martyr’ Bobby Sands stated at the time that her brother ‘did not die for cross-border 
bodies with executive powers.  He did not die for nationalists to be equal to British 
citizens within the Northern Ireland state’.252  In 1986, there had been a splinter from 
the Provisional Movement, with former Provisional Sinn Féin President Ruairí Ó 
Brádaigh leaving to form Republican Sinn Féin, which soon developed a parallel 
armed wing, known as the Continuity IRA.  In 1998, the provisional republican 
movement split again, with some high ranking IRA members leaving to form the Real 
IRA and its connected political wing, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement (32CSM).    
The optimism of the people of Ireland, north and south that political violence would be 
a thing of the past was shattered soon after the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement.  In August 1998, the market town of Omagh was devastated by an RIRA 
bomb which killed 29 people, including a pregnant woman.  However, the bomb did 
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not cause a slip back into violence for most of the main paramilitary organisations, 
and the widespread revulsion from all sections of the community prompted a 
temporary cessation of activities from the RIRA.  
 
The years after the Good Friday Agreement were fraught with political difficulties.  
Full decommissioning of arms had still not taken place by the paramilitary 
organisations on ceasefire.  The lack of progress on the issue hamstrung progress, 
with the Northern Ireland Assembly being suspended as a result of Unionist refusal to 
engage in the political institutions until the decommissioning issue had been 
resolved.  Additionally, measures decided upon as part of the Good Friday 
Agreement were still taking time to unfold.  Prisoner releases under licence occurred 
throughout 1999 and 2000, with over 400 paramilitary prisoners convicted of 
terrorism related offences being released, with over 100 of those serving life 
sentences, many for some of the most heinous atrocities carried out during the worst 
days of the conflict.  For victims and their families, this was a bitter pill to swallow, but 
one that had been deemed to be politically necessary to bring the paramilitaries on 
board with the peace process and secure their continued ceasefires.   
 
As part of the Good Friday Agreement negotiations, many paramilitary prisoners 
serving long sentences for terrorism related crimes were released from prison on 
licence.  While this was a bitter pill for many civilians and victims of terrorist violence, 
it was deemed to be the price to pay in order to achieve the support of the 
paramilitaries for the peace process.  Additionally, the Good Friday Agreement had 
also established a commission, led by senior British politician, Chris Patten, to 
indicate changes to be made to policing in Northern Ireland. Given the concerns of 
the nationalist community about the perceived partiality of the police and their levels 
of professionalism, this was seen as a major hurdle to overcome in the hope for a 
lasting settlement to the conflict.  
 
The Patten Report was published in September 1999, and while it did not conclude 
that the RUC should be disbanded, it made 175 recommendations for substantial 
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reform of the organisation.253 By 2001, most of these reforms had been implemented.  
They included   the change of name from the Royal Ulster Constabulary to the Police 
Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), the removal of the most visible symbols of 
Britishness, a new code of ethics and oath of office, as well as a strengthened 
emphasis on human rights, training, and normalisation of policing, and crucially 50-50 
recruitment policy for Catholics and ‘other’.254  Police reform in Northern Ireland had 
been something that had been ongoing throughout the conflict, but its progress was 
often piecemeal and conducted during the conflict, meaning that the opportunity for 
the community to reflect on the real differences that the changes had made were few 
and far between, and were in many cases undermined by the series of scandals and 
allegations against the RUC.  In the clear light of day, against the backdrop of relative 
peace, the most comprehensive changes ever made to policing in Northern Ireland 
were implemented. 
 
Terrorism legislation had been updated and amended throughout the conflict, and 
had during the 1990s been subject to annual renewal as a means to demonstrate 
that the necessity of the emergency legislation was under continual review.  The end 
to the PIRA and loyalist campaigns of violence in 1997 provided space for the greater 
normalisation of counter-terrorism legislation.  In 2000, the Terrorism Act was passed 
to replace the EPA and PTA legislation which had been the mainstay of legal 
measures to deal with terrorism throughout the conflict.255 The legislation applied not 
just to Northern Ireland but to the entire United Kingdom, and was drafted in such a 
way to deal with a wider range of potential terrorism than just that emanating from 
Northern Ireland.256 Whilst the decrease in terrorist activity in Northern Ireland 
allowed for the passage of the Terrorism Act, it was the first time that the legislation 
designed to combat terrorism had been drafted, debated and passed into law without 
the spectre of wide scale republican and loyalist violence.  The legislation’s 
permanence, and its more general nature meant that it seemed less obviously 
stringent and attracted little of the controversy that previous counter-terrorism 
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legislation had in the past, despite there being no grand departure or significant 
liberalisation of the legislative regime. 
 
The political atmosphere had fundamentally changed in Northern Ireland by 2005.  
The Assembly had been operating for five years. Though it suffered teething 
problems and suspensions as unionists attempted to exert pressure on the PIRA to 
decommission entirely, it provided checks and balances to ensure that peaceful 
nationalist voices would be heard politically, and prevented a return to the old pre-
1972 version of devolved rule.   Those paramilitaries on ceasefire had not held 
entirely true to their word, with several killings attributed to the Red Hand Defenders 
and to the PIRA from the late 1990s and early 2000s, indicating just how delicate the 
peace process was.257  However, the UK state were finally making substantial 
inroads in their quest to secure the normalisation of politics and everyday life in 
Northern Ireland, and it came not through the imposition of doctrinaire security 
policies alone, but through mediation and negotiated settlement, including with those 
who had perpetrated some of the conflict’s worst atrocities.   
 
Across the United Kingdom, and indeed globally, the attitude towards terrorism had 
changed substantially in those early years of the 21st century.  The events of 11 
September 2001 had created an atmosphere of absolutism surrounding the use of 
terrorist tactics, evidenced by the American response to the attacks in the shape of 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. There was the feeling that whatever the cause of 
the terrorist, that their message in this new climate of fear was more likely to be lost, 
and seen as an attack on democratic values.  Within Northern Ireland there was 
significant political change, too.  Sinn Féin had risen to become the largest nationalist 
party in the Assembly, surpassing their more moderate rivals the SDLP in the 
Assembly elections of 2003.  In July 2005, the PIRA issued a statement announcing 
an end to its armed campaign, and in September of that year, the Independent 
Monitoring Commissioning on Decommissioning that had been established to 
oversee the decommissioning of arms by paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland 
announced that the PIRA had given up its arms and no longer posed a threat. 
 
                                                 
257 A. Sanders, Inside the IRA: Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy, (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press; 2011), p.226-230. 
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In 2007, as a result of the relatively peaceful climate in Northern Ireland, the British 
Army finally withdrew from Northern Ireland, leaving only a normal garrison of troops.  
It marked the end to the British army’s longest campaign, Operation Banner. The 
death of civilians throughout the conflict was always met with an outpouring of grief 
and frequently shook support for the paramilitary organisations.  That such an 
outpouring of grief occurred in response to the death of 28 civilians in Omagh is thus, 
no surprise.  Far more telling however, of the changing political climate was the 
reaction to attacks on security force personnel at the hands of dissident republicans. 
The killing of two Royal Engineers sappers at Massarene Barracks in Antrim by the 
RIRA in April 2009 and just ten days later, the killing of Constable Steven Carroll in 
Craigavon in 2009 by the Continuity IRA was roundly condemned by all sections of 
the community, including former high ranking PIRA member, by then a senior Sinn 
Féin politician and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland under the new devolved 
institutions Martin McGuinness.258  In 2011, the killing of a young Catholic police 
officer Ronan Kerr in Omagh, County Tyrone by dissident republicans created 
powerful symbols, with a guard of honour at his funeral being provided by both the 
PSNI and Gaelic Athletic Association.  A powerful indicator of how far society had 
come in Northern Ireland and the massive improvement in community relations 
despite the sporadic occurrence of violent attacks by dissident republican groups.   
 
Whether the conflict in Northern Ireland has reached a conclusion is still a matter of 
debate.  A comparison of the PSNI statistics from 2013/14 to those of the 1998/1999 
which marked the signing the Good Friday Agreement show a considerable reduction 
in the intensity of the conflict.  From April 2013 to March 2014 only a single death 
from conflict is recorded, compared to 44 for the same period in 1998 to 1999.  
Likewise, 2013/14 shows 57 shooting incidents and 69 bombing incidents in the 
period, compared to 187 shootings and 123 bombing incidents in the same period of 
1998 to 1999.259  Statistics however mask detail, and a number of the incidents 
included in the figures were the disruption of large scale attacks, including an 
                                                 
258 McGuinness publicly stated that those who carried out the attack were ‘traitors to the island of 
Ireland’ and commented that the attack and others like it would not derail the peace process. See 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/mar/10/northern-ireland-policeman-killed (accessed 24/11/13). 
259 Police Service of Northern Ireland, Police Recorded Security Situation Statistics: Annual Report 
Covering the Period 1st April 2013 - 31st March 2014. (PSNI, 2014), p.9. 
http://www.psni.police.uk/annual_security_situation_statistics_report_2013-14.pdf (accessed 25/5/14). 
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attempted dissident republican mortar attack on a PSNI station in Derry, and a 
number of attempted car bombs, similar in size to that which claimed the lives of 29 
people in Omagh in 1998.  The levels of violence may have greatly reduced but there 
is little room for complacency. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The nature of the UK state response to terrorism in Northern Ireland was shaped by 
a number of factors which the state elites had not recognised early in the conflict, and 
which later they would struggle to control.  It was only with the eventual management 
of some of these factors, that UK state elites were able to manipulate the political 
scenario from a situation resembling war, to a situation resembling peace.  Owing to 
previous outbreaks of conflict in Ireland and the constitutional settlement that was 
reached concerning partition and the establishment of devolved institutions at 
Stormont, the Westminster government had maintained a distance from Northern 
Ireland’s internal political affairs for almost 50 years by the outbreak of serious civil 
unrest in the late 1960s.  Unscrutinised by central government, the administration in 
Northern Ireland had taken on sectarian and overtly Unionist overtones, which served 
to foment the grievances of the nationalist minority.  When violence did erupt, the 
character of the locally recruited security forces, the USC and the RUC, which were 
overwhelmingly Protestant and Unionist in their make up, unprofessional, ill trained, 
and tended towards sectarianism caused the worsening of inter -communal 
relationships.  Unhelpful rhetoric from the Unionist government at Stormont served to 
exacerbate these tensions and allowed republicans to use the ill-treatment at the 
hands of the security forces as evidence of the irreformable nature of the state in 
Northern Ireland. 
 
There is little doubt that as the civil unrest spread, that the inability of the locally 
recruited security forces to cope meant that the deployment of the British Army was 
necessary.  However, the history of the British army, with its accrued experience in 
counter-insurgency campaigns in the colonies meant that its standard operating 
procedures and organisational culture were ill suited for its peace keeping and ‘aid to 
the civil defence’ role in Northern Ireland.  While the military leadership had preached 
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‘minimum force’ and the importance of ‘winning hearts and minds’ in the military’s 
engagements prior to Northern Ireland, the abstract ideas expounded by senior 
officers were seldom put into practice on the ground by rank and file soldiers.  Thus, 
the army’s overzealous actions in the early years of the troubles served to foment 
nationalist disaffection from the state in Northern Ireland, and gave the IRA the 
chance to portray the army as one of occupation and repression. 
 
The lack of knowledge of Northern Ireland among state elites at cabinet level meant 
that when Direct Rule was implemented, that the politicians in Westminster had little 
experience of handling Northern Ireland and lacked a basic familiarity with the history 
and political problems it faced.  The assumption that the security forces were expert 
in this area, and thus the high levels of operational independence granted to them, 
also contributed to the problems.  Furthermore, there were tensions between the 
coercive arms of the state from the deployment of the Army.  This situation worsened 
when the Westminster government opted for police primacy.  As a result, cooperative 
endeavours between the police and the military was not as smooth and effective as 
they could have been.  There was also a duplication of roles which created 
confusion, and a less than optimum intelligence approach.  Despite the 
professionalisation of the RUC throughout the conflict, the highly emotive nature of 
terrorist attacks on security force personnel meant that some RUC and UDR 
operatives took matters into their own hands, passing resources and intelligence to 
loyalist paramilitaries, or at times even holding dual membership of state and terrorist 
organisations. 
 
State elites were not immune from visceral reaction, and Margaret Thatcher, who had 
been deeply affected by the loss of close personal friends at the hands of republican 
paramilitaries was vociferously outspoken against the IRA, making her a target for 
attack and a reviled figure for the nationalist community.  Despite her attempts behind 
the scene to broker a deal with representatives of the hunger strikers in the early 
1980s, she maintained a publicly defiant attitude, which assisted the coalescence of 
anti-state sentiment in the aftermath of the death of the ten hunger strikers, assisted 
the electoral rise of Sinn Féin and gave a shot in the arm to the IRA who had been 
struggling since the adoption of the ‘criminalisation’ approach and the increase in 
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intelligence led operations against terrorism.  A more publicly moderate tone might 
have defused the situation without giving the republican movement the sense of 
legitimacy they hoped they would win from the ‘prison war’.   
 
The reform of elements of the state apparatus and honing of the counter-terrorism 
approach from the late 1970s onwards made it more difficult for the IRA to frame the 
conflict as a war of national liberation against a colonial oppressor.  While there were 
still mistakes in the form of security force ambushes of suspected IRA units which 
had characteristics of counter-insurgency operations, and were ill fitting with the 
‘criminalisation’ approach, the counter-productivity of such operations was 
recognised and they became fewer and more sporadic as time went on.  The publicly 
more conciliatory and moderate tone that UK state elites began to adopt post-
Thatcher played an important role in quelling the conflict.  Essentially, ensuring that 
the state did not resemble the nefarious and uncompromising colonial oppressor that 
republicans liked to portray it as went a long way in defeating their arguments.  When 
this was coupled with attacks by the IRA that caused widespread revulsion because 
of the nature or number of casualties, it was much more effective than the aggressive 
counter-insurgency operations seen in the early 1970s. 
 
It is remarkable that the PIRA campaign has been brought to an end, with former 
senior members now occupying elected political positions within the UK state 
apparatus.  This development cannot be explained without an understanding of the 
transition, reform and changing strategy of the UK state with regards to the conflict.  
While some of the key factors in achieving the permanent cessation of violence by 
the main paramilitary organisations were in place from early in the conflict, including 
a redress of the civil rights issues, the dissolution of the old Stormont government, 
and the attempts to foster power-sharing arrangements, it took decades for the UK 
state, in collaboration with Northern Ireland’s politicians and assistance from the 
Republic of Ireland and the USA before ceasefires were announced and allowed the 
peace process to take root.  The UK’s evolving state response to terrorism was very 
much a process of trial and error.  The visceral responses of partisan security force 
personnel gradually became rarer as the security forces were professionalised and 
reformed.   
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The success of the UK state’s counter-terrorism campaign in Northern Ireland can be 
attributed to the slow evolution over time of their strategy for dealing with political 
violence.  Reform of symbolically and practically problematic organs of the state to 
avoid own goals and break the cycle of ‘action/repression/action’ which republicans 
relied on to represent Northern Ireland as a region under brutal colonial occupation 
was of paramount importance to securing the peace.  This is not to say that there 
was a blueprint in place that demonstrated the Westminster government’s awareness 
of the problems, but rather the reforms were ad hoc, implemented as the negative 
consequences of unprofessional and illegal conduct by security forces became clear.  
 
Eventually, it was the combination of  intelligence led approaches leading to criminal 
prosecutions, combined with restraint on the part of the security forces and moderate 
and conciliatory language from government officials that helped to demoralise and 
wear down support for the PIRA.  Though much of the groundwork had been put in 
place with regards to a political settlement in the early 1990s, the change of 
government in 1997, with Labour headed by Tony Blair as Prime Minister helped to 
create an atmosphere that allowed the Good Friday Agreement to be signed.  In 
many ways, the Good Friday Agreement represented the starting line, rather than the 
finish line. The fragility of the peace was tested on several occasions, by dissident 
republican bombs, and breaches of ceasefires by the major paramilitary players.  The 
erosion of support for terrorist organisations and the desire for a peaceful settlement 
amongst the general population, and the absence of a violent backlash by loyalist 
paramilitaries to dissident republican attacks, and the tone of senior politicians which 
avoided the vitriol that had been emblematic of Thatcher’s approach succeeded in 
steering a path through the decade and a half since the signing of the Good Friday 
Agreement.  
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Chapter Four 
Making Sense of State Responses to Terrorism 
 
 
Having examined our three case studies, we have by now a clear picture of the way 
in which these states have responded to specific campaigns of terrorism.  We have 
seen the different characters of these three states, with their contrasting histories, the 
varied relationships with the territories which have been fought over, and their 
divergent understandings of the organisations which used terrorism.  The terrorist 
organisations that the state has been faced with have also been very different in their 
composition and their strategies.  Despite these differences, there is something about 
the nature of states generally, and the particular character of these particular states 
which has shaped and directed their response, rather than being the rational and 
utility driven responses that we might expect.  Thus, there is something we can learn 
from these case studies about what causes states to respond in the way that they do 
more generally, in reaction to either a sustained and prolonged campaign of terrorist 
violence, or sporadic or isolated incidents.  In this chapter, I will highlight themes 
concerning the nature and character of the state which shape and drive the state’s 
response to terrorism.  In doing so it will show how, more generally a focus on the 
nature and character of states and their histories and development can shed light on 
their counter-terrorism efforts which will augment how we view current and future 
campaigns of terrorism and state response. 
 
As was set out in the introduction chapter, the state is not a unitary actor but rather is 
a collection of organisations with particular responsibilities and priorities, each 
shaped by the peopled nature of the state, that is, by the people who fill each of the 
positions within each organisation and who also shape the particular character, 
agendas and priorities of particular state organisations. 
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Emotional Impetus for Reaction 
 
The effects and importance of emotion have been neglected in the field of 
International Relations, but there have been some notable attempts in recent years to 
reintegrate emotion into analyses of state action.  Neta Crawford demonstrated in her 
seminal article in 2000 that those academics who adopt neorealist or neoliberal 
international relations theories to explain state action at the international level 
acknowledge the importance of emotion, albeit implicitly, and limited to the emotions 
of fear and hatred.1  Alexander Wendt discusses the ‘state as person’ in an article in 
2004,2 a method which would allow us to attribute human emotion to the intangible 
state.  However, given our analysis of the state thus far, not as a ‘person’ but as a 
‘peopled organisation’, composed of a variety of organisations composed of people, 
Wendt’s argument is thus not a useful tool for attempting to understand the action 
taken by individuals or groups of individual state personnel in response to terrorism, 
acting on their emotions.  An understanding of the emotions of state leaders is useful, 
given their prominence and position within the state, but again, only takes us so far.  
Brent Sasley comes close with his call to consider ‘intergroup emotion theory’ (IET).3  
IET is concerned with ‘the manner in which members of a group experience emotions 
as members of the group when the group - not the individual - is affected by a given 
event or circumstance’.4 In some respects, this is echoed by Karin Fierke, who draws 
attention to the idea that emotion, ‘while most often experienced at the individual 
level, is inherently social and relational’.5 
   
If we understand the state primarily as a human community in which the identity of 
individual personnel is not entirely suppressed by training, discipline and the duty to 
carry out one’s job in service of the state, then we can imagine that this will affect 
how we view state response.  Given that terrorism is often said to be used to achieve 
political ends through producing psychological effects, such as terror, or fear, it is 
                                                 
1 N. Crawford, ‘The Passion of World Politics’, International Security, 24/4, pp. 116-56. 
2 A, Wendt, ‘The State as Person in International Theory, Review of International Studies, 30/2, 
(2004), pp. 289-316. 
3 B.E. Sasley, ‘Theorizing States’ Emotions’, International Studies Review, 13/4,  pp. 452-76. 
4 Ibid, p. 454. 
5 K. Fierke, Political Self Sacrifice: Agency, Body and Emotion in International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 92. 
 
169 
  
unsurprising that these emotions, and others such as anger, hatred, frustration, and 
the desire for vengeance that terrorism may generate in the victims and wider 
audience, can be factors in shaping the response to terrorism.  As previously 
discussed, each member of the state apparatus is an individual with a complex 
identity, shaped by a range of considerations.   He or she will come from a particular 
place, be a member of a particular ethnic group, hold a particular set of religious and 
political beliefs, and may have had a range of other roles in society prior to or along 
side their position as a member of the state apparatus, as well as their own opinions 
on the effectiveness of the measures they are being asked to implement in response 
to terrorism.   
 
 As such, each person will have a different view of particular instances of terrorism 
and of terrorist campaigns, and it stands to sense that state personnel in discharging 
their duty will at times act on the basis of their emotions, to a greater or lesser 
degree.  Indeed, given that state personnel are often disproportionately affected by 
terrorism, with some branches of the state or state apparatus as a whole being 
targeted for attack, it is understandable that the actions of particular individuals 
tasked by the state with responsibility for responding to terrorism will be tempered by 
their own views, prejudices and experiences.  While different state personnel have a 
different proximity and relationship to the conflict, (think of the soldier who has fought 
against terrorists for a prolonged period, versus the senior governmental minister, 
potentially far away from the tangible and visible effect of terrorism), emotional 
responses to terrorism are produced at all levels of the state, though the effect of 
these emotions on the overall response and the trajectory of the conflict at large, 
depends a lot on the role the individual plays in the state apparatus and the amount 
of responsibility and power they have.   
 
Our case studies offer numerous examples of where emotional knee-jerk reaction 
took the place of reasoned decision-making. These cases frequently served to 
exacerbate rather than quell the conflict, and impacted the trajectory of the conflict.  
In Northern Ireland, we saw how the locally recruited security forces, consisting 
almost entirely of Protestants often overstepped the mark in their response to 
nationalist civil unrest and violence from republican paramilitaries.  The emotional 
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knee-jerk reaction was evident in the heavy handedness by the RUC witnessed at 
NICRA marches and protests, and the failure to meaningfully intervene at Burntollet 
when loyalist mobs attacked civil rights protesters (with some among the loyalist mob 
being off-duty USC B-Special officers). 6 Their actions may have been simply the 
emotional response to a movement they perceived as a Trojan horse, attempting to 
destabilise the state in Northern Ireland, and while there was no policy in place 
determining that police should take such a robust approach towards civil 
disobedience, it added fuel to the fire of the conflict and reinforced the understanding 
of many nationalists that the UK state in Northern Ireland was irreformable, further 
polarising an already divided community. 
 
Eamon Collins, a former PIRA member who became a double agent, working for the 
RUC Special Branch before being killed by republicans in 1999, describes the 
experience of being interrogated by RUC officers who had recently lost nine 
colleagues who were killed in an IRA mortar attack on Newry RUC barracks in 
February 1985.  The exchange demonstrates the intensely personal nature of the 
conflict in Northern Ireland. At one point during questioning, Collins’ interrogators told 
him ‘A fucker like you ought to be taken out into the yard and shot. I don’t know why 
we waste time on you’ .7  In one particularly personal attack on Collins, he was told 
by interrogators: 
 
I’m going to the first of many funerals today.  After the funerals I’m going to 
your house and we are going to turn it upside down. I’m going to arrest 
your wife and she’s coming here [RUC interrogation centre] for seven 
days… And you know, Eamon, I’ve got a name for your wife. I’m not going 
to call her Bernadette…’8 
 
And later being told when he complained about the verbal abuse from interrogators:  
 
Verbal abuse? Verbal abuse is about the only thing we can give you 
Provie [Provisional IRA] fuckers.  I wonder what you’d give me, you Provie 
                                                 
6 B. Purdie, Politics on the Streets, p. 215. 
7 E. Collins, Killing Rage (London: Granta, 1998), p. 261. 
8 Ibid, p. 267. 
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bastard, if you were interrogating me in some barn in south Armagh?  It 
wouldn’t be verbal abuse, you murdering cunt.  No you’d be taking lumps 
out of me with an iron bar before you put a fucking hole in my head. 9  
 
Collins himself notes the personal nature of that encounter, saying that ‘I could see 
that he felt hurt and angry at the loss of his nine comrades, in much the same way I 
felt when I heard about the deaths of IRA volunteers’.10  In this particular instance, 
there was no sense that the interrogators transcended any accepted practice for 
interrogating IRA suspects.  However, it serves to neatly demonstrate the intense 
emotion felt by state personnel and its effect on their behaviour. 
 
In both Spain and Northern Ireland, we see the formation and activities of what have 
been termed ‘death squads’.  Either in the form of collusion between existing terrorist 
organisations (as in Northern Ireland) with police officers passing intelligence, arms, 
or indeed at times filling the ranks of these organisations, or in the formation of the 
new death squad or ‘anti-terrorist’ organisations, largely staffed by off duty state 
personnel (as with the BVE and AAA in Spain), organisations wreaking terror against 
the minority civilian populations in retribution for the acts of separatist terrorist 
groups.  Indeed, to look at the Algerian case, the birth of the OAS itself is a clear 
example of dissatisfaction of state personnel with the direction and intensity of policy 
towards terrorism, the fear created by terrorism itself, and the desire to influence the 
trajectory of the conflict beyond what their role as state operatives would have 
permitted. Of course, individuals will be driven to participate in these organisations for 
a variety of reasons, and yet overall they appear to be the reaction to frustration at 
the ineffectiveness of the state and the hatred, anger and fear produced by terrorism.  
This is not to say their actions were acceptable or excusable, but in the context of a 
conflict fought at close quarters as was the case in these instances, it is 
understandable that passion and emotion drives the decisions of state personnel as 
much as their training, or sense of obedience to the state itself.  Furthermore, 
understanding the actions of state personnel in such a manner is essential to 
understanding the discourses of both state and terrorist concerning the moral 
justifications for their respective actions. 
                                                 
9 Ibid, p. 269. 
10 Ibid. 
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States which have seen their personnel either act over-zealously in their use of force, 
or take matters into their own hands, subverting the law to carry out their own violent 
acts have attempted often to explain away these deeds as the work of ‘bad apples’.11  
The idea here, is that these state personnel who act illegally or beyond their remit are 
individuals who have taken matters into their own hands, and that in the main, the 
security forces have acted with tremendous restraint in the face of provocation and in 
high pressure situations. 12  Their actions, we are told are beyond the control of the 
state in this regard, though the state seeks to punish those among their staff who 
break the law or go beyond the acceptable use of force in the interests of justice and 
discipline. 
 
However, the knee-jerk responses of the state towards terrorism are not confined to 
the rogue activities of individuals or small groups of state personnel. We have 
evidence from our cases of where policies were made which, while not transcending 
the law, were made in haste, borne out of the anger and fear caused by terrorism and 
a desire to punish, but more importantly exact revenge upon the terrorists. That such 
strategies are often made within the remit of the law, and receive official sanction 
from the state at large, or particular state organisations can sometimes serve to 
obscure the emotional and knee-jerk character of the decisions made.  Closer 
attention to the context, as well as the comments made by state personnel with the 
authority to initiate measures to direct the approach of the state at large or particular 
state organisation illuminates the emotional impetus and unspoken vengeful 
justification of some state responses to terrorism. 
 
Consider for example, the decision to move Basque nationalist prisoners to high 
security prisons across Spain.  Made in the aftermath of ETA assassinations of state 
personnel, it seems that the decision represents more than simply a way to disrupt 
ETA within the prison system, but a form of collective punishment.  Subjecting ETA 
prisoners to maximum security prison regimes far from their homeland, 
inconveniencing their relatives and where they would be subject to the disdain from 
                                                 
11 G. Ellison and J. Smyth, The Crowned Harp, p. 61. 
12 see for example, the Cameron Report 1969 into the actions of the RUC in the disturbances at Civil 
Rights demonstrations on 5th October 1968, and thereafter. 
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other prisoners, and as we later learned, brutality in detention at the hands of military 
prison guards.    
 
In Northern Ireland from 1979 to 1992, the active personal involvement that Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher in directing overall policy and in negotiating a course 
through the various crises that arose during those turbulent years left its imprint on 
the conflict.   That Thatcher had been deeply affected by events including the killing 
of Louis Mountbatten, 18 British soldiers at Warrenpoint and her close colleague and 
friend Airey Neave was clearly evident. In eulogy for Neave, she appeared to equate 
republican violence with the Nazis, referring to his role at the Nuremberg trials.13   In 
the aftermath of to the death of Mountbatten in Sligo and 18 British soldiers at 
Warrenpoint, her derogation from longstanding British policy which she had inherited 
of ‘normalisation and Ulsterisation’, with the militarisation of RUC elite units, and the 
placing of inter organisational security cooperation in the hands of an ex Military 
Intelligence chief, Maurice Oldfield led to an increasingly muscular counter-terrorism 
campaign throughout the 1980s, which although destabilising the PIRA and affecting 
their ability to conduct attacks, served to polarise Northern Ireland society and 
increase the mistrust of locally recruited security forces. Thomas Hennessey notes 
that during the Hunger Strike crisis in 1980 and 1981, ‘Thatcher’s hand was literally 
all over the “deal” sent to the Provisionals - revealing the key involvement of a Prime 
Minister who claimed that she refused to negotiate with terrorists’.14  
 
In Algeria, the frustration at the continued disruption and destabilisation by the OAS 
and the complicity or unwillingness of the security forces on the ground to 
comprehensively deal with them resulted in the French state sanctioning the use of 
parallel secretive units. Michel Hacq’s Mission C, basing their operations on high 
grade intelligence and precise efforts in the hope that the more professional outfit 
from mainland France could successfully apprehend OAS suspects and stop the 
slippage of intelligence from the state to the OAS which had been the cause of so 
many failed operations against the OAS.  The parallel organisation known as ‘les 
barbouzes’ were a more violent and negative outcome of the frustration of state 
personnel, as funds from French Military Intelligence appear to have been used to 
                                                 
13 T. Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 38. 
14 T Hennessey, Hunger Strike, p. 8. 
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finance the shady organisation whose intentions to wipe out OAS through more 
violent means resulted in the further polarisation of pieds noirs from the French 
government and a quick defeat as the European community in Oran and Algiers 
alerted OAS Deltas to their presence in the cities. 
 
In Spain, the activities of the GAL, a pro-state death squad formed during the period 
of PSOE government in the 1980s, and with much closer and more demonstrable 
links to the state, might have helped to disrupt ETA hierarchy for a period and create 
terror and confusion amongst Spanish Basques living in exile in the French Basque 
Country, but ultimately served to alienate the Basque people from the Spanish state 
and provide ETA with a lifeline at a time when their support had been dwindling.  
Again, the GAL seems to have been formed as a way to extend the reach of the 
state, as the frustration of the PSOE government grew at the lack of cooperation from 
the French government, which ultimately provided ETA with a safe haven from which 
to organise and launch attacks against the Spanish state.   
 
The character of state organisations 
 
The nature of the state, with its division of labour among many specialised state 
organisations leads to the development of particular characters for each of the state 
organisations.  Each state organisation has a particular remit, decided by the state 
leaders, although often these organisations have overlapping competences 
(something which will be discussed more fully later).  In order for these organisations 
to successfully coordinate the activities of individual personnel within each unit, there 
is the creation of standard operating procedures which the personnel are taught.  
Thus, each individual is expected to know and to follow these protocols in 
discharging their duties in relation to responsibilities that the state organisation is 
normally charged with.15  Secondly, the character of state organisations and how they 
will act in specific scenarios is determined partially by more informal norms, 
generated through experience in which state personnel gain an understanding of 
what is expected of them and how they should handle specific circumstances.  This 
is closely linked to standard operating procedures, but is more informal, being learnt 
                                                 
15 G. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision (2nd edn.) (New York; Harlow: Longman, 1999), p 
.143. 
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through experience rather than formal teaching and adherence to written rules and 
regulations.  Thirdly, how organisations respond is largely the product of 
organisational culture.  Organisational cultures are informal and are produced by the 
state personnel that compose each state organ.  The prevalent organisational culture 
however, also shapes state personnel into particular forms of action.  While the 
organisational culture is largely informal, it may be fostered by the elites in an 
organisation, encouraging the personnel to take on particular traits.  The 
organisation’s personnel may be encouraged to act more tactically, or to place unit 
cohesion, espirit des corps, or obedience to superiors, as specific desirable qualities 
for the specific organisation which may make the execution of their duties more 
efficient dependent on the environment in which the particular organisations are 
expected to act. There are some important factors which can contribute to particular 
organisational cultures.  One can easily imagine how, if the personnel that compose 
a certain state organisation are drawn from a particular section of society, and thus 
overwhelmingly represent the traits of that group, that the organisation will take on 
that particular culture.  Those entering the organisation from outside that sector may 
not share the same attributes or qualities as their colleagues but may perhaps be 
influenced in the discharge of their duties by the prevailing attitude or organisational 
culture.  Ore Koren addresses this point in relation to military responses to civil 
disobedience, but it is just as true for military responses to terrorism and indeed, the 
actions of other state organisations in the execution of their own specific duties.16  
Additionally, this organisational culture is normally dependent on the experiences of 
the organisation over time, with some organisations acquiring particular character 
traits as a result of their histories. 
 
When attempting to understand the response of states to terrorism, it is important to 
understand that in giving responsibility to particular state organisations for a role in 
counter-terrorism, the state leaders are not able to work with a blank canvas, setting 
an entirely neutral entity into action, but must rely on the existing organs of the state, 
with their peculiarities, identities and cultures to do the job.  As such, the response to 
terrorism will be affected by which organisation is tasked to respond in particular 
ways, the familiarity of the role the organisation is expected to play, and how well this 
                                                 
16 O. Koren, ‘Military Structure, Civil Disobedience, and Military Violence’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, ahead of print (2014), pp. 1-25. 
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sits with their standard operating procedures and regular competences, as well the 
experience of the organisations in question in carrying out such duties. 
 
The Algerian case presents the strongest evidence that the character of particular 
state organisations can often affect the state response to terrorism and political 
violence in ways which are not often considered.  The military had been apolitical in 
France for many years, coming to be known as the ‘Great Mute’ for their deference to 
politicians.17 The chasm opened between Pétainists and Gaullists in World War Two 
perhaps changed this situation, with political considerations now playing a much 
stronger role in military life.  The response of armed forces to protests in May 1958, 
and again in September 1969 during Barricades Week’ underpinned the extent to 
which political considerations were now of much greater importance than the benign 
respect for hierarchy and obedience to the state.  The composition of individual units 
was an important factor.  Some of the elite forces with those who had fought 
extensively in Indochina and Algeria and those units formed from pied noir (who 
perhaps understandably were anxious about the possibility of a future under the FLN, 
though their plight we have seen, was ultimately not helped by the OAS in the long 
run) were more likely to revolt against the orders of the state, or at least be ineffective 
tools in apprehending OAS operatives.  By contrast, it was units of men from 
metropolitan France, and conscripted men rather than professional soldiers which 
were most loyal to the state and effective in the fight against the OAS eventually, 
though often these units struggled due to a lack of familiarity with the geography of 
Algeria and lack of knowledge or understanding of the character of the conflict that 
was ongoing in Algiers and Oran. 
 
Indeed, the state leaders took notice of the character of various military units and 
sought to address the issues.  De Gaulle was shrewd in repositioning and retiring the 
most senior activist officers who could have undermined large sections of the 
military’s allegiance to the government.  Furthermore, in the aftermath of the 
‘Generals’ Putsch’ which had been scuppered by the unwillingness of raw recruits 
and conscripts to mutiny and de Gaulle’s own charisma and impassioned call for 
obedience in service of the nation, the dissolution of several problematic units 
                                                 
17 O.D. Menard, The French Army and the Fifth Republic, p. 10. 
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ensured that any similar attempts in the future would have difficulty in presenting a 
real threat to the state.  Ultimately though, the OAS were an organisation born largely 
from the state, and presented such a violent threat by virtue of their military expertise 
and the inability and unwillingness of the remaining security forces in Algeria to clamp 
down on them.  It is difficult to discern whether de Gaulle had realised when he came 
to power that the loss of Algeria would be inevitable, but the violence waged by 
former state personnel and the inefficiency of response to the violence owing to the 
reluctance of serving state personnel to apprehend their former comrades with whose 
cause they sympathised pushed de Gaulle to settle for less than the French 
government had anticipated at the Evian talks, and the future of the pied noir 
community in Algeria as well as the nature of Franco-Algerian relations post Algerian 
independence were largely shaped because of this. 
 
In Northern Ireland too, the particular character of particular state organisations, and 
more cogently, the failure by state leaders and elites to recognise and mitigate the 
effects of these characteristics, had a huge impact on the response to terrorism and 
the overall trajectory of the conflict.  That the Northern Ireland government had 
always been controlled by the Ulster Unionist Party, and locally recruited security 
forces by the outbreak of civil unrest in the late 1960s were Protestant almost to a 
man, meant that their understanding of the nature of the civil rights campaign was a 
unionist one, and one which treated those protesting against perceived discrimination 
as fifth columnists attempting to subvert the state.  As such, their response to unrest 
was often overzealous and more befitting of serious violent attacks on the state than 
the largely peaceful protest with some attached civil disobedience and disorder. 
Furthermore, the locally recruited security forces under the administration of 
Stormont, and owing to previous outbreaks of inter-communal violence in the 
decades prior, resembled more the gendarmeries of the continent than their Great 
British counterparts.  The lack of professionalism and training for such circumstances 
that plagued the RUC and USC meant that when the power of internment was 
granted by Westminster, the security forces resorted to widespread use of the 
measures, and directed entirely at the nationalist community for the first couple of 
years.  The nature of the devolved administration at Stormont meant that the 
Westminster government were unfamiliar with both the developing political situation 
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in Northern Ireland until it reached critical levels, and also with the branches of the 
UK state that had responsibility for maintaining law and order.  Given the composition 
of the security forces and the way that republican violence and civil unrest was 
perceived by the Stormont administration, it is not difficult to understand why the 
RUC, backed by the British Army abused the powers of internment without trial as 
they did, resulting in the further alienation of the nationalist minority. 
 
Additionally, while reinforcement in the form of additional man-power in aid of the 
police might have been necessary, the deployment of the British Army had a massive 
impact on the scale, intensity and character of the conflict.  The army’s prior roles in 
colonial conflicts where they were fighting running battles against insurgents meant 
that their temperament and experience was ill suited to the sporadic urban conflict on 
home soil, in Northern Ireland.  Their muscular and over-zealous engagements in the 
early years of the conflict alienated the nationalist community, played into republican 
rhetoric about the occupation of Ireland by oppressive British forces, and gave the 
republican paramilitaries obvious targets.  In addition, the rising intensity of the 
conflict saw them take on a more prominent role, helping to shift the violence from 
sporadic attacks to something more like a low level war for a period.  However, the 
British army were in the main, apolitical and disciplined, exhibiting few of the 
characteristics of the Spanish or French army in terms of derogating vastly from what 
they were expected to do.  Rather than their actions being the culmination of 
longstanding bitter political grievances against the native population or the perceived 
enemy, the way the military responded was largely based on their standard operating 
procedures that had been utilised elsewhere.  Despite their newly issued rules of 
engagement for Northern Ireland, the outlook of the army, despite its professionalism, 
was still a military one which was ill suited for the type of conflict.  As Richard English 
notes, the conflict in Northern Ireland at various junctures was of such intensity that 
the British Army played a vital role in maintaining stability.18  However particular 
actions, such as the shootings in Ballymurphy and in Derry in 1971 and 1972 were 
military responses of units trained for war, and not suited to a role in peacekeeping.  
These incidents, and others likened them, deepened the perception of some 
nationalists that the state was prepared to use all its instruments of force to maintain 
                                                 
18 R. English, Terrorism: How to Respond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 128. 
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the status quo.  The longstanding British ideals of liberty and justice seemed to fade 
into the background in the aftermath of such atrocities. 
 
Despite the change of tack in the mid 1970s, with the policy of police primacy, and 
reforms to the RUC, the state still struggled with the character of the security forces 
both locally recruited and the British army.  Police primacy resulted in the emergence 
of specialist anti-terrorist units of the RUC, trained in military tactics.  These units 
took on the character of military units, and the controversies they caused with 
allegations of shoot to kill policy throughout the 1980s undermined the overall attempt 
to normalise day to day life in Northern Ireland.  Furthermore, while the police may 
have taken charge of security operations in the open, secretive units of the British 
Army such as the Force Research Unit, the SAS, and the Military Reaction Force 
(MRF) who were largely unseen but made their present felt in more militaristic efforts 
to defeat the paramilitaries served to further undermine the picture of police primacy 
and normalisation.  While efforts were being made to fight terrorism through counter-
terrorism legislation, to fit with the rhetoric that political violence was nothing more 
than crime, the existence and actions of covert hard hitting units of the military and 
police created an atmosphere of warfare that made the comments of the UK 
government look disingenuous.  
 
In Spain prior to the civil war, it had been the Guardia Civil who had been tasked with 
suppressing civil unrest and disquiet, often alienating the civilian population in the 
process.19  The Guardia Civil and the Spanish military, which saw itself as the 
embodiment of the Spanish nation proved difficult to reform during the Second 
Republic, and the brutality and corruption of the security forces continued despite the 
attempts of the Second Republic’s government to fundamentally change the structure 
and face of the state.  When Franco rose to power after the Civil War, the state was 
thus led by a former soldier of the Africanista faction of the military.  As such, the 
state began to take on the rhetorical patriotism of the military, and challenges to the 
state’s legitimacy or political plan, which saw Spain as indissoluble were harshly 
penalised through legislation, which banned expressions of minority ethnicity and 
                                                 
19 S.G. Payne, Politics and the Military in Modern Spain, p. 278. 
 
180 
  
culture (such as Basque)20, as well as through the repressive and brutal treatment of 
the Guardia Civil.  Indeed, Preston highlights that under Franco, the Spanish army 
were trained and organised as if Spain was a country under occupation, in order to 
conduct action where it was deemed necessary, not against invading forces but 
against the native population who might challenge the regime.21  Future efforts to 
reform the Spanish state were again hampered by the character of the security 
forces.  After the accession to the throne by Juan Carlos, he introduced a series of 
senior personnel changes in the Guardia Civil and military, legalised some moderate 
Basque political parties, introduced a new constitution and liberalised some labour 
legislation, in an attempt to shed the appearance of the former Francoist state.  
However despite the changes to legislation and the new constitution, the character of 
many state organs remained the same.  The King could not push too far for fear of 
alienating the military, who demonstrated their unwillingness to change by 
prosecuting UMD members.  Later under the first democratically elected government 
since the death of Franco, the UCD government sent mixed messages, introducing 
legislation which allowed for preventive detention, search without warrant and 
detention incommunicado.22  Despite the symbolic departure of Franco and the hope 
that the new democracy had inspired in many among the civilian population, the 
Guardia Civil continued to abuse Basque civilians, including many entirely 
unconnected with ETA.  Against this backdrop, the PNV, who were attempting to 
steer a more moderate course in the hope that the end of the Franco regime would 
offer political opportunities for Basques found it difficult to totally condemn ETA 
entirely.23 
 
Intra-state cooperation and competition 
 
As a result of the specialisation of state organisations and the imposition of standard 
operating procedures, state personnel are often effective communicators within their 
own organisations.  Communication between organisations is more difficult, 
especially where protocols for relaying information do not exist.  It was also easy to 
understand how, when faced with the threat or actuality of terrorist violence, even the 
                                                 
20 D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p.81. 
21 P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, p. 42 
22 R.P. Clark, The Basque Insurgents, p. 257. 
23 D. Gilmour, The Transformation of Spain, p. 227. 
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most robust structures for communication can break down or become frustrated. 
Additionally, formal policy and strategy decisions for countering terrorism can be 
seen as the result of conversations between the elites of the state organisations with 
the overall state leader or leaders. 24  In these discussions, organisational elites will 
bring with them their own personal perspectives on matters, in addition to the aims, 
objectives, priorities, and perceptions which are shaped by the state organisations 
they are a part of.25  Given the highly specialised nature of state apparatus, and the 
likelihood that the priorities and objectives of organisations will differ, combined with 
the sometimes overlapping competences of the organisations, this can often mean 
that the mutually clashing agendas and objectives result in competition, rather than 
cooperation between arms of the state.  Thus, rather than achieving the optimum 
results in terms of state response to terrorism, we see the response of the state to 
terrorism is often the outcome of sometimes troubled communication and strained 
relations or competition between state organisations. Thinking again of the examples 
discussed in the previous chapters, we can highlight instances where this has been 
case. 
 
From our examples, the case which most clearly illustrates the importance of intra-
state cooperation and the difficulties created by competition, is the Northern Ireland 
case.  The Ulster Workers’ Council was a body of Unionist and Loyalists who were 
critical of the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and the establishment of a power 
sharing assembly in Northern Ireland the same year.  The UWC called a general 
strike in May 1974, and while the strike was far from universally heeded, with heavy 
involvement from loyalist paramilitaries and key stoppages in power plants and 
industry, the power sharing institutions collapsed.26  While the division in Unionism 
over the Sunningdale Agreement and the power sharing institutions, with some being 
particularly outraged at the role to be afforded to the cross border ‘Council of Ireland’ 
meant that the institutions were perhaps unlikely to survive, it is notable that the 
Westminster government who had orchestrated negotiations which led to the creation 
of power sharing did little to dampen the effects of the strike.   
 
                                                 
24 G. Allison and P. Zelikow, Essence of Decision, pp. 255-8. 
25 Ibid, p. 258. 
26 See P. Bew, P. Gibbon, and H. Patterson, Northern Ireland 1921-2001: Political Forces and Social 
Classes, pp.189-90.  
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The army were not used to replace striking workers in the power stations for 
example, which would have prevented power shortages.  There is some debate 
surrounding the events, with some claiming that the level of opposition to the power 
sharing institutions meant that the government felt that breaking the strike by using 
the military strategically would have only prolonged the inevitable collapse. There is 
some suggestion however, that the Westminster government had decided on 24 May 
to use troops to end the stoppage, but that the Army had refused.27  As John 
Newsinger states that there was the lack of political will to break the strike, noting that 
‘it is indeed inconceivable that such a challenge would have been refused in any 
other circumstances.  The inescapable conclusion is that it was the army that took 
the political decision not to support the executive and that [Secretary of State, Merlyn] 
Rees tamely went along with it’.28 This brings the conflict between the executive and 
military branches of the state into sharp relief, and undermines the longstanding view 
of the British military as being apolitical and subservient to the executive branch of 
the state.   
 
The governmental policy shift in the mid 1970s to ‘police primacy’, ‘criminalisation’ 
and ‘normalisation’ was tested throughout the remainder of the decade.  The attacks 
on the same day which killed 18 soldiers at Warrenpoint and Lord Mountbatten in 
Sligo brought the matter of security cooperation between the locally recruited forces 
and the British army to a head.  Military leaders were incensed that such an attack 
could have occurred, and the suggestion that the RUC were not up to the job of 
leading the security efforts were highlighted to Thatcher and governmental officials.  
There had been the feeling among many in the army that the RUC was not 
professional enough and had not the capacity to prevent catastrophic attacks, and 
senior military officials suggested that the attack at Warrenpoint was evidence of this.  
In response, the RUC claimed that what was needed was not a reversal of ‘police 
primacy’ but rather, an expansion of the RUC, which they said, would provide them a 
greater capacity to lead the security efforts.  Looking deeper into the police-military 
relations in Northern Ireland, shows that concerns, suspicions and competition 
between the RUC and army had been a persistent problem since the first deployment 
                                                 
27 M. Farrell, Northern Ireland: The Orange State, p.320, See also, D. Hamill, Pig in the Middle, pp. 
144-54, and J. Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland, p. 176. 
28 J. Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency from Palestine to Northern Ireland, p. 177. 
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of regular regiments of soldiers in 1969.  It is striking that despite the fact that by the 
time the attacks of Warrenpoint occured, the police and army had been collaborating 
on security operations for a decade, it was the first time that formal overarching 
structure had been set in place to harmonise and coordinate the security operations.  
Even within the army, some officers had complained about the more aggressive 
units, and how the parachute regiment, for example had often undone in a matter of 
days, the good relations and rapport with the community that more decorous 
regiments had spent a good deal of time establishing. However, both the army and 
the RUC had their flaws, with the bigotry and tendency towards collusion from some 
RUC and UDR men noted by Army officers, who felt that the army’s professionalism 
was better suited to leading the security arrangements, and the RUC feeling that the 
lack of local knowledge amongst their army colleagues meant that they were 
unsuited for the task at hand in Northern Ireland. 
 
Despite the efforts in 1979 to establish an overarching command under Oldfield, it 
appears that it took a significant amount of time, and changes in the intensity and 
character of the conflict brought about by political initiatives to create a more stable 
working relationship.   The failure of a coordinated response between the 
governmental level and the security forces meant that the actions of secretive and 
highly trained RUC and army units in operations in Loughgall, Lurgan, Armagh and 
Gibraltar served to undermine greatly the government’s plight to normalise everyday 
life in Northern Ireland and deal with terrorism through the criminal justice system.  
Rather, these units and their operations created the feeling amongst the nationalist 
community, exploited by the IRA and by republican politicians that the state was 
conducting an undercover dirty war, which violated the established pillars of the 
British legal system in terms of due process and right to a fair trial.  The debacle 
ensuing from the Pat Finucane murder highlighted that even by the the very end of 
the 1980s, cooperation between the police and army was fraught with difficulty. The 
running of agents within loyalist paramilitaries by both the British Army’s Force 
Research Unit, and RUC Special Branch, and the lack of intelligence coordination 
between the two created serious problems.  Indeed, the Finucane murder and the 
subsequent series of official inquiries highlighted substantial difficulties in 
coordinating the various branches of the state, and the lack of oversight by the 
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government which would have highlighted the need for ‘urgent reform’ of the security 
forces, to address collusion between the UDR and loyalist paramilitaries, among 
other shortcomings.29 Furthermore, the lack of understanding the political 
atmosphere on the ground, and the nature of the conflict saw Government Minister 
Douglas Hogg MP making inflammatory comments about some solicitors who he saw 
as being ‘unduly sympathetic’ to the IRA,30 while obviously not understanding the 
legitimising effect his words might give to the actions of loyalist paramilitaries in the 
eyes of some in Northern Ireland. 
 
Turning to Algeria, the fractious and mutinous character of the military created such a 
problem for the French state that it barely needs explaining how there were 
difficulties with cooperation and intra-state competition.  The comments of General 
Massu in relation to judicial processes against some of his men alleged of torturing 
prisoners, his open criticism of de Gaulle, 31 and his statement to the press that the 
duties the military were being asked to carry out in terms of both attempting to 
rehabilitate Algeria socially and economically was untenable,32 was an early 
indication of cleavages between the French government under de Gaulle and the 
military.  If further evidence was needed of the scale of dissent and disagreement 
between branches of the security forces, the inaction of the Premier REP upon arrival 
at the scene of unrest during Barricades Week, and the subsequent ‘guard of honour‘ 
they provided for the leaders of the protests despite the deaths of fourteen 
gendarmes provided it.33  Indeed, de Gaulle’s management of the Algerian conflict 
from the outset was largely driven by the need to maintain the cohesion of the state. 
De Gaulle’s rise to Head of State was a product of the disquiet and unease by military 
leaders and other elements of the state at the direction in which the former French 
government were taking on the Algerian question.  As such, his arrival in the middle 
of the crisis limited his capacity to make the strategic shifts that might have been 
required to ensure total obedience and uniformity of message across the branches of 
the state.  Nevertheless, de Gaulle’s management of the Algerian crisis was largely 
                                                 
29 D. de Silva, The Report of the Patrick Finucane Review, (Vol. 1) (London: The Stationary Office, 
2012), p.261. 
30 Ibid, p. 282. 
31 B.E. Brown, ‘The Army and Politics in France’, p. 270. 
32 B. Crozier, and G. Mansell, ‘France and Algeria’, International Affairs, 36/3, (1960), p. 313. 
33 G. Bocca, The Secret Army, p. 33. 
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concerned with maintaining the cohesion of the state to a degree that would allow 
there to be an eventual settlement in Algeria. Whether or not independence for 
Algeria was something he envisioned from the outset is difficult to say, but it is clear 
from his successive speeches that he understood that the status quo could not be 
peacefully maintained.  His sacking and redeployment of senior activist military 
personnel and his ‘transistor victory’ during the Generals’ Putsch are clear cases of 
his efforts to ensure that the security forces at the state’s disposal would be obedient.  
Perhaps his experience as a soldier and general afforded him an appreciation of the 
character of particular military units and the kind of measures required to steer a 
course through the crisis that other statesmen may not have had.  Nevertheless, 
despite the best efforts of de Gaulle to ensure obedience and cooperation between 
the various state organisations tasked with security in Algeria, that so many of the 
gendarmes and soldiers that had been stationed in Algeria were sympathetic to the 
plight of the pied noirs and the OAS made it extremely challenging to maintain order. 
 
In Spain, the character of state organisations often frustrated the efforts of the state 
to reform and adapt its approach towards terrorism.  The reforms of Arias Navarro 
that upset the ultra-right faction in the security forces resulted in the formation of the 
BVE by frustrated off-duty security personnel, seeking to continue the retributive 
attacks on Basque nationalists, undermining Arias Navarro’s efforts to take a new 
approach towards Basque terrorism.   Despite the change in tack at governmental 
level, that the security forces couldn’t be counted on to take a similarly restrained 
approach meant that the state simply seemed to be adopting new repressive 
measures in the form of the BVE death squads rather than liberalising, in the eyes of 
some Basques.  Similarly, the introduction by the King of a whole package of reforms 
designed to re-image and begin the de-Francoisation of the state was met with 
resistance by the military hardliners. Given that the liberalisation of the Spanish state 
after Franco with the new constitution and the first democratically elected government 
under Adolfo Suarez in 1977, as well as the Basque Autonomy Statute in 1979 had 
helped to drive a wedge between the branches of ETA, and foster the feeling 
amongst some that the armed action of previous years was no longer necessary in 
the post-Franco era.  Had the state been able to coordinate the response to ETA 
violence during this period of soul searching for ETA as an organisation and for 
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individual etarras who were deciding where their allegiances lay, it is possible that 
many more would have accepted the veracity of ETA(p-m)’s arguments and moved 
away from the use of violence.  However, the continued violence by the Guardia Civil, 
whose suspicion of the new democratic regime was highlighted by the attempted 
coup in October 1981, ensured that the hard-liners within ETA(m) and the Berazzi 
Commandos of ETA(pm-m) with whom they would later merge, were able to present 
an argument that the state was basically a continuation of Franco-style repression by 
other means, and claim some of their bloodiest years in the early 1980s. 
 
Political motivation for response 
 
Barbara Walter, in her book Reputation and Civil War, highlights how states respond 
to separatist challenges to the state.  She demonstrates that it is rational for states 
whose population is composed of a number of ethnic minorities which are 
concentrated in specific regions to challenge violent secessionist threats to the state, 
thus resulting in a civil war.34  They choose this path, regardless of the strategic or 
economic value of the territory that is questioned so as to build a reputation for 
resilience and steadfastness, discouraging potential secessionist movements in the 
future.35  Applying this theory to our case studies, only the case of Spain seems to fit 
this description.  With nationalist movements in Galicia and Catalonia amongst 
others, the actions of the Spanish state, at least during the Franco years, where 
Basque separatist violence was met with repression and robust action could be 
interpreted as an attempt to send a clear message to other nationalist movements 
considering the use of violence to achieve their independence.  Independence 
movements in the UK aside from that of Northern Ireland had been weak,  
overwhelmingly peaceful, with only a handful of isolated sabotage attacks, and thus 
the suggestion that the robust action taken in Northern Ireland was an attempt to 
send a message to separatists elsewhere in the United Kingdom does not seem to fit 
very well.   The case of the OAS in Algeria and France is one which lies outside 
Walter’s remit, given that the OAS’s raison d’etre was the maintenance of French 
Algeria rather than secession.  However, while it may be difficult to interpret the 
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Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 200-1.   
35 Ibid. 
 
187 
  
actions of the states we have studied here as attempting to discourage other 
separatist movements from challenging the state, the idea of ‘reputation building’ is 
useful when considering the actions of the state within particular conflicts.  At various 
junctures in each of our conflicts, but particularly at the emergence of the threats from 
the IRA, ETA and the OAS, robust violent response by the state can be seen as 
reputation building, aiming to demonstrate the obstinacy in the face of terrorist 
violence in the hope that it will illustrate the futility of such tactics.  As our case 
studies have shown, state intransigence and overzealous response frequently had 
the opposite effect, fuelling accusations of mistreatment, amplifying anti-state rhetoric 
concerning grievances, and widening the divide between the state and the 
community in question. 
 
At the level of state leaders and organisational elites, there may also be a political 
motivation for the particular policies and strategies that are designed and 
implemented to counter terrorist violence. The ability of terrorism to evoke strong 
emotion amongst the general public, creating terror, fear, anger, and the desire to 
respond is a powerful thing.  As such, the perception among the general public of 
how well the government is dealing with terrorism and their particular approach can 
be a decisive factor in winning or losing elections.  Indeed, there may not necessarily 
be a consideration of the effectiveness or potential outcomes of particular courses of 
action.  Rather, counter-terrorism measures too have a strongly symbolic and 
emotive quality.  Backed by political rhetoric of security and freedom from terrorism, 
the response of the state to political violence may be driven and shaped by political 
considerations, such as the need to present a strong front to pacify the electorate and 
allay fears.  So too, counter-terrorism measures can take a particular direction as a 
means to silence one’s political opponents or critics, as a way for politicians to prove 
a point and send a powerful message, rather than representing a carefully 
considered policy designed to precisely and effectively reduce the ability of terrorists 
to wage violent campaigns.  In many ways, this demonstrates that counter-terrorism 
can be ‘propaganda of the deed’, just as terrorism is itself. The propaganda effect of 
counter-terrorism is visible throughout the vast array of measures at the state’s 
disposal. Designation of organisations as ‘terrorist’ in the first place, through such 
devices as the Foreign Terrorist Organisation list in the United States of America, has 
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a clear propaganda effect of delegitimizing the organisations on it by branding them 
as terrorists, and by proclaiming their modus operandi as illegitimate, which can in 
some cases lead to the stigmatisation of their aims and objectives themselves. Given 
the arguments about the strategic logic of decapitation of terrorist organisations, 
killing or otherwise eliminating key leaders of groups which deploy political violence 
against the state, we may wonder why such tactics continue to be pursued. Daniel 
Byman for example argues that targeted killings of suspected Palestinian terrorists by 
Israel have a series of negative consequences for Israel.  ‘Killing suspects prevents 
them from striking, but dead men also tell no tales’. 36 Furthermore, he highlights that 
terrorist groups retaliate when their leaders are killed, and highlights the thoughts of 
one senior Palestinian security official who argued that ‘whoever sign[s] off on killing 
a leader among Hamas or any other leader on the Palestinian side should turn the 
page and should sign off on killing 16 Israelis’.37 While highlighting that the ‘positive’ 
effect of such targeted killings, the extent to which they make Israel more safe from 
terrorist attacks is difficult to disaggregate given that it represents a single tactic in a 
range of counter-terrorist efforts,38 he highlights their propaganda value – satisfying 
domestic demands for a forceful response to terrorism, and bolstering morale,39 as 
well as subjecting those in militant organisations to constant paranoia and fear of 
attack.40  Again, if we think about Barbara Walter and the reputation protection motive 
for responding to challengers in civil war scenarios mentioned earlier, we see how 
the considerations which drive counter-terrorism may well include dissuading future 
potential challengers through taking swift, unequivocal action; a clear propaganda 
message to a secondary audience beyond those who bear the brunt of the counter-
terrorism measures directly, highlighting what lies in store for those who seek to 
challenge the state’s legitimacy.  The political cogency of terrorism is something 
which is particularly noticeable at times. Terrorism and the response to it can take 
centre stage in media and popular conversations about governmental policy 
regardless of the level of actual threat. We only have to think of the disproportionate 
amount of spending made on preventing and combating terrorism compared to the 
level of threat presented.   
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37 Ibid, p. 100.  
38 Ibid, p. 105. 
39 Ibid, p.102. 
40 Ibid, p. 104. 
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Evidence of this kind of approach can be seen in each of our examples.  We might 
understand the actions of successive Spanish governments and other branches of 
the state in this light.  The arrests after the first ETA attack which targeted a trainload 
of Falangist Civil War veterans, and the severe sentences imposed were clearly an 
attempt to send a political message to ETA and those who might support such action.  
As we saw, the message was one which was lost in translation with Basque 
nationalists and Spanish opponents of the Franco regime reading a rather different 
interpretation of the events.  Similarly, Carrero Blanco upon his appointment of Prime 
Minister continued the robust action of Franco against violent Basque nationalism, 
partially as a symbol to set the tone to the aperturismo faction in Franco’s support 
base, that there was to be no sea-change of approach.  The Burgos trial is 
emblematic of this type of ‘message sending’, and yet once again the message sent 
was interpreted rather differently by the regime’s opponents, both domestic and 
international, and as we saw added validity to ETA’s narrative and strengthened their 
legitimacy with the Basque population rather than disheartening them and reducing 
morale.  It should be noted however that such ‘message sending’ endeavours were 
not limited to the authoritarian regime.  The PSOE, who had been goaded by their 
right wing opponents took similar symbolic action with a raft of legislation which 
restricted human rights in 1983 and 1984 to silence their critics.  This posturing no 
doubt inflamed Basque nationalist sentiment and furthermore, made French 
authorities unwilling to cooperate on security matters arresting and extraditing ETA 
suspects in the French Basque country.  In attempting to show their commitment to 
countering terrorism through symbolic acts and extending counter-terrorism powers 
for the security forces, the PSOE government hamstrung efforts to achieve cross-
border security cooperation which hamstrung long-term efforts to bring ETA 
personnel to justice.  The governmental stance on counter-terrorism was a political 
football between the main Spanish parties for much of the conflict, with the 
bipartisanship that had been secured in the UK context so early in that conflict 
remaining elusive until 2000 with the  ‘Pact for Freedom and Against Terrorism’ and 
then short-lived as it strained under the weight of the controversial decision by the 
PSOE government in 2004 that negotiation with ETA might be necessary to bring a 
conclusive end to radical Basque violence. 
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As noted, the political parties in the United Kingdom were much more unified on the 
approach that should be taken towards terrorism emanating from the Northern 
Ireland conflict.  Bipartisanship on counter-terrorism efforts was achieved much 
earlier, but the UK had not the same troubled past of authoritarianism.  It should be 
noted too, that Northern Ireland’s geographical separation from Great Britain, as well 
as its political exceptionalism, (with none of the mainstream UK political parties 
achieving substantial shares of the votes in Northern Ireland) meant that despite 
significant conflict and trauma in Northern Ireland, terrorism there and the response 
to it never became a major political issue in mainstream British politics nor a focus of 
party politics.  Nevertheless, the adoption of particular strategies and approaches to 
the conflict for political reasons and symbolic ‘message sending’ was very much a 
feature of the response to the conflict in Northern Ireland.  The introduction in the mid 
1970s of the strategies of Ulsterisation, Criminalisation and Normalisation were 
clearly designed for pragmatic as well as symbolic reasons.  Putting heavily armed 
soldiers in fatigues into a support role rather than a lead role would decrease the 
appearance that order was being maintained solely by force, and would also give the 
republican paramilitaries fewer targets, though this was perhaps undermined by the 
increasingly muscular response of the RUC, as we have seen.  Thatcher’s 
didacticism over criminalisation when she came to power however was a force that 
turned the Prison War into a propaganda war over the legitimacy of armed resistance 
to British rule in Ireland, giving the republican prisoners the battle of ideas that they 
so desperately needed at that time.  Her polemic statements regarding terrorism as 
nothing more than crime, looked disingenuous when juxtaposed with the plethora of 
special legislation and extraordinary measures at the disposal of the security forces 
to deal with terrorism.  While privately, the Thatcher government may have been 
more pragmatic in searching for compromise behind the scenes, her public position 
on the hunger strikes and special category status and its portrayal by nationalist and 
republican politicians helped to stoke the fires of the conflict that were to burn for 
another decade and a half. 
 
The rapidity of the breakdown of order in Algeria and the intensity of the conflict, with 
both the FLN and the OAS reeking havoc in Algeria and metropolitan France meant 
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that there was not the same scope for the state leaders to use counter-terrorism 
against the OAS as a tool for political gain or to make symbolic points as there was in 
our other instances.  Having said that, de Gaulle’s management of the Algerian crisis 
shows how deeply aware he was of the political and symbolic importance of the 
Algerian conflict and the need to tread carefully to avoid a full scale military revolt 
which would have ousted him from power. His language on the future of French 
Algeria showed an eagerness to bridge the gap between sentiment in Algeria and the 
military, and sentiment in France, gently suggesting that the nature of the relationship 
between Algiers and Paris might change rather than announcing radical departures in 
policy which would have grated with the conventional position of the French state that 
the Mediterranean ran through France as the Seine ran through Paris. 
 
Conclusion 
 
What are the implications of understanding state response to terrorism as the 
combination of a multitude of shaping forces and characteristics, each of which 
derived from the peopled nature of the state?  
 
For academics 
 
If we as academics accept that the state is not a unitary actor, then we must logically 
accept that there is no single set of state aims and objectives.  In terms of countering 
terrorism (or indeed, any other form of state action) thus, we must take a nuanced 
view of the state as the sum of its parts.  An academic focus on the aims and 
objectives of leaders of the state, that is the government, can be useful and 
enlightening, but only where scholars attempt to understand the multitudes of forces 
working within the state that the government has had to manage in order to achieve 
its aims and objectives or further its agenda.  Explanations of any particular approach 
or policy set with regards to its effectiveness cannot be isolated from the context of 
both the character of the particular organisations which constitute the state, the 
relationship between these organs and how the state leaders have attempted to 
manage these factors to achieve their stated goals.  Furthermore, in considering the 
state at all, academics must understand the wider context.  Given that state 
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personnel have complex identities which are shaped by their experiences and 
position within society, and that these state personnel and their identities shape the 
state itself, we must consider the relationship between the state and the wider 
population. Studying terrorism, the individuals or groups who use it, or particular 
campaigns of terrorism, we must similarly take a nuanced approach.  We cannot 
hope to understand why terrorists take the particular ideological view of the world and 
their situation that they have, or resort to the type of violent means that they use in 
order to achieve their ends unless we understand the nature and character of the 
state, both historical and contemporary.  This might seem a rather obvious point, 
particularly given the parallel emergence and development of terrorism and the 
modern state, and yet it is striking that the literature which attempts to explain and 
understand terrorist organisations so often fails to pay attention to the development 
and history of the state. 
 
‘History has proved a very bad predictor of future events’, Richard Evans asserts.41    
Yet paying attention to the historical development of states and the challenges they 
have faced in the form of civil disobedience and political violence, can help to explain 
why states respond in the way that they do.  And so, while history lacks a predictive 
ability, it can serve to explain elements of the present features, nature and character 
of states, demystifying some aspects of state response to terrorism.  Similarly, 
learning how states have responded to challenges to either their legitimacy or their 
monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force in the past might help us 
understand and account for their actions when faced with incidents and campaigns of 
terrorism.  Furthermore, through understanding how a state developed over time in 
terms of territory and control, we might come to better understand the attitude of the 
state and particular state apparatus towards those who might attempt to undermine 
the territorial integrity of the state through terrorism.  Despite the disparity between 
our three case studies, there is evidence to suggest that a look into the often 
turbulent histories of the state can shed light on the approach taken by the state to 
terrorism.  In each of our case studies, we saw how important the colonial and 
decolonisation experience was in shaping how the state sees itself, how particular 
state organisations develop their organisational culture, and in setting norms and 
                                                 
41 R.J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta Books, 1997), p.59. 
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operating procedures for responding to political violence which at times were ill suited 
to the type of the conflict they were translated to. Given the stated importance of 
understanding the terrorist motivation in tandem with the objectives of the state, and 
how they relate, we see that history becomes important.  It is only from a reading of 
the history of states and their populations that we can come to understand the 
grievances that terrorists have in the present day, and at times, how the state itself in 
its actions and characteristics in the past have acted to catalyse the outgrowth of 
particular ideologies which terrorists subscribe to.  
 
For the state 
 
More practically, there are implications of this analysis for the state itself.  It is 
obvious from the cases that we have looked at often state leaders are not entirely 
oblivious to the nature and character of the state.  Given that in each of our cases, 
there were attempts made to reform particular organisations to make them more 
efficient or more obedient, it appears that state leaders have recognised the flaws of 
the state which stem from particular state organisations.  The problem, however, is 
that often these reforms were made in the aftermath of particular crises, when the 
characteristics of state organisations and their engagement in the conflict had 
already taken their toll on counter-terrorism, sometimes catalysing the violence as 
opposed to quelling it.  It stands to sense that states must pay close attention to the 
character of state organisations and the coordination and competition between them, 
so as to ensure more effective and harmonious cooperation between units and to 
have allow them to make more informed decisions about the types of policy to be 
pursued to counter terrorism and the most able and suitable units to do so.   
 
Furthermore, state leaders in attempting to protect the legitimacy of the state need to 
understand the consequences of the discourses they use to describe those who 
engage in terrorism.  Terrorism is above all, concerned with propaganda, political 
messages and the creation of sentiments of fear, anger, and alienation.  In 
countering terrorism, the state must ensure that the message they send to the 
population at large does not feed into existing discourses used by terrorists and those 
who support them to alienate people from the state.  By showing that the state 
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leaders have a nuanced understanding of the terrorists, their ideologies and their 
goals, states stand a much smaller risk of alienating a wider population than if they 
engage in total condemnation, the caricaturing of terrorists as purely evil or purely 
criminal.  Furthermore, avoiding these absolutist and crude portrayals of those who 
disagree fundamentally with the state, and who might use or support the use of 
violence against the state, we can hope that state personnel in discharging their 
duties to the state will act less out of the raw emotion of hatred, anger or fear, and 
rely more on training, their duty to the state and the aims and objectives of their 
particular state organisations.  Additionally, in attempts to reform the state, policy 
changes or senior personnel changes can be useful in attempting to make various 
arms of the state more obedient and more effective in countering terrorism, but states 
need to understand that organisational culture is something less tangible and more 
diffuse, and that greater more fundamental reform of organisations is required to shift 
these cultures, which are often resilient to change, developing organically over a 
period of years or even generations. The emotional response is often a reflex one, 
and the state as a human community will always be liable to make very human 
mistakes, but framing the conflict between the state and terrorists as one of good 
versus evil is something that will evoke strong emotional reaction from both terrorists 
and state personnel alike, and is best avoided.  
 
For terrorist groups 
 
Understanding the state in such a way as has been set out in this chapter pinpoints 
some ways in which terrorists misunderstand or misrepresent the state.  Firstly, as 
the state is not unitary, but rather a collection of peopled organisations with 
contrasting and competing interests, subject to the emotional responses of 
individuals and group personnel, state leaders cannot be omniscient or omnipotent.  
Terrorists too engage in caricaturing, sometimes out of firmly and honestly held 
opinion about the state, and sometimes out of the desire to misrepresent state action 
for their own gain.  State leaders however do not have the ability to direct every 
action of state personnel and state organs.  Each individual member of the state 
apparatus will act individually, either in service of the state, to serve their own ends, 
or in some combination of the two.  The idea that state leaders could grant the kinds 
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of concessions that terrorists fight for is frequently misguided.  We have seen in each 
of our cases how the state leaders had to tread a careful path to ensure that various 
state organs or factions within them were not upset by the direction which the state 
leaders hoped to move in their approach to terrorism.  Furthermore, in each of our 
cases, we see that campaigns of terrorist violence can spawn opponents in the 
shape of ‘pro-state’ terrorist or ‘counter-terrorist’ organisations, as they are 
sometimes known.  These groups seek to either take the fight directly to the terrorists 
or to influence the decision making of the state in the opposite direction to those of 
the ‘terrorists’.    As such, even if the state were unitary and all organs of the state 
perfectly obedient to the whim of the state leaders, conflicts with terrorists are rarely a 
two sided affair, but rather, a situation exists in which the state must again carefully 
pick their way through a conflict, hoping to address the terrorist organisation without 
risking the ire of these ‘pro-state’ terrorist organisations.  Additionally, terrorists often 
seem to misunderstand that state personnel have complex identities and that while 
they work for the state, they are often members of particular communities with 
particular political and religious views.  Thus the targeting of state personnel by 
terrorist organisations, which is designed to strike at the state apparatus and 
demonstrate dissatisfaction or disapproval of particular policies or actions of the 
state, or at times, with the state as a whole, come to be interpreted as attacks by 
radicals of one community upon entire communities as a whole. 
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Chapter Five - Conclusion 
 
This thesis has highlighted facets of the response to terrorism that are often 
overlooked.  Terrorists may not be particular effective when it comes to achieving 
their primary political goals.  They are however, extremely effective in grabbing our 
attention and making themselves the subject of state, media, and academic analysis 
in political conflicts. 
 
Richard English in Terrorism: How to Respond, in which he highlights seven key 
points which state leaders must bear in mind when responding to terrorism, stresses 
first and foremost the importance of ‘learning to live with terrorism’.  He adumbrates 
that particular campaigns of terrorism will come to an end, but that terrorism itself is 
‘too tempting a form of warfare to be likely to dissolve’.1  While the state is not static 
but continually emerging and changing given its peopled nature and the ebb and flow 
of state duties and responsibilities, states, for the most part are more resilient and 
durable than the terrorist groups that seek to coerce them.    
 
Despite the surge of interest on the topic of terrorism and counter-terrorism, works 
which have examined meaningfully the concept of the state as well as the inner 
workings of states who seek to respond to sub-state terrorism are largely missing 
from the literature. Furthermore, the focus work on terrorism in recent years has 
tended to be unidirectional and focused overwhelmingly on those using terrorism, 
addressing themes such as radicalisation, ideology, terrorist tactics and strategy, and 
financing.  Although there has been a substantial contribution to the field in terms of 
works which address counter-terrorism, there is seldom a reflection on the nature and 
character of the state which seeks to counter terrorism, and on the particular 
instruments which are tasked with counter-terrorist responsibility.  In short the focus 
is overwhelmingly on ‘policy’.  Furthermore, even in the accounts of particular armed 
conflicts, there has been a systematic failure to turn the spotlight on the state itself 
and to examine its role (or as we have seen, it is perhaps more accurate to say 
                                                 
1 R. English, Terrorism: How to Respond, p. 120. 
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‘roles‘), in particular conflicts.  This failure may be in part due to the predisposition of 
academics to see terrorism (amongst other phenomena) as a problem to be solved.  
It may be the case to a degree that states funding research on terrorism have to a 
degree set the agenda either explicitly or implicitly.  However, given that terrorism’s 
raison d’etre as a tactic and sub-species of warfare is to shock, to terrify and to 
attract attention to a particular cause, the most obvious explanation for the omission 
is the one most often overlooked. Academics are not immune to the shock, horror 
and anger that terrorism generates.  Terrorism is designed to compel the direct and 
indirect audiences to consider the political meaning of the perpetrators’ actions, and 
so that terrorists themselves have attracted the lion’s share of academic attention 
when considering terrorism is hardly surprising.  However, as we have seen, to 
understand why political conflicts occur and their trajectories, we must study the state 
as well as the sub-state actors, and have a strong appreciation of the context in 
which these conflicts develop.  This thesis has attempted to address this malady, and 
reintroduce the concept and study of the state back into considerations of political 
violence and terrorism.  I have posited that in order to fully understand the trajectory 
of terrorist campaigns and the success or failure of campaigns of counter-terrorism, 
such a close reading of both the contemporary character, but also the historical 
development of the state is of paramount importance.   
 
However, the future of counter-terrorism is not all bleak.  While state elites will never 
be able to control the actions of each individual operative in every circumstance, 
creating an awareness and understanding of the nature of state organisations  
 
I have presented a theory of the concept of the state which hinges on viewing the 
state primarily as a ‘peopled’ organisation.2  While many more orthodox conceptions 
of the state accept the obvious point that the state is a ‘human community’3, they 
often play down the role that the individual identities and action of state personnel 
can have in shaping the state, as well as state action and its outcomes.  In order to 
highlight the importance of understanding state action in conflicts with sub-state 
terrorism as the product of the ‘peopled’ state, and what this means, I have analysed 
three campaigns of terrorism and state response.  The analyses of these case 
                                                 
2 R. Jones, People/States/Territories, p.44. 
3 M. Weber, From Max Weber, p. 78. 
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studies, of the Spanish, French and United Kingdom states have been presented, 
placing the state in historical context to explain its facets and particular 
characteristics.  It was not my intention to present comprehensive historical 
narratives of these three intricate and complex conflicts, but rather to highlight the 
interaction of the sub-state terrorist organisations and the state, and to demonstrate 
how the state action and its outcomes should be viewed as the product of the 
‘peopled’ nature of the state.   Fundamentally, in each of our examples, we have 
seen how, even before the outbreak of the particular violent campaigns of terrorism, 
the nature and character of the state served to exacerbate existing cleavages in 
society, and to at least in part, lend credence to the arguments that the respective 
terrorist organisations made for their justification of political violence. 
 
Chapter One focused on the historical development of the Spanish state, the rise of 
Basque nationalism, and the engagement between the Spanish state and Basque 
separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). We traced the development of the 
Spanish state from multiple sites of power loosely aligned with Madrid under the foral 
system, to the more centralised and familiar modern state at the beginning of the 
twentieth century.  Furthermore, we saw how the removal of the foral system and 
regional rights played into the Carlist Wars of the 19th century and served to foment 
grievances against the centralisation of Spain and the vesting of power in Madrid.4  
The twentieth century’s continued turbulence with the loss of empire, coups and 
military juntas, and the position of prestige for the Guardia Civil who were frequently 
relied on by business owners and industrialists to quell civil disobedience during 
labour disputes all contributed to the state’s particularities.  Given the fascist rhetoric 
of Franco, and the desire for a strongly centralised Castilian dominated Spain, the 
Basques suffered more than most.  Under Franco’s dictatorship, the already 
staunchly (Spanish) nationalist security forces were encouraged to view Spain as 
under attack from those who sought to subvert the state by expressing identities 
which derogated from the Francoist vision.5  As such, the harsh repression of Basque 
national identity fostered grievances and alienation from the Madrid based regime. It 
was the muscular way in which dissent was quietened in the Basque country, as well 
as the prohibition on cultural expressions of Basque identity that saw the resurgence 
                                                 
4 D. Conversi, The Basques, The Catalans, and Spain, p. 47. 
5 P. Preston, The Politics of Revenge, p. 42 
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of a more radical form of Basque nationalism amongst Basque youths who were 
frustrated with the stagnant moderate nationalism of the PNV.  After the emergence 
of ETA and their initial violent actions against symbolic targets of the Francoist 
regime, the knee-jerk arrests and overzealous action by the security forces served to 
reinforce the radical Basque interpretation of the state of the Basque position and the 
need for a campaign of violence to emancipate themselves from Spanish domination.  
In the attempt to forcefully reassert Spanish identity and to repress violent 
expressions of Basque nationalism, the state under Franco only served to worsen 
their position.  The discourses and actions of the state played into the hands of ETA 
and made condemnation of violence by more moderate forces within the broad 
nationalist movement politically difficult in such an atmosphere.  Under Franco, the 
response of the state to ETA violence was predictably violent, repressive, and 
vengeful.  There seemed to be little in the way of a coherent strategy, but rather the 
counter-terrorism efforts were reactionary, with wide scale arrests, frequent 
mistreatment of prisoners in detention, and derogations from the established rule of 
law occurring in the aftermath of ETA attacks.  Given the overall character of 
Franco’s Spain, this is perhaps unsurprising.  What is more surprising however, is the 
shape that Spain’s counter-terrorism efforts took in the years after Franco. 
 
After the death of Franco the Spanish state was plagued with infighting and a number 
of countervailing forces, not just on issues of counter-terrorism but over the direction 
and outlook of the state in more general terms.  This turbulence and disagreement 
threatened to hamper the democratic process on more than one occasion, and 
conservative and reactionary elites in the coercive arms of the state tried desperately 
to resist the modernisation and preserve the authoritarian character of the state.  The 
disunity of the state and its split personality was apparent in the immediate post-
Franco era response to terrorism.  The conciliatory gestures from King Juan Carlos 
and the first democratic governments were enough to convince some ETA operatives 
and supporters that they had served their purpose and need not maintain a campaign 
of violence, but for others the struggle continued. The reflex response of the 
government and security forces to some ETA attacks and the shadowy figure of 
death squads in the form of the BVE and later the GAL, born out of the frustration 
that ETA’s French safe havens were beyond the reach of the security forces acting 
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within the remit of the law, continued to serve as propaganda for radical Basque 
nationalists, making a transition to solely peaceful pursuit of their aims a bitter pill to 
swallow.  Eventually, successive rounds of constitutional measures introduced by 
Spain’s democratic governments served to strengthen support for those Basque 
nationalists who attempted to achieve their goals through democratic means alone.  
The greater stability of democracy in Spain contributed to the agreement of the 
French government to cooperate in extradition of ETA suspects from France, which 
thus was no longer a safe haven for ETA.  ETA contributed to their own demise by 
continuing attacks which increasingly perturbed the civilian population, Spanish and 
Basque alike. 
 
Chapter Two looked at the campaign of violence waged by the OAS in Algeria and 
France during the final years before Algerian independence and the efforts of the 
French state to quell their violence.  We saw how the disunity of the state was not 
just a factor affecting counter-terrorism in the French Algerian context but rather was 
key in the birth of the OAS and their campaign of terrorism.  For although the OAS 
embodied the disaffection and anger of some pied noirs at the French government 
over their handling of the Algerian crisis, the organisation was created and largely 
staffed by rebellious military and former military personnel.  The military had been left 
fragmented after the Second World War, and was at risk of being fractured entirely by 
the competing world views of progressives and traditionalists, Petainist and Gaullists, 
and of the colonial army and metropolitan army. 6 For those OAS members who had 
been former military personnel, the attitude towards the defence of French colonies 
had been central to the idea of identity as French and as soldiers, fighting in 
Indochina and in Algeria.  Furthermore, the dispute in Algeria was emblematic of 
these opposing world views.  The rhetoric over generations about the indivisibility of 
French and the integral position of Algeria within the French nation made the idea 
that the French government would eventually grant Algeria its independence 
unthinkable.  That these personnel had spent most of their time either in Algeria 
where pro-Algerie francaise sentiment was understandably stronger than in the 
metropole, or in fighting colonial campaigns of counter-insurgency meant that they 
                                                 
6 D. Porch, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013), p. 153. 
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had little appreciation of the contemporary view of the Algerian crises through 
metropolitan French eyes. 
 
That so many of the troops stationed in Algeria were sympathetic to the plight of the 
OAS made countering them effectively a difficult job.  Many units of the military could 
not be relied on and those who were more reliable, and when reinforcements from 
more loyal and reliable units from metropolitan France were drafted, they 
experienced some of the same problems as the British Army in Northern Ireland.  
They found themselves in part of their country that they were unfamiliar with entirely, 
in terms of both the terrain that they were expected to work in, and the political 
maelstrom in which they were expected to operate.  As such, even these recruits 
struggled to effectively combat the OAS.  De Gaulle was instrumental in limiting the 
effectiveness of the OAS in other ways.  His decision to transfer key activist military 
officers back to metropolitan France after he rose to power, and his disbandment of 
key activist regiments after the attempted Generals’ Putsch did not bring an end to 
OAS violence, but it substantially hindered their ability to wreak havoc in Algeria and 
France.  The barbouze death squads were a product of the increasing frustration at 
the inability to quell OAS violence, but they too were ineffective and widened the 
distrust between the pied noirs and the French government.  The intelligence led 
approach to apprehending and arresting OAS suspects proved to be the most 
successful tool in suppressing their violence, but the campaign of the OAS had 
already taken its toll on de Gaulle and shaped the French government’s desire to 
drive a hard bargain with the Algerian nationalists.  As such, they eventually settled 
for much less than their original aims at the Evian talks,7 and subsequently the FLN 
reneged on the agreement to secure the rights of the pied noirs in Algeria. 
 
Chapter Three dealt with the United Kingdom state’s engagement in the Northern 
Ireland conflict.  The historical development of the UK state followed a substantially 
different trajectory to that of Spain, being largely marked by its internal stability, aside 
from the Irish question which had at various junctures caused concern for the British 
political elite and infrequent bloody episodes.  What Spain and the UK shared, 
however was a history of empire and wars of decolonisation, which had informed the 
                                                 
7 J. Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 291. 
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conventional wisdom, standard operating practices and culture of their respective 
militaries, though in very different ways.  As such, when the British Army arrived in 
Northern Ireland in aid of the civil authority, they arrived with their skill set, and 
experience which had been honed in very different environments and were not well 
suited to the task at hand. 8  The counter-terrorism efforts in Northern Ireland were 
characterised by a similarly ad-hoc response during the initial engagement, and the 
Northern Ireland government was eventually suspended when it became clear that 
the political establishment had lost its stability and its ability to deal sensitively and 
dispassionately with the rising levels of conflict.  The character of the military 
engagement in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s gave the IRA and other 
republicans the propaganda they needed to portray themselves as a liberation 
movement against the colonial occupying forces.  The UK government learned slowly 
how to counter this, with the policies of Ulsterisation, criminalisation and 
normalisation of the mid 1970s, coupled with the attempts at political settlement in 
1973 which were scuppered by unionist opposition and campaigns of civil 
disobedience from loyalist workers and paramilitaries.  While at the level of 
government elites, the UK state might have had the right idea about how to go about 
solving the Northern Ireland conflict from at least the mid 1970s, their strategy was 
made inefficient and ineffective by the series of scandals and knee-jerk reactions 
which occurred throughout the 1970s and 1980s.  The desire to normalise Northern 
Ireland was countervailed by an increasingly militaristic police force who took on a 
more robust policing strategy which continued to carry out controversial counter-
terrorist operations throughout the 1970s and 1980s and a small number of high 
profile actions by the British army continued to play into the hands of republicans in 
portraying the UK state as having double standards and being duplicitous in their 
approach to law and order.  Furthermore, Thatcher’s strident unionism, and her 
approach to the Northern Ireland conflict was tempered by how she has been 
personally affected by the conflict, with the loss of close personal friends and political 
allies in IRA attacks, and the attempt on her life, coupled with her desire to present 
her government as unwilling to bend to terrorism made achieving political cooperation 
with the Republic of Ireland and the securing of a political settlement all the more 
difficult.   
                                                 
8 Douglas Porch describes the early 1970s for the British army as the ‘least successful phase of the 
thirty-year campaign’.  D. Porch, Counterinsurgency, p. 268. 
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As with ETA, as the IRA’s fortunes waned and they struggled to conduct high profile 
attacks to show their continued military ability, they made some strategic mistakes 
which soured their relationship with the nationalist community.  Behind the scenes 
talks between the republican movement and the British government continued and 
despite the bombing of targets in Great Britain, the urge to respond with punitive 
punishments or vastly increased security powers was resisted in the 1990s, allowing 
for the peace talks which eventually led to the Good Friday Agreement.    Crucially, 
the UK state efforts to consolidate peace did not only entail the constitutional 
settlement.  Conciliatory measures were introduced in the shape of prisoner releases, 
and police reform which went a long way to helping those parties on the political 
extremes to placate their hardliners.  While the RUC had been reformed at various 
junctures during the conflict, it was the transition from RUC to PSNI in the new 
atmosphere of relative peace and stability that was instrumental in improving the 
image of the UK state in Northern Ireland.  50/50 recruitment procedures, root and 
branch restructuring of the police, and a newly appointed chief constable from 
outside Northern Ireland ensured that the organisational culture of the old RUC faded 
away and were replaced with a more professional and politically neutral police 
service. 
 
The case studies I selected for investigation are not carbon copies of each other.  
There are substantial differences in the history and character of the three states in 
question.  The United Kingdom state for example can be characterised by its stability, 
in contradistinction to the much more turbulent pasts of France and particularly, 
Spain. Furthermore, the states differ greatly internally.  The relationship between the 
executive branch of the state and the coercive arms of the state differs between our 
cases and the disparate histories of the states has meant that these relationship 
have been more or less strained, better or worse funded and resourced. Crucially, 
the relationship in each of our cases between the central seat of government and the 
region in which the conflict was concentrated has varied, all of which are factors 
which will in themselves continue to shape the state in particular ways.  Furthermore, 
the terrorist organisations and political climate into which they emerged and operated 
differ vastly from case to case.  As such, the variance in the level of violence, the 
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nature of threat and the wider political atmosphere in each of our cases necessitated 
a very different kind of state response.  And thus the way in which the UK, Spanish 
and French states attempted to deal with sub-state terrorism was at times vastly 
different.  Although this kind of close case study analysis has illuminated the great 
differences between each of case studies, we see that there are elements present in 
each of the cases which give them something of a family resemblance.  All three 
case studies examine what might broadly be called ethno-nationalist campaigns of 
political violence, in that the principal sub-state protagonists in each of the conflicts 
were agitating for ethno-nationalist aims rather than for overtly religious, or 
ideological purposes, although there are elements of religious and ideological 
justification to each conflict. Indeed, in each of our case studies, it could be said that 
we see examples of the partial failure of state building, and the inability of state elites 
to establish a hegemonic ideology in the regions where the conflicts are centred.  
Additionally, the cases we have examined have all been drawn from the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries, and each of the states in question are all western European 
based states which have undergone (or were undergoing at the time) processes of 
decolonisation.  It stands to sense thus, that the character of these states will 
perhaps resemble each other more closely than if we were to take case studies from 
different periods in history, campaigns of terrorism fought for vastly different ends, or 
states which are based culturally, socially and geographically in very different parts of 
the world.  
 
However, that states however different, are ‘peopled’ is something which applies 
across time and space.  As such, the conclusions reached in Chapter Four which 
highlights some of the factors which have driven and shaped the individual 
responses of the states we analysed, will also be factors determining the response of 
any state faced with sub-state terrorism.  As I set out in the introduction, and 
demonstrated through the case studies, no two states will have the same internal 
dynamics, and so the factors outlined in Chapter Four will affect state response to 
terrorism in different ways and to varying degrees.  However, in any case, a close 
analysis of the nature and character of a state, its history and development and 
attention to the factors I set out will help us to understand why states respond in 
particular ways.   
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I highlighted the emotional impetus for particular types of response to terrorism; how 
terrorism, designed to evoke certain emotions amongst its direct and indirect targets 
naturally affect state personnel. Given that state personnel, especially those in the 
coercive arms of the state tasked with the kinetic responses to sub-state violence, 
are so frequently the direct target of terrorist violence, this is no surprise.   
Additionally, attacks on members of an individual’s ‘community’ can have a strong 
emotional resonance.  This community can be the ethnic, linguistic, religious, 
political, geographical or a familial group, but of course can also extend to work 
colleagues, or indeed any other type of community which the individual perceives 
themselves to be a member of.  As such, we might understand how frustration, 
anger, fear, or the desire for revenge might become a factor in determining how each 
member of state personnel with counter-terrorist responsibility might act.  In this way, 
we see how important it is to consider the emotional impetus for responses to 
terrorism. 
 
Secondly, I identified the role that the character of state organisations can have in 
shaping the response to terrorism, and the need for state leaders to have an 
awareness of this to ensure effective and proportionate response.  It is easy to 
understand given the historical engagements, strong unit culture, and standard 
operating procedures often found in the coercive arms of the state how they can 
represent a rather blunt instrument to dealing with terrorism.  While in particular 
instances, the availability of professionally trained armed units of soldiers or police 
might be necessary for quelling the most astringent political violence, the 
predisposition to use force more suitable for warfare can stoke anti-state sentiment 
and lead to an escalation of the conflict which seldom produces a positive outcome in 
terms of healing community divisions, or strengthening the perceived legitimacy of 
the state.  Furthermore, we saw how the tendency for armies and police forces to be 
drawn disproportionately from particular sectors of the wider population, especially in 
divided societies can increase tension and add to the perception of injustice, 
inequality and unfair treatment.  Thus, care should be taken by states to ensure that 
the state, particularly the coercive arms of the state, are drawn from across society, 
remain apolitical, and are trained specifically in dealing with low level terrorist 
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campaigns, rather than simply attempting to adapt tactics and strategies more 
suitable for conventional wars or highly volatile insurgencies. 
 
Thirdly, I highlighted how the division of labour necessitated by the delegation of 
power by the state to its subsidiary organisations has created problems of intra-state 
cooperation and competition, and the effect that this has on counter-terrorism.  The 
rigidity of behemoth organisations means that they are often slow to adapt to 
developing situations.     Frequently, when a new terrorist campaign emerges, the 
state is caught off guard.  Thus, the creation of new channels for communication and 
cooperation between disparate organisations, often with vastly different structures, 
standard operating procedures and cultures can be a difficult task. We saw how 
often, despite the organisations all being under the umbrella of the state, they have 
their own discrete set of interests, aims and objectives, which are often mutually 
clashing and competing.  Thus, while the state may have an extensively developed 
apparatus at its disposal for countering terrorism, the implementation of counter-
terrorism action can often be frustrated because of bureaucracy and intra-state 
politics. 
 
Finally, I highlighted how the counter-terrorism strategy of the state can be as much a 
political tool as it is an effective tool for bringing political violence to an end.  The 
highly emotive and shocking nature of terrorism means that it often occupies a 
central position in political discussions and debates whatever its relative importance.  
As such, the continuity of a particular strategy to dealing with terrorism, or indeed the 
implementation of a new counter-terrorism strategy can frequently be with other aims 
and objectives in mind than solely the reduction of violence and the maintenance of 
order. I illustrated how the adoption of certain approach to terrorism can be designed 
to send unambiguous messages to opponents from rival political parties or factions, 
to silence one’s critics, for electoral gain, or indeed to help build international 
alliances, or strengthen relations with other states.  This assertion further underlines 
the importance of understanding terrorism and counter-terrorism as political acts 
situated within the wider context of historical and political development of intra-state 
and inter-state politics. 
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We as academics should be rightly suspicious of those who present universal 
theories which purport to explain manifestations of a particular phenomenon, 
whatever its geographical, political or historical context.  In this thesis, I have 
demonstrated precisely the importance of taking into consideration just those 
contexts and the difference that this will necessarily have on our understanding of the 
motivations and the outcomes of responses to terrorism.  We have seen how only 
through paying attention to the idiosyncrasies of each situation and studying closely 
both the development of the state and the movement or milieu from which the sub-
state terrorist organisation emerges, can we fully understand the engagement of both 
state and sub-state actors and the trajectory of the conflict.  Despite the variances 
between individual states, which of course are essential to understandings of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism, the factors affecting the response to terrorism 
emanate from the peopled nature of the state, and thus, can be applied to all states 
faced with terrorism perpetrated by sub-state actors.  In every case of counter-
terrorism, we must strive to understand the effect that emotional responses, the 
character of state organisations tasked with responding, problems of cooperation and 
intra-state competition, and political motivations have in tempering responses, if we 
are to properly understand and explain counter-terrorism and violent conflicts more 
generally.   
 
Future research on terrorism and counter-terrorism should consider the complexities 
of the state that have been dissected in this thesis.  While the study of terrorism is 
riven with difficulties and problematic trends have developed in the past, the story is 
not all bleak.  Some scholarly works of serious value have been produced, which 
take into consideration some of the key concerns raised in this thesis.  It is 
encouraging, for example to see a body of work emerge which stresses the 
importance of effective intelligence.9 States too have realised the value of intelligence 
led approaches to terrorism.  However, the recent scandals caused by the surfacing 
                                                 
9 see for example, L. Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the 
Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), pp. 208-15, R. English, Terrorism: How to Respond 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 131-3 , C. Kaunert, and S, Léonard, (eds). European 
Security, Terrorism and Intelligence: Tackling New Security Challenges in Europe (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), F. Gregory, ‘An Assessment of the Contribution of Intelligence-led 
Counter-terrorism to UK Homeland Security Post-9/11 Within the ‘Contest’ Strategy’, in, P. Wilkinson, 
(ed) Homeland Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since 9/11 (London: 
Routledge, 2007), D. Omand, Securing the State (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), particularly 
chapters 2 and 8. 
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of documents leaked by NSA operative Edward Snowden have highlighted how this 
too can become a blunt instrument when misused, making it difficult to isolate useful 
intelligence from the noise associated with wide scale surveillance, eroding civil 
liberties, and damaging trust in the state. 
 
The need for a synchronised approach to counter-terrorism has been made all the 
more pertinent since 9/11 and the efforts of states to create and foster counter-
terrorism and security cooperation across national borders.  While the state remains 
the primary actor in defending populations against terrorism, supra-national counter-
terrorism efforts bring with them extra levels of bureaucracy and organisations which 
need to be coordinated, diverse organisational practices and cultures, and the 
variegated priorities of nation states. Some of the problems of state response to 
terrorism highlighted in this thesis have been identified already by those scholars 
investigating supra-national counter-terrorism efforts.  Javier Argomaniz, analysing 
EU counter-terrorism efforts post-9/11, raises a number of issues. Firstly, cooperation 
rises and falls on the agenda depending on the length of time since the last major 
attack, moving to the top of political agendas in the aftermath of particular atrocities, 
and falling down the list of priorities in periods of relative peace and stability. 10  
Secondly, states have found themselves torn in two directions, desiring the security 
benefit that closer cooperation and harmonisation on counter-terrorism would bring to 
all EU member states, but showing a reluctance to cede power to European 
institutions;11 again an example of how the multitude of preferences and political 
considerations of the executive branch of the state affect the course of counter-
terrorism endeavours. Wyn Rees points out in terms of transatlantic cooperation, that 
multilateral cooperation on internal security is increasing, that external security 
cooperation with the EU has remained difficult as a result of the differing agendas of 
the EU member states and the USA.12  Additionally, he highlights the continued ad 
hoc arrangements with regards to transatlantic intelligence sharing, owing to 
suspicion of other states and of institutional intransigence from the US security 
                                                 
10 J. Argomaniz, The EU and Counter-Terrorism: Politics, Polity and Policies After 9/11 (London: 
Routledge, 2011), pp. 20-9. 
11 Ibid, p. 34. 
12 W. Rees, Transatlantic-Counter Terrorism Cooperation: The New Imperative (London: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 105-6.  
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organisations.13  Importantly, as Amy Zegart has highlighted, the tendency when 
discussing action by states in the international domain, is to adopt realist approaches 
which ignore domestic factors, treating states as unitary actors.14 While those 
adopting Bureaucratic Politics or New Institutionalist models of thinking may be 
inclined to dig deeper, into the ‘black box of the state’15, considerations which look 
only at the institutions in question, rather than the people who compose these 
organisations, the informal cultures and potential for visceral responses by state 
personnel (acting either within or out-with their remit) will continue to miss important 
detail which can illuminate the complexity of responses to terrorism.  As the 
apparatus for defending against terrorism becomes larger and more diffuse, it may 
become more difficult for states and academics alike to identify the hand of individual 
actors, be they state elites or low-level state operatives and its effect on counter-
terrorism.  Obviously, the coordination across borders on issues of counter-terrorism 
can represent a positive development resulting in an increase in peace and security 
for populations across the globe.  There is the risk however that states and 
academics alike will come to view these matters in a depersonalised way, seeing 
only rational institutions and policies and failing to acknowledge the individual actors 
and their agency which have had such an impact on the course of the conflicts 
presented here. 
 
Countering terrorism is a difficult job.  The successes, in terms of security policies 
acting as effective deterrents to those who might otherwise seek to pursue their 
political aims violently is impossible to measure.  Similarly, in the chaos of prolonged 
violence with numerous actors operating in complicated political and social 
atmospheres, it can be difficult to disaggregate the effectiveness of particular state 
organs, of policy shifts, of actions, and of words so as to understand what works and 
what does not.  We hear in the media only of the failures, when states fail to prevent 
attacks, or when their actions in the course of counter-terrorism infringe on civil 
liberties. These issues must of course be taken seriously, and the attention received 
and outrage generated when state personnel err is usually justified. It provides 
additional incentives for states to strive to find the balance between liberty and 
                                                 
13 Ibid, p. 90-1. 
14 A.B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999), p. 4. 
15 Ibid, p. 20. 
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security.  It is doubtless that mistakes will be made in the future course of counter-
terrorism efforts.  States are after all ‘peopled’ and people are imperfect.  And indeed, 
as discussed earlier, particular campaigns of terrorism might end, but terrorism as a 
tactic seems unlikely to disappear in the future, but there is reason to be optimistic.  
History provides no indicator of the future.  Analysis of history, both our own and of 
others, helps us to identify the mistakes of the past.  It is my hope that this thesis 
might in some way contribute to an awareness of the historical difficulties of state 
counter-terrorism policies, so as to inform debate and discussion concerning the road 
ahead. 
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